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PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No. 4, Jul-Aug 1983

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Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 220-222

[Article summaries in English]

[Text] SOVIET UNION AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ARMS RACE IN ASIA

N. A. Gnevushev

Today, Asia is the largest hot-bed of constant political and military tension. Imperialism is in the first instance to blame for this state of affairs. Many Asian states are increasing their military build-ups, argmenting the import of up-to-date military technology and establishing war industry of their own. The military budgets are bulging, the armies are growing. The fact that in the developing countries the annual rate of military spendings exceeds by far that of the industrial states is a matter of concern.

The escalating military build-ups side-track financial resources and qualified personnel which are so scarce in the developing world. The militarization has an adverse effect on the process of social reproduction and distorts social and economic mechanisms, which are far from being perfect apart from this.

The only reasonable alternative to the unproductive spending and political rope-walking "on the verge of war" is to bridle the arms race. A cut in and an eventual abandoning of military spendings both world-wide and in certain parts of the globe would play a crucial role in deepening the relaxation of international tension, in resolving the most acute social and economic problems of today.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are actively coming out for bridling the arms race and diminishing the arms supply to the third countries. At the same time, the US policy of suppression of the national-liberation movement is countered by the USSR mobilizing broad support of the peoples fighting for independence.

In the present-day context, characterized by the deteriorated international situation, the Soviet Union consistently advocates peace and disarmament all over the world.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND PROBLEMS OF THEIR TRANSFORMATION

V. L. Sheinis, A. Ya. Elyanov

The article examines the impact the economic shifts have upon the social structure of developing countries. It tackles two aspects of this problem: the redistribution of active population among the agricultural, industrial and service sectors and the change of relation between the traditional and modern sectors.

The cross-examination of the dynamics of structural shifts in the GNP and employment between developed capitalist and developing nations on the basis of extensive statistical data ranging from the late 19th century to the present demonstrates that whereas the share of the product produced in the industrial and "tertiary" sectors of the developing world is rapidly increasing and is catching up with the indices of developed countries, the employment is still largely concentrated in agriculture. This fact gives rise to a profound gap between the macro structures of production and employment, which has no parallel in the history of the presently developed capitalist nations. On the strength of the analysis of developing countries divided into various groups the article concludes that the gap is especially pronounced and fraught with negative consequences in the states which make the nucleus of the Afro-Asian world.

The post-war development, telescoped into a short space of time, exacerbated the unbalanced nature of the basic socio-economic proportions. The calculations presented in the article show a substantial dwindling of the share of the product produced in the traditional sector throughout the '50s and '70s. At the same time, the employment in this sector has been diminishing far more slowly. The analysis of various regions allows to suggest that the traditional sector fulfills important economic and social functions in the developing world, in particular, in Asia and Africa. The point is not to speed up it replacement but to find ways of including it into the process of extended reproduction and social modernization.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POTENTIAL OF ARAB COUNTRIES

S. L. Stoklitsky

The establishment of science and technology potential (STP) in Arab countries is impeded by such factors as lack of resources, dearth of qualified personnel and brain drain. There are only few states which can afford a wide-ranging research and development programme. The transfer of technology from the West more often than not turns an importing country into "a prisoner" of a Western company.

For want of a better science and technology policy, main efforts in the Arab world are directed at adapting the borrowed technology to local conditions.

The establishment of the STP bears direct relation to the economic backwardness of the region. At the same time, the Arab states differ economically and therefore face different problems in their approach to the STP formation.

The coming to the international science and technology arena of Socialist states offers real opportunities to young independent states to get rid of the "technological neo-colonialism".

FORMATION OF SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS OF WEST AFRICAN "EVOLUÉS"

A. B. Letnev

The article investigates into the emergence of the African intelligentsia with a special reference to the former French West Africa in the late 30s and the early 40s. The article utilizes diploma papers of the Ponty School graduates, a leading educational establishment of the discussed period.

The analysis of these papers allows to draw a conclusion concerning the anti-assimilative trends as a component part of the social ideas of the young generation of the West African "evolués". The article evaluates the contribution of the Ponty School graduates to the formation of the intelligentsia's self-consciousness, in the development of the West African social thought.

REVOLUTION OF 1905-07 IN RUSSIA AND INDIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

E. N. Komarov

On the basis of sources published in independent India and Soviet and Indian studies the article suggests that the impact of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-07 was not an insignificant factor of the mounting national liberation movement in India in the early 20th century. This was the time of the awakening of the masses, their turning to the struggle for freedom. In particular, this struggle affected industrial workers, and the middle strata came out to play an important part in social and political activities.

The repercussions the First Russian Revolution had in India and the attitude to the Revolution of various sections of the national liberation movement help in their own way to elucidate important characteristics of the movement, ideological and political stands taken at the time when it was growing into a mass political force. The impact of the First Russian Revolution had an encouraging effect upon this process, which by and large reached its close in the forthcoming period.

The First Russian Revolution was taken in India primarily as "a lesson" (to borrow a M. Gandhi term) of mass political struggle and staunchness. At the same time, it gave stimuli to the search for a new social ideal.

TROPICAL AFRICA: MYTH AND FAIRY TALE IN PEOPLE'S CULTURE

V. B. Iordansky

The article probes into the interrelationship between the myth and the fairy tale. It is emphasized that historically the myth "gets simplifyed", and seeks vitality, which it is being denied by the growing social scepticism, in the external verisimilitude. As a result of this, the myth gets closer to the fairy tale but the indirect difference between them is not removed. It lies in the

fundamentally opposite approaches to reality. The myth, as such, is imperative, whereas the fairy tale is didactic. The action in the myth unfolds with no relation to the real time, whereas in the fairy tale the time is conditional and real. The article comes to the conclusion that the African fairy tale is a challenge of its kind to the rational social thought and to the rationality of the myth. At the same time, it is a treasury of creative findings of the social consciousness of the period when the Tropical Africa was in the prime of its myth creation.

GREAT SCHOLAR OF THE MEDIEVAL EAST

(Towards the 1200th Birth Anniversary of Muhammed Ibn Musa Al-Khorezmi)

P. G. Bulgakov, A. Ahmedov

The article deals with the heritage of the brilliant medieval scholar, mathematician and natural scientist Muhammed ibn Musa al-Khorezmi, whose 1200 birth anniversary celebrations are to be held in the Soviet Union in September, 1983.

It is hard to overestimate the impact of al-Khorezmi's works upon the further development of numerous branches of science both in the East and in Europe. He laid down the foundations of algebra as a separate branch of mathematics. The very word "algebra" was derived from the title of his tract "Kitab al-djabr wa-l-mukabalah" as a result of the transformation the term "al-djabr" had undergone in the early Latin translations. In Europe his arithmetic tract paved the way to the adoption of the decimal positional system of numeration and calculations, which is in use today. The very name of the scholar, transliterated in Latin as "Algarithmus", went down into history as a term "algorithm". The works of al-Khorezmi on geography initiated the tradition of geographical literature in Arabic. His astronomical tables fostered the development of spheric astronomy both in the East and in Europe. The kown historian of science G. Sarton called the development of science in the first half of the 9th century as the period of al-Khorezmi. Despite all this little is known of al-Khorezmi as an individual. Using the indirect data of the available sources, the article suggests that al-Khorezmi was born in the early 80s of the 8th century and died about 850.

The article also characterizes the group of scholars, disciples and collaborators of al-Khorezmi and deals with their works and the history of their translations into the West European, Russian and Uzbek languages.

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U.S. BLAMED FOR ARMS RACE IN ASIA

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 3-13

[Article by N. A. Gnevushev: "The Soviet Union and the Struggle Against the Arms Race in Asia"]

[Text] The development of international relations in the 1980's has been characterized by the increased influence and authority of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. Soviet foreign policy is based upon a concern for the maintaining of peace, active countering of the aggressive actions of the imperialist forces and a struggle to halt the dangerous arms race and to create the necessary conditions for mutually advantageous collaboration among states regardless of their sociopolitical system. The high foreign policy activeness of the socialist countries, in clearly reflecting the humanistic nature of world socialism, conforms to the vital interests of not only these countries but also all mankind. Soviet foreign policy, including in the developing countries, proceeds from the instructions of V. I. Lenin who was a fundamental opponent of the "exporting of revolution." Our plans in Asia, he pointed out, "are the same as in Europe: peaceful cohabitation with peoples."[1] This Leninist thesis has been consistently carried out. "The ensuring of a stable peace, the defense of the rights of peoples to independence and social progress are permanent goals for our foreign policy," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov.[2]

The relations of the socialist countries with the Eastern states have been established and strengthened on the basis of joint actions against imperialism and neocolonialism and on a basis of the solidarity of the socialist commonwealth countries with the Asian and African peoples in the struggle to strengthen their political independence and achieve economic independence, in the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress.

As is known, the shaping of an international climate in Asia has been significantly influenced by many unresolved problems left as a heritage to the Asian peoples by the distant and near past. Factors of a socioeconomic and cultural-historical nature such as the unequal economic development levels, religious contradictions and ethnic differences, territorial disputes and so forth continue to impede the processes of normalizing the situation on the continent. However, as essential as all these problems may be, they are in no way the basic factor in the instability which has lasted in Asia. The main impediment

on the path to improving the international climate here is the policy of imperialism, primarily American, which is inimical to the cause of the peace and freedom of the Asian peoples. The old "hot spots" in Asia persist and new ones break out precisely as a result of the adventuristic activities by the present U.S. Administration which is oriented at solving international problems by using force.

In declaring various regions of Asia as the spheres of its "vital interests," American imperialism has endeavored to dispose of the fates of the peoples and the very rich resources of the Asian countries, striking against the forces of national liberation. The chief means for achieving these hegemonistic plans are the increased direct military presence of the United States in the strategically important areas of Asia the modernizing and widening of the network of the Pentagon's military bases, the involvement of a number of states in a system of aggressive blocs and forcing the arms race on the Asian countries.

Two carrier groups from the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets are maintained constantly in the Indian Ocean which skirts the shores of 36 states. Reconstruction is continuing on the major Pentagon base in the central part of the ocean on Diego Garcia Island, where they have already begun deploying American nuclear weapons. Anchored around this island are now 12 transport ships of the U.S. Navy. Their holds contain fuel, food, tanks, artillery pieces, helicopters and ammunition in a quantity sufficient for supporting the combat operations of 12,000 Marines from the so-called Rapid Deployment Forces. To the American military bases already functioning in Asia, Washington has set the goal of gaining new ones: the Port of Moroni (Comoro Islands) and a base in Trincomalee (Sri Lanka). These points should become the connecting links between Diego Garcia and a new chain of support points which the United States intends to create at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

As a total in the Asian countries, there are at present over 90 major U.S. military bases, including 40 in South Korea, 32 in Japan. The second largest concentration of American naval bases and staging areas after Western Europe is precisely in East Asia and the Western Pacific.[3] The representatives of the Washington Administration make no secret of the fact that in the event of necessity the United States will begin deploying medium-range nuclear missiles in the "Asian theater of war."[4] In endeavoring to strengthen its positions in Asia, the United States has intensely worked out different studies for activating the already-existing military blocs and creating new ones. It has given particular importance to the forming of a bloc which as yet has been differently named: "Pacific community," "the Asian-Pacific pact" and "SEATO-2." For these purposes military ties are being strengthened between the member nations of the ANZUS (United States, Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand) and ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, England, Malaysia and Singapore) blocs. Cooperation in the military area is also being organized between ANZUS and Japan. They are also endeavoring to involve the countries which are a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), having given them the task of "counteracting" Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. A possibility is being studied of involving South Korea and Taiwan in the system of aggressive blocs and alliances.

Another aspect in the present-day strategy of the imperialists is in a partial transfer of the functions of the world policemen to their allies, the

reactionary regimes, as well as the strengthening of the last bastions of colonialism and neocolonialism which can be employed for fighting against the forces of national and social liberation. The functions of "restraining" the liberation movement of the Arab peoples has been entrusted by imperialism to Israel which Washington has long viewed as a weapon for establishing its domination over the Near Eastern region. For this reason, particular attention is given to the strengthening of American-Israeli military-economic ties. Over the previous 10 years, Israel has received 18 billion dollars in credits from the United States and a large portion of this has gone to buy weapons.[5] The United States is responsible for around 90 percent of the entire Israeli imports of weapons. This includes the most modern military equipment such as F-15 and F-16 fighters, the Lance operational-tactical missiles, the M-60 series tanks and so forth. For the 1984 fiscal year, the United States is granting Israel 2.5 billion dollars (more than one-third of the total military-economic aid to all countries) basically for military purposes. Of this amount, 1.5 billion dollars have been granted on a non-repayment basis.[6] For reinforcing the "special relations" which exist between the two countries, the U.S. and Israeli governments not long before the Israeli attack on Lebanon agreed to "strategic cooperation." Such privileges are granted to Israel not only because it is the main ally of the United States in the Near East. Rather it is a question that in exchange for American weapons, the Pentagon and the U.S. military-industrial firms gain an opportunity to have a testing range where the most recent weapons and electronic systems are tested under combat conditions.

Prior to the antimonarchical revolution, the role of the policemen in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean was entrusted to Iran. The South Korean regime served to carry out Washington's strategic plans in the area of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. South Korea was assigned the role by the United States of an outpost in the system of "forward lines" in the Far East. Washington more and more actively used Pakistan as a staging area for conducting subversive work against the progressive countries. Over the last decades precisely Pakistan has been a constant source of tension in relations with its neighbors and primarily with India and now with Afghanistan.

All of this leads one to the fact that at present the Asian Continent is the major region of constant political and military tension. Military preparations are growing in many Asian countries, the purchases of modern military equipment are increasing and their own military industry is being developed, military budgets are growing and regular military formations are being enlarged.

The dynamics of the growth of military expenditures and the size of the armed forces in certain Asian countries can be judged from the data in the table.

In 1971-1980 alone, the military expenditures of the developing countries increased by 2.5-fold, having reached 77 billion dollars.[7] Although these still seem relatively small, they substantially impede the switching of the already limited resources in the developing countries to peaceful purposes. It is also essential to bear in mind that the growth rates of military expenditures (an average of 15 percent a year over the designated period) are accelerating and greatly surpass the corresponding indicators both in the industrially developed states (3 percent) as well as the world as a whole (2.5 percent).

Military Expenditures and Size of Armed Forces
in Certain Asian Countries

	Military Expenditures (million dollars)		Size of Armed Forces (thousand men)	
	1970	1980	1970	1980
Japan	1,582	8,960	259	241
Taiwan	500	1,750	522.5	438.2
India	1,404	4,400	980	1,104
South Korea	333	3,400	645	600.6
Indonesia	278	2,070	365	341.8
Malaysia	260	1,470	47.8	66
Pakistan	625	1,180	324	438.6
Philippines	123	764.3	33	112.8
Singapore	106	574	14.8	42
Bangladesh	--	115.4	--	72
Burma	108	164	143.25	173
Sri Lanka	21	26.5	--	14.94
Thailand	154	1,090	235	230

Sources: "The Military Balance 1970-1971," pp 57-71; 1979-1980, pp 60-74; "World Armaments and Disarmament," SIPRI, Yearbook, Stockholm, 1978, pp 151, 153 (below--SIPRI).

Certainly, military expenditures to a certain degree are essential for the defense of national sovereignty and for repelling possible imperialist aggression. However, the arms race is being developed actively precisely in those countries which are not externally threatened by anyone and which, on the contrary, themselves have territorial and other claims on their neighbors. Thus, Saudi Arabia has employed the weapons purchased by it for fighting the countries with progressive political regimes and supplies their separatist movements. These weapons have been employed by Qaboos, the sultan of Oman, in punitive actions against the patriots of the Dhofar and by the separatist forces on the islands of Sulu and Mindanao. They were also used during the period of aggression by the Somali regime against new Ethiopia, by the Eritrean separatists and so forth.

The United States is the basic supplier of weapons to reactionary regimes throughout the world. As is shown by data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States has firmly maintained world leadership in weapons trade. In recent years, the volume has sharply increased. While in 1980, 1981 and 1982, in cost terms this was 17.5, 19 and 25 billion dollars, respectively, in 1983 this will rise to 30 billion.[8]

The United States sells weapons to more than 120 countries. It is responsible for 75 percent of all the weapons sold by the capitalist states. The basic purchases of American weapons in the 1970's were Saudi Arabia (35 billion

dollars), the Shah's Iran (14 billion), Israel (11 billion), South Korea (5 billion), Egypt, Taiwan and Japan (3 billion dollars each).[9] The program of U.S. military and economic aid in recent years has envisaged a further increase in the deliveries of American weapons to these same nations (with the exception, certainly, of Iran).[10] The flow of American weapons to Pakistan is becoming wider and wider. In 1982, Washington supplied Islamabad with comprehensive military-economic aid totaling 3.2 billion dollars. The aim of these deliveries is obvious: the United States wants to turn Pakistan into a staging area for various provocations against Afghanistan and India and it should serve as a support for hegemonistic influence in the Indian Ocean Basin.[11]

Washington has been intensely pushing the ASEAN nations toward increasing their military potential. In recent years, the military expenditures of the ASEAN member countries have risen to 18-27 percent of the national budgets. American weapons most are being purchased. This has led to a standardizing of the weapons in the association. Thus, all five states are virtually armed with the M-16 rifle and the G-5e and A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. The process of weapons standardization has helped to deepen military integration of the ASEAN countries and has strengthened their overall dependence upon the American supplier.

Washington views Thailand as a certain "key" to ASEAN. For precisely this reason the United States after the withdrawal of its troops from Thailand in the mid-1970's has constantly maintained close military-political ties with it and has provided Bangkok with great military aid. In 1978, the Pentagon sold Thailand military supplies valued at 100 million dollars, while in 1979, the deliveries of American military equipment to Thailand were already 400 million dollars. In 1982, it was granted unrepayable military aid amounting to 80 million dollars.[12] The Pentagon, in essence, has restored its former military bases on the territory of Thailand, sending American maintenance personnel to them and has significantly increased in recent years the number of military instructors training the Thai Army.

The Council for the Collaboration of Persian Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) founded in 1981 can lead to the standardizing of weapons and consequently to a strengthening of military and political dependence of the local armies upon the source of supply. These nations have been under great pressure to increase their military potential, to increase the amount of weapons purchases in the capitalist states and to more widely resort to the services of advisors from the United States and the other NATO members. The main aim of these efforts is to persuade the leaders of the Arab countries to support the American concept of ensuring the "security" of the Persian Gulf and adjacent areas. The key element of this concept is the organizing of American-Western European "Rapid Deployment Forces" capable of conducting military punitive operations in the entire Near East and Southwest Asia, relying on the land and sea bases. It is assumed that the weapons arsenals stockpiled in the member nations of the Council on Cooperation will serve as an additional reserve for the "Rapid Deployment Forces." The ruler of Oman, Sultan Qaboos who has been arguing for the Persian Gulf states to join the aggressive NATO bloc, has been openly in favor of giving the Council the nature of a pro-Western military alliance.[13]

The military-economic ties of the United States with Saudi Arabia are becoming stronger. Although Riyadh has come out officially against a direct American presence in the kingdom, here naval and air bases, dumps, military compounds and radar stations are being built with American aid, the road network, the pipeline system and the communications lines are being broadened and modernized. In 1976-1980, contracts for carrying out such measures just for the U.S. Army Engineer Corps were almost 9 billion dollars.[14] Washington has succeeded in obtaining Riyadh's agreement for the use of these installations by the U.S. Armed Forces in the event of a "crisis situation" in the area of the Near East and Persian Gulf. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has presently become the world's largest purchaser of American weapons. In 1980, 60 percent of the total U.S. military exports went to this country.[15]

Washington is hopeful that in exchange for the deliveries of modern weapons Riyadh will make a number of political concessions. First of all, the United States in every possible way is urging the Saudi monarchy to moderate its opposition to the Camp David Accord, with this opposition up to now being rather sharp. Moreover, the United States is interested in a guaranteed delivery of a significant amount of Saudi oil to the American market. For Washington it is very important that Riyadh support its former favorable position for the imperialist powers in the questions of limiting oil prices.

The weapons sold by the United States are largely destined for police reprisal by the antipopular regimes against the population of their own countries. For these countries, according to the evidence of the American political scientist M. Claire, "instead of a program in the educational and development area, in the forefront is the use of modern equipment for increasing the government's military superiority over the rebels."[16]

One other destination of American weapons deliveries is the terrorist formations which are endeavoring to overthrow legitimate governments. The Washington Administration openly is aiding the terrorist bands which have invaded Afghanistan from outside. Here the fact is ignored that such actions represent a flagrant violation of international law and order. According to the ruling unanimously approved by the United Nations in 1974, an act of aggression--this severest international crime--is, in particular, "the sending by a state or on behalf of a state armed bands, groups, irregular forces or mercenaries who carry out acts of the use of armed force against another state."[17]

In supplying weapons to the developing countries, the U.S. is pursuing primarily its own selfish political goals. "In taking a decision to sell weapons," said the White House emissary in the Near East, P. Habib, "we are guided not only by the interests of the U.S. balance of payments. The main thing is that the deal conform to our broad national interests.... A large number of factors is weighed, however the basic one is the role of the recipient nation in defending U.S. interests in the given area as well as the question of to what degree the taken decision will help to achieve our own special political goals and conform to our national interests."[18]

Weapons sales inevitably presuppose the existence of a certain political partnership between two countries. Certainly in selling weapons, the United States demonstrates its approval and support for the goals for the achieving of which

the military equipment is being purchased. The already mentioned P. Habib, in speaking before the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives of the American Congress, emphasized: "We do not sell weapons if there is not a broad political concensus, particularly in the area of political security, between us and the recipient nation."[19]

The more modern the weapons delivered, the more the purchaser depends upon the technical services of the seller. Since such services are essential over the entire "life" of the military equipment (for example, 10 years for a majority of military aircraft[20]), the military deliveries tie the purchaser, in the given instance the developing Asian nations, to the seller, the United States, for an extended time. Since the reactionary regimes purchased weapons for the sake of achieving set political goals by military means, that is, the weapons are primarily a means of ensuring their political domination (in a number of Asian countries the army is the sole support on which the power of the ruling class rests), the dependence upon the imperialist supplier country grows from a technical one to a political one.

With the coming of the Reagan Administration to the White House, the military export policy to an even greater degree became an integral part of the global strategy for American imperialism. The Presidential Directive "On the Policy Toward the Delivery of Conventional Weapons" of 9 July 1981, in particular, it is stated that "the United States views the exports of conventional weapons as a completely essential component in its foreign policy."[21] For realizing this goal, Washington has nullified certain limitations put into force by the previous administration.

The widening of weapons deliveries to regimes following in the mainstream of imperialist policy has been accompanied by the strengthening of U.S. military-political activeness per se throughout the world. Thus, on 1 January 1983, Washington officially established the "Central Command" (Centcom). The sphere of its action includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somali, Kenya, as well as a significant part of the Indian Ocean including the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. It has been announced that the "Rapid Deployment Forces," the military bases on Diego Garcia Island, in Oman, Somali, Kenya and a number of other states are at the disposal of the "Central Command."

The U.S. NATO allies are also increasing weapons deliveries to the Asian countries. By the end of the 1970's, France emerged in second place in terms of the volume of exports of military equipment to the developing countries. In individual years, France was responsible for up to 17 percent of all weapons exports by the capitalist countries.[22] The armament market in the developing countries from a commercial viewpoint plays a significantly larger role for France than for the United States. Geographically a basic portion of French deliveries goes to states of the Near East and Africa. England which for a long time held second place in terms of the volume of sales with France, has now been forced into third place. London has concluded more than one-half of all the deals with the Near and Middle Eastern countries.[23] West Germany and Italy are also major weapons suppliers and they comparatively recently joined the "club" of weapons sellers to the developing countries. Sweden and Japan

also trade actively in military equipment. Although at present Japanese weapons exports are comparatively small, approximately 50-60 million dollars a year, there is every reason to assume that in the next few years this will increase significantly. The Japanese military industry is developing rapidly and over the decade its volume of product has grown by 6-fold (from 1.6 billion dollars in 1970 up to 10.1 billion dollars in 1979). While in the 1950's, Japan produced only pistols for the police, at present Japanese industry supplies 95 percent of the army's needs for weapons.[24] Washington, as is known, is encouraging in every possible way the increased militarization of Japan and is endeavoring to involve this country in carrying out American aggressive strategy vis-a-vis not only the Soviet Union, but also the Southeast Asian states. In the U.S. plan, Japan has been assigned the role of an American policeman in the region.

We must particularly point to the role of Israel as a major weapons exporter and this country has emerged in sixth place among the capitalist countries in terms of the sales volume. In 1981, Israel sold a total of 1 billion dollars worth of weapons to the developing countries, including the Asian ones.[25] The accelerated development of the Israeli defense industry, which grows on the yeasts of American investments and technical collaboration has provided an opportunity to realize covert support for the most reactionary regimes. This can be seen from the destination of the Israeli weapons deliveries including those produced under U.S. licenses. At the end of the 1970's, 30 percent of the Israeli weapons exports went to South Korea and Taiwan and another 20 percent to South Africa.[26]

Recently Zaire also appeared in the list of Tel Aviv clients. The agreement concluded with it, in the words of the Associated Press, "has become one of the most important military programs which Israel has ever carried out."[27] The rapprochement with Kinshasa which started after the resuming of diplomatic relations in May 1982 has not only economic but also political significance for Israel. The Israeli leaders are hoping to use the resumption of official contacts with Zaire as a precedent which can help break the isolation in which Tel Aviv has been in Africa as a result of its aggression against Lebanon.

In recent years, there has also been a growing trend for the development of national weapons production in the developing Asian countries themselves. The output of military products developed both by internal forces as well as a result of purchasing licenses in the industrially developed countries has been growing. Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines possess significant capacity for producing weapons in Asia. The initial page has been turned in the history of the gradual turning of the militarily dependent countries into weapons producers. The acute competitive struggle between the monopolies of the Western countries has contributed to the growth of local weapons output. In order to avoid their competitors, they resort to production collaboration with the developing states.

South Korea is trying to become a major supplier of weapons to the Asian countries. In 1977-1980, it sold 40 million dollars worth of weapons.[28] Seoul has endeavored primarily to establish military contacts and become a weapons supplier for the ASEAN nations. Thereby it makes its own "contribution" to carrying out the Pentagon plans of turning the "five" into a military grouping. It

is no accident that during the talks in San Francisco in April 1981 between the U.S. Secretary of Defense, C. Weinberger, and the Defense Minister of South Korea, Choo Young Bock, agreement was reached not only on the delivery of modern combat equipment to the dictatorial regime but also for turning it into an exporter of weapons manufactured under American licenses. "South Korea is becoming a weapons arsenal for the Southeast Asian states," commented the Japanese newspaper AKAHATA on this question.[29] Seoul already is a major supplier of weapons for the Indonesian Navy which is equipped with South Korean launchers and landing craft.[30]

In assessing weapons production in the developing countries it is essential to bear in mind that in a majority of instances only a small portion of the value of the produced good is obtained in these countries. For manufacturing small arms such as rifles and submachine guns, significant imports are required of finished parts and materials and this strengthens the dependence of the importer on the exporter. According to the official American data, for example, from 53 to 80 percent of the value of the M-16 automatic rifle produced in the developing countries under U.S. license goes on imported parts.[31]

The above-given data show not only the increased military preparations by many nations on the Asian continent, but also that military needs divert large financial resources and technically trained personnel which are so essential for carrying out the tasks which acutely confront the Asian countries. At present, the developing countries each year spend 5 percent of the GNP on weapons.[32] In certain Asian countries this share is many times higher. Thus, in Oman, it reaches 22 percent and in Bahrain 15 percent.[33]

The arms race has a particularly harmful effect on the socioeconomic development of the small Asian countries. Along with the problems common to all the liberated countries, they encounter a number of specific difficulties related to their limited natural and human resources. Moreover, the military development carried out in the small states has an extremely bad effect on the territorial placement of their productive forces. Under the conditions of a land "hunger," at times areas suitable for agriculture are confiscated for military projects. For example, in Singapore, around 60 km^2, that is, over 10 percent of the island's territory, are occupied by military installations.[34] At the same time, land must be won from the sea for civilian purposes and this consumes money which is significant even for this economically comparatively developed state.

Militarization inevitably influences the process of social reproduction in the developing countries. Under its impact the already imperfect socioeconomic mechanisms of the young states are distorted. The negative consequences from the growth of military preparations are apparent in the reproduction of both the labor force and social capital. The arms race diverts enormous human resources from creative labor. As an average for the developing countries, around 30 percent of the able-bodied population, chiefly young people, are employed in the military sphere. However, in a number of states this indicator reaches 10 and more percent. For example, in Pakistan there is a military person for every eight industrial workers, and in Egypt one for three.[35] The army takes away a significant portion of the technically skilled personnel. The use of human resources in the developing countries in the military sphere, primarily

for the purposes of organizing armies, has shown a tendency to grow (see the table).

The increased size of the armies in the developing countries means that there is an increased number of persons who do not produce any valuable materials and who are fully supported by the budget. Each year, the developing countries spend on maintaining one serviceman the equivalent of the average income of 10 persons.[36] The increased part of national income consumed for military purposes also occurs as a result of the qualitative development of armies. All of this leads to a reduction in the amount of funds which can be used for investment purposes.

The arms race also aggravates the foreign economic problems of the developing countries, primarily the problem of limited foreign currency resources. The very purchasing abroad of weapons which must be paid for in a hard currency frequently substantially reduces the possibilities for the young states to purchase goods essential for economic construction and for covering the demand of the population.

The checking of the arms race is the only reasonable alternative to the unproductive expenditure of resources and to balancing "on the brink of war." The reduction and ultimately the complete halting of military preparations both on a world scale and in individual regions would play a crucial role in the lessening of international tension.

In working to develop the process of detente in all areas, the USSR has come forward with an initiative to ensure security in Asia by collective efforts of this continent's states. The Soviet Union is interested in strengthening the relations of good neighborliness, equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in all regions of this enormous continent and in resolving all disputed questions arising between the Asian countries by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for one another. The Program for a Further Struggle for Peace and International Collaboration and for Freedom and Independence of Peoples adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress posed the task of historical importance: "To work to achieve security in Asia on the basis of the joint efforts by this continent's states."[37]

Since security in Asia, like in any other region, is a component of world security, any settlement of international problems involving the interests of the Asian countries should not run counter to the countries of other continents. Between the members of the continental system there should not be any differences in the degree of ensuring security and none of them should possess unilateral advantages.

The Soviet Union has proposed and is actively defending the idea of collective security on the Asian continent not only because our country both geographically and historically is part of Asia, although this is a very important factor. Some two-thirds of Soviet territory lies in Asia. The USSR proceeds primarily from the Leninist principles of its peace-loving foreign policy and from the interests of peace and social progress. The Soviet Union does not seek any unilateral advantages, privileges or special rights. It sees its task in helping to spread political and military detente on the Asian continent in the

interests of all Asian states, without exception, and to aid in turning the continent into a zone of peace.

The 26th CPSU Congress convincingly demonstrated that the USSR gives exceptionally important significance to the development of good neighbor relations between the Asian states and on its behalf is ready to collaborate on a bilateral and multilateral basis for the sake of strengthening security in Asia. "A realistic view of the world, a constructive approach to solving complex international problems" was how, for example, the Indian mass information organs viewed the peace initiatives proclaimed by the 26th CPSU Congress. "The peaceful proposals made by the 26th CPSU Congress," pointed out the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI, "contrast sharply to the position of the 'hawks' in the Washington Administration which demand primarily an increased arms race."[38]

The Soviet Union is actively in favor of bridling the arms race and for reducing weapons deliveries to third countries. Conversations were conducted between the USSR and the United States on this question from December 1977 through December 1978. At them an agreement was reached "that the problem of limiting the international deliveries of conventional weapons is an urgent one and requires a solution on a constructive basis, in the aim of strengthening international peace and security and reinforcing detente."[39] However, precisely at this stage, when possible approaches to solving the question began to be sketched out, Washington broke off the talks and then, regardless of the repeated proposals from the Soviet side and the agreement reached, refused to resume them.

The USSR also advanced specific proposals formulated in the document "On Practical Ways to Halt the Arms Race" submitted for review by the First Special UN General Assembly Session on Disarmament.[40] First of all, in the opinion of the USSR, the solution was to be sought in the general context of a lessening of international tension, the strengthening of international peace, the eliminating of the existing centers of military danger and the preventing of the rise of new ones. For this first of all precise political and international legal criteria should be worked out and approved on the admissibility or inadmissibility of providing weapons to one or another recipient in strict accord with the generally recognized standards and principles of international law. On this basis it would be possible to sharply limit the deliveries of weapons to aggressive, repressive and antipopular regimes and this to a significant degree would help to eliminate sources of tension and the arms race in various regions of the world. Certainly in working out the criteria for the admissibility or inadmissibility of weapons deliveries, the inalienable rights recognized by the United Nations of states and peoples to obtain aid and support to repel aggression and in the struggle for national and social liberation should be fully ensured.

The peace-loving states share the position of the USSR on this matter. For many years now in the United Nations, the African and other non-aligned countries have worked to have the Western powers strictly observe the Security Council decisions on banning the delivery of weapons to South Africa. Upon the initiative of the Arab countries, the UN General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions with an appeal to the Security Council to introduce an embargo on the delivery of weapons to Israel.

The Soviet Union has opposed the line conducted by imperialism of imposing the arms race on the developing and liberated countries by a firm policy of disarmament. Our country proceeds from the view that the problem of limiting international trade and deliveries of conventional weapons requires an immediate solution. The Soviet memorandum to the Second Special UN General Assembly Session on Disarmament "To Remove the Growing Nuclear Threat and to Check the Arms Race" again proposed that the governments of all countries "agree to limit the sale and delivery of conventional weapons the volume of which presently runs into scores of billions of dollars." In the interests of achieving such agreement, the memorandum states, "the Soviet Union is ready to resume the Soviet-American talks which were broken off by the American side precisely at the stage when possible approaches to solving the question had begun to be outlined. The USSR has no argument also against involving other states in examining the question of limiting the weapons trade."[41]

A promising path to eliminate tension and limit the stockpiling of weapons in various regions of Asia and other continents is also laid out in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States adopted in January 1983 at the Prague Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States. "The danger of the development of local conflicts into a world-wide armed clash," states the declaration, "to a great degree is linked to the attempts at the direct or indirect involvement of the Asian, African, Latin American and Oceanic states in military-political alliances and extending the sphere of influence of the blocs in them. In confirming that the Warsaw Pact states have no intention to broaden the sphere of influence of their alliance, the participants at the meeting also urge the NATO states to give up the extending of the zones of influence of their bloc to any areas of the world whatsoever, in particular the Persian Gulf."[42]

At the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov again pointed out that the policy of the reactionary imperialist forces which are endeavoring at any price to turn back world development, although not bringing success to the imperialists, is extremely dangerous in its adventurism. The attempt to resolve the historical dispute between the two world social systems by a military clash would be the end of human society. For this reason, the adventuristic policy of the ultrareactionary aggressive forces led by U.S. imperialism is encountering strong resistance from the peoples. At present, the peoples of the countries which have been liberated from colonial or semicolonial dependence to an ever-increasing degree are joining this struggle.

"Our aim is not merely to prevent wars," Yu. V. Andropov emphasized decisively in his speech at the June plenum. "We are endeavoring to fundamentally improve and develop all good principles in these relations. We will seek respect for the sovereign rights of states and peoples and the strict observance of the principles of international law which imperialism more and more often endeavors to discard and violate."[43] These noble aims are fully supported by the progressive forces in the Asian and African countries.

In the present-day very complex international situation, the USSR and the other socialist countries are working constantly to make headway in solving the problems of disarmament, including in Asia, to lead the peoples from under the threat of war and preserve peace and detente.

FOOTNOTES

1 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 145.

2 PRAVDA, 23 November 1982.

3 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 April 1982.

4 INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 12 December 1981.

5 MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, September 1982, p 16.

6 UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 14 January 1983.

7 Calculated from: SIPRI, 1981, p 156.

8 Ibid., 1982, p 177.

9 Ibid., p 178.

10 Ibid., 1981, pp 110, 198.

11 Ibid., 1982, p XXVIII.

12 ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 12, 1981, p 15.

13 Ibid., No 11, 1981, p 23.

14 Ibid.

15 A. Pierre, "The Global Politics of Arms Sales," New Jersey, 1982, pp 179-180.

16 Quoted in: PRAVDA, 3 September 1982.

17 Ibid.

18 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Vol LXXV, No 1946, 1976, p 450.

19 Ibid.

20 SIPRI, 1979, p 169.

21 MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, No 14, 1982, p 22.

22 Calculated from: SIPRI, 1981, pp 156-160.

23 Calculated from: SIPRI, 1982, p 177.

24 A. Pierre, op. cit., pp 116, 117.

25 SIPRI, 1981, p 197.

[26] MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 8, 1980, p 108.

[27] PRAVDA, 21 February 1983.

[28] SIPRI, 1981, p 196.

[29] Quoted in: IZVESTIYA, 6 September 1982.

[30] SIPRI, 1981, p 198.

[31] See: MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 8, 1980, p 108.

[32] Calculated from: SIPRI, 1982, pp 186-188.

[33] HORIZONT, No 45, 1979, p 21.

[34] BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, No 2, 1977, p 134.

[35] MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 8, 1980, p 110.

[36] J. Schell, "The Fate of the Earth," New York, 1982, p 105.

[37] "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 26.

[38] Quoted in: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 April 1982.

[39] PRAVDA, 3 November 1982.

[40] Ibid., 31 May 1978.

[41] Quoted in: NOVOYE VREMYA, No 36, 1982, p 13.

[42] PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.

[43] Ibid., 26 June 1983.

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PROBLEMS IN TRANSFORMING SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 14-26

[Article by V. L. Sheynis and A. Ya. El'yanov]

[Text] In 1950-1980, the aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of the developing countries increased by more than 4.7-fold.[1] Such a significant jump in development could not, of course, occur on the basis of unchanging socioeconomic structures. In the first place, the ratio of private and state forms of management altered; secondly, the relationship of national and foreign capital changed; thirdly, so did the modern and traditional organizational, technical and socioeconomic structures.

In this article we will examine only the last, third section in the socioeconomic evolution of the developing countries which has been less examined in our literature, and more precisely two aspects of it: the affect of shifts in the social division of labor on the employment structure and the change in proportions between the so-called modern and traditional economic sectors.

Shifts in Production and Employment: The Deepening of the Structural Gap

The growth of gross product in the peripheral zone of the nonsocialist world and the diverse changes in its physical, value and functional composition have been accompanied by shifts in the sectorial production structure and in employment. The general direction of these shifts has coincided but their scale has varied: changes in the production structure have occurred much more rapidly than in employment. What levels this process went through in the developed capitalist and developing countries over the last 100 years have been shown by one of the authors of the given article previously.[2] Although historical statistics reaching far back are very imperfect, the calculations and comparisons made disclosed a rather striking picture.

The structure of gross product in the developing countries changed in approximately the same manner in the developed countries previously while differences in product macrostructure gradually declined between the two groups of countries. In 1950, the sectorial proportions of the GDP in the developing countries more or less coincided with the averaged indicators for the now developed countries in 1870-1880: the shares of the agrarian sectors were approximately equal, slightly less went to the industrial sectors and a slightly larger portion of the product went for the service sectors than in the developed countries

in the designated time. However, by the end of the 1970's, a product structure which never existed in the developed countries had formed in the developing states (to the degree that we take them as a whole).

In Table 1 we have shown the composition of the GDP of both groups of countries in the two measurements: in 1970 prices which makes the corresponding indicators commensurable with the data of Table 2 (and Table 4) mentioned in footnote 2 and in 1975 prices which experienced the impact of the "price revolution" in the first half of the 1970's. In the developed countries the differences between the two columns are not essential while for the developing countries they are quite significant. The indicators calculated on the basis of the 1975 prices and more accurately reflecting the situation of recent years rather clearly show the trends which will be dealt with here. The developing countries at the end of the 1970's, in terms of the share of the agrarian sectors in the product had reached the indicators of the developed countries from the 1920's[3] (a lag of 50-60 years), while in terms of the share of the industrial sectors they had virtually reached the modern level of the developed countries[4] and for the service sphere were approaching the situation of the developed countries at the beginning of the 20th Century (a lag of 70-80 years).

Table 1

Structure of GDP and Employment in Developed Capitalist and Developing Countries in 1979 (% of total)

	Developed Capitalist States			Developing Countries		
	GDP in prices of		Employment*	GDP in prices of		Employment*
	1970	1975		1970	1975	
Agrarian sectors	3.9	4.3	6.0	19.7	17.5	59.4
Industrial sectors**	46.2	46.7	43.8	39.9	46.3	18.2
Service sphere sectors	49.9	49.0	50.2	40.5	36.2	22.4

Compiled and calculated from "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," 1980, Vol II, pp 3-403; UN MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, No 8, 1982, pp XVIII-XIX; ILO, "Labor Force Estimates and Projections. 1950-2000," Vol I, Geneva, 1977, pp 1-59; Vol II, pp 72-73; Vol III, pp 41, 46; Vol IV, pp 56-66; Vol V, p 40; FAO, "Production Yearbook," 1980. Rome, 1981, p 71.

* Our estimate based upon the extrapolating of preceding indicators.

** Industry (extracting, manufacturing, power), construction, transportation and communications.

But the issue is not merely in the substantial time difference in the lag of the developing countries behind the developed ones in terms of product structure. Even more important are the differences in the distribution of the gainfully employed population according to the basic subdivisions of the economy in the two groups of countries, for the employment structure in the developing world has changed not only more slowly than the product composition but also in a completely different manner than in the developed states. Here one can most clearly see the differences in the types of economic growth for the two groups of countries.

This applies primarily to agriculture. In the developed countries, the decline in the proportional amount of the agricultural sector in employment occurred with an increasing acceleration: in 1890-1950 it was half as much and in 1950-1979 it was 1/4 as much. In a majority of the developing countries, the analogous process commenced only in the 1950's. Here agriculture employed three-quarters of the able-bodied population. A similar situation in Western Europe and North America existed at the beginning or middle of the 19th Century and in Japan at the start of the 20th Century.[5] The gap, consequently, is approximately 150 years in the first instance and about 80 in the second.

In truth, in the 1970's, the share of agriculture in the employment of both groups of countries was higher than in the GDP. Indirectly this shows that differences in labor productivity for the basic economic subdivisions survive not only in the developing countries. But in the developed capitalist states, this gap after the war showed a clearly expressed tendency to decline (labor productivity in the industrial sector in 1950 was 3.4-fold higher than in the agrarian and in 1979, just 1.5-fold), while in the developing countries it was the reverse with a tendency toward a rise (by 2-fold in 1950 and 3-fold in 1979). In the developed capitalist countries, already in 1900, agriculture employed only around one-third of the labor resources while in the developing countries even in 1979, it was almost 60 percent. For this reason the lag of agriculture behind the industrial sectors in terms of labor productivity in the developed capitalist nations concerns a minority of the able-bodied inhabitants while in the developing ones this is presently a problem for an enormous majority of the population.[6]

The situation in the nonagricultural sectors has developed in a substantially different manner. As is seen from Table 1, in the developed capitalist nations the shares of the industrial sector in the structure of both the GDP and employment were approximately the same. They were this also 80-100 years ago. The proportional amount in the employment of the service sector gradually "caught up" to its share in the GDP, and at present both indicators are more or less equal. But in the developing countries, in both sectors (and particularly in the industrial one) profound gaps arose between product and employment and the surmounting of these as yet cannot even be seen. In other words, the ratios of product and employment in these two sectors with relatively high productivity and a low labor-absorbing capacity mirror the opposite situation in agriculture. We would point out that the service sector at least since the 1950's has taken up a larger portion of the manpower leaving the countryside than has the industrial one and this has not occurred in the developed countries (only in the 1970's did employment in the service sphere here somewhat exceed the industrial). But the service sphere in the developing countries is very

heterogeneous both economically and socially. A predominant share of its product goes to some subunits (thus, in virtually all the developing countries the estimate of "services" of the state apparatus to society is greatly inflated) while employment goes to others. These sectors (retail trade, consumer services and so forth), after agriculture, are gradually being turned into a sort of settling tank where significant contingents of manpower accumulate the employment of which has a fictitious or, in any event, a little productive nature.

Thus, a crosscomparison of the dynamics for structural shifts in the GDP and employment on the level of the developing world as a whole indicates a rather intensive movement of the product share in favor of the industrial and service sectors with a significantly more meager shift in the employment structure. The arising gaps between the production and employment macrostructures in terms of their profundity do not have analogs in the economic history of the now-developed capitalist countries. An analysis differentiated by groups of developing countries makes it possible to clarify and concretize this general conclusion.

The dynamics in the structural shifts over the last three decades within a classification dividing the developing countries into seven groups by economic development level (and also, to a certain degree, by type) and the amount of economic potential[7] is shown in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2 this is represented by a sampling of 57 countries comprising around one-half of all the states and territories of the developing world and encompassing approximately 93 percent of its population in 1950 and over 84 percent in 1979 (86-87 percent of the GDP).[8] For these 57 countries it has been possible to move the initial point of the analysis back to 1950. The situation at the end of the 1970's can be represented by a significantly broader sampling (99 countries), but the ratio between product and employment can be traced here only in agriculture (Table 3).[9] The indicators for the groups in the table are comparable with indicators for the regions which produce a less clear (not considering the important differences within the regions) picture, but make it possible to see the situation from a different slant, on the basis of average weighted data.

As is shown by Tables 2 and 3, in the developing world as a whole, the "surplus" of agricultural population in relation to the share of the GDP produced in the agrarian sector, as expressed in percentage points, has remained more or less stable with any method of computation and on the basis of different country samplings over all three decades. But behind this general result are concealed substantial differences in the depth and dynamics of the gap in the different country groups. The amount of the gap between the shares of agriculture in the GDP and employment has noticeably reduced over the entire period in groups I and III. On the threshold of the 1980's, this had approached the comparatively small indicator of 12-13 percentage points. Thus, for the share of agriculture not only in product but also in employment the proportions in these two country groups are close to the proportions which existed in the centers of the world capitalist economy at the end of the 1940's and the start of the 1950's.[10] The amount of the gap in the oil exporting group has also declined (in any event up to the 1970's); in groups IV and V, this, as a rule, has not shown a uniformly determinable trend in the changes while in groups VI and VII, this has risen. In all these groups the gap is measured by a striking amount, on the order of 25-40 percentage points.

Table 2

Share of National Economic Sectors in GDP and Employment for Basic Groups of Developing Countries. 1950-1970 (%)*

a) Группы стран	b) Количество стран	c) Сельское хозяйство 1950	1960	1970	d) Промышленность и строительство ** 1950	1960	1970	e) Сфера услуг ** 1950	1960	1970
I (страны среднеразвитого капитализма)	13									
1. ВВП		22,5	15,8	11,0	28,1	31,5	34,1	49,4	52,3	54,8
2. Занятость		44,7	36,9	28,5	22,5	24,9	26,4	32,8	38,2	45,2
3. Разрыв (между 1—2)		—22,2	—21,1	—18,5	5,6	6,6	7,7	16,6	14,1	9,6
II (страны — производители нефти с высоким уровнем дохода на душу населения)	2									
1. ВВП		24,0	13,5	9,5	37,5	45,0	58,0	38,5	41,5	32,0
2. Занятость		66,6	53,2	39,3	12,7	17,4	21,9	20,7	29,4	38,8
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—42,6	—39,7	—29,8	24,8	27,6	36,1	17,8	12,1	—6,8
III (мельчайшие страны с высоким уровнем дохода на душу населения)	3									
1. ВВП		31,0	25,0	17,6	32,0	25,3	31,7	37,7	49,7	50,7
2. Занятость		41,7	37,4	29,9	22,2	21,3	24,8	36,1	41,3	45,3
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—10,7	—12,4	—11,8	9,8	4,0	6,9	1,6	8,4	5,4
IV (страны с уровнем развития, несколько превышающим средний по развивающемуся миру)	15									
1. ВВП		37,5	29,5	23,8	20,4	23,7	27,5	42,1	46,7	48,6
2. Занятость		65,8	60,5	52,9	14,2	15,8	18,0	19,9	23,7	29,1
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—28,3	—31,0	—29,1	6,2	7,9	9,5	22,2	23,0	19,5
V (страны с уровнем развития, несколько уступающим среднему по развивающемуся миру)	14									
1. ВВП		42,4	34,9	30,9	22,4	23,7	26,6	35,6	41,4	42,2
2. Занятость		69,4	66,0	60,5	11,6	12,8	15,5	19,0	21,2	24,0
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—27,0	—31,1	—29,6	10,8	10,9	11,1	16,6	20,2	18,2
VI (многонаселенные страны с низким уровнем дохода на душу населения) ***	3									
1. ВВП		55,0	49,3	43,3	12,3	16,7	21,0	32,7	34,0	35,7
2. Занятость		78,9	69,9	64,8	8,1	12,5	14,0	13,0	17,6	21,2
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—23,9	—20,6	—21,5	4,2	4,2	7,0	19,7	16,4	14,5
VII (наименее развитые страны)	7									
1. ВВП		54,7	46,9	41,0	13,7	13,1	19,0	31,6	40,0	39,9
2. Занятость		88,6	85,1	80,5	4,5	5,6	7,1	7,0	9,3	12,4
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—33,9	—38,2	—39,5	9,2	7,5	11,9	24,6	31,7	27,5
4) Все развивающиеся страны	57									
A ****										
1. ВВП		37,5	30,1	24,9	22,6	24,6	28,7	40,0	45,1	46,2
2. Занятость		64,1	58,5	51,5	14,0	16,1	18,3	21,6	25,4	30,2
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—26,6	—28,4	—26,6	8,6	8,5	10,4	18,4	19,7	16,0
B *****										
1. ВВП		37,7	32,5	25,9	21,8	26,2	30,5	40,5	41,3	43,6
2. Занятость	-	75,5	70,8	65,0	9,3	11,6	13,8	15,2	17,6	21,2
3. Разрыв (1—2)		—37,8	—38,3	—39,1	12,5	14,6	16,7	25,3	23,7	22,4

Compiled and estimated from: "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," 1957, pp 110, 212; 1968, Vol II, pp 83-100; 1979, Vol II, pp 56-86; UNCTAD, "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics," 1979, pp 506-522; ILO, "Labor Force Estimates and Projections. 1950-2000," Vol I, IV; "Afrika. Ekonomicheskiy spravochnik" [Africa. An Economic Reference], Moscow, 1974, pp 38-41, and also see the sources for Table 4 in: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 12, 1981, p 73.

[Table 2 continued]

* Calculated on the basis of mean unweighted amounts in all groups for compared samplings of countries. GDP--in 1970 prices. Results do not always produce 100 percent due to rounding off.

** Transport and communications are included in the service sphere and for this reason the data given here are not comparable with the indicators of Table 1.

*** The data for Pakistan in 1950 have been taken for its frontiers at that time. In 1960 and 1970, Bangladesh was considered separately (and put in group VII). This makes the dynamics of indicators for group VI not completely comparable.

**** Calculation on the basis of mean unrated indicators for all countries included in above groups.

***** Calculation on basis of average weighted aggregate indicators for developing world as a whole.

Key: a--Country groups
b--Number of countries
c--Agriculture
d--Industry and construction
e--Service sphere

1--GDP
2--Employment
3--Gap (between 1-2)
4--All developing countries

I--(countries of medium developed capitalism)
II--(oil producing countries with a high level of per capita income)
III--(smallest countries with high level of per capita income)
IV--(countries with development level somewhat exceeding average for developed world)
V--(countries with development level somewhat below average for developing world)
VI--(countries with large population and low per capita income level)
VII--(least developed countries)

The share of the active population employed in the industrial sectors also varies substantially for the groups. In all the stages the corresponding indicators of group I are approximately 4-fold greater than for group VII. But the countries of group I have a colossal lag behind the developed capitalist states in terms of the share of the active population involved in the industrial sectors. While in agriculture this gap at the end of the 1970's was, as we have seen, an average of around 30 years, in terms of the proportional amount of the industrial sectors in employment they have only approached the average indicators which in an averaged form characterized the situation in Europe and the United States 100 years prior to this.

The difference in the economic structures even for the higher group of developing countries, like the entire developing world, from the present and past economic structures of the developed capitalist states is primarily in the relatively small labor-absorbing capacity of the industrial sector. If one excludes the group of smallest states (where the shares of the industrial sectors in gross product and employment probably have drawn closer and have become more or

Table 3

Structural Indicators in Basic Groups of Developing Countries at End of 1970's (%)*

a) Группы стран	b) Количество стран	c) Доля в ВВП						
		d) Сельское хозяйство			e Промышленность и строительство		f Сфера услуг	
		ВВП g	занятость h	разрыв i	в целом j	обрабат. k промышленность	j в целом	транспорт и связь ** l
I (страны среднеразвитого капитализма)	15	8,4	20,7	—12,3	35,4	22,6	56,5	8,1
II (страны — производители нефти с высоким уровнем дохода на душу населения)	7	4,1	43,3	—39,2	68,0	5,7	28,0	3,9
III (мельчайшие страны с высоким уровнем дохода на душу населения)	6	11,0	23,8	—12,8	22,7	10,3	65,8	5,0
IV (страны с уровнем развития, несколько превышающим средний по развивающемуся миру)	17	21,8	47,7	—25,9	30,5	17,5	47,4	6,6
V (страны с уровнем развития, несколько уступающим среднему по развивающемуся миру)	25	27,1	60,9	—33,8	26,4	12,3	46,2	6,0
VI (многонаселенные страны с низким уровнем дохода на душу населения)	3	31,3	59,8	—28,5	26,3	13,0	43,0	5,7
VII (наименее развитые страны)	26	44,5	76,0	—31,5	15,5	8,2	39,9	4,6
m) Все развивающиеся страны ***	99	25,4	53,0	—27,6	27,2	13,0	46,1	5,8
n) Африка		22,7	68,5	—45,8	37,4	10,4	39,9	5,9
o) Ближний Восток		9,8	49,1	—39,3	59,0	10,7	31,2	5,2
p) Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия		29,4	63,1	—33,7	30,7	19,3	39,9	6,3
q) Латинская Америка		11,0	34,7	—24,7	39,7	25,6	49,3	5,7
r) Все развивающиеся страны ****		17,5	59,4	—41,9	40,4	18,1	42,1	5,9

Compiled and calculated from: "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," 1979, Vol II, p 56-85; 1980, Vol II, p 417; UN MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, No 2, 1981, pp 205-213; UNCTAD, "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics," 1979, pp 506-522; 1980, pp 396-407; FAO. "Production Yearbook," 1980, pp 61-71.

* In all the groups the calculation is on the basis of average unweighted amounts and in the regions by weighted amounts; for the GDP of the groups the data for 1977, 1978 or another close year; for the GDP of the regions, the data for 1979 (in 1975 prices); for employment according to the FAO estimate for 1978-1979.

** The data for transportation and communications have been made separate for comparability with the indicators of Table 1.

*** Calculation on basis of average unweighted indicators for all countries included in above groups. GDP--in current prices of 1977-1978 or close years.

**** Calculation on basis of average weighted aggregate indicators. Employment is our estimate, extrapolation on basis of trends characteristic for dynamics of previous decade; GDP--in 1975 prices.

[Table 3 continued]

Key: a--Groups of countries
b--Number of countries
c--Share in GDP
d--Agriculture
e--Industry and construction
f--Service sphere
g--GDP
h--Employment
i--Gap
j--As whole
k--Manufacturing industry
l--Transportation and communications
m--All developing countries
n--Africa
o--Near East
p--South and Southeast Asia
q--Latin America
r--All developing countries

I--(countries of medium developed capitalism)
II--(oil producing countries with high per capita income level)
III--(smallest countries with high per capita income level)
IV--(countries with development level somewhat above average for developing world)
V--(countries with development level somewhat below average for developing world)
VI--(countries with large population and low per capita income level)
VII--(least developed countries)

less equal), the gap between these shares everywhere, as a rule, has increased rather rapidly. This is the leading trend and, as is seen, is significantly more uniform than in agriculture. As for the amount of this gap, it is minimal in group I and maximum in group II, where oil production and the related sectors create a significant share of the gross product, but involve a comparatively small portion of the active population. The gap is striking in groups IV and V where a majority of the nations are just beginning to industrialize. It again climbs in groups VI and VII, where the indicators are comparatively low not only for the population involved in the industrial sphere but also for the product produced in it.

As can be seen, at the start of the examined period, in 1950, the excess of product created in the industrial sectors over the agrarian product was observed only in the first three groups of countries. In other words, at that time a predominant majority of the Asian and African countries still were not involved in the industrialization process. At the end of the 1970's, the situation had changed sharply with a clear excess of the industrial sector found now in group IV, in group V the "contributions" of the agrarian and industrial sectors had become approximately the same, in group VI they were approaching this parity and only in group VII did the agrarian sector clearly dominate in the material production structure. The prevalence of the industrial sector over the agrarian one at the end of the 1970's was also observed on a level of all regions (including in South and Southeast Asia, if transportation and communications are included in the industrial sector).

If one assesses the differences between the groups of developing countries in the industrialization level from the viewpoint of the employment structure and not the gross product, then the general picture will appear substantially different. The industrial-agrarian profile had formed only in group I which included just three small Asian countries (Lebanon, Cyprus and Singapore) and

one colony (Hong Kong), and not before the 1970's. In all the remaining groups of countries (with the exception of III) agricultural employment even now exceeds industrial by 2-5- and even 10-fold. In this regard, the oil exporting countries of group II stand significantly closer to the basic mass of Afro-Asian countries concentrated in groups IV-VII than to the remaining higher groups of I and III, while the gap in the productivity of the basic economic sectors here is particularly great and is increasing rapidly. This situation has found an extreme expression in Saudi Arabia, where the share of the agrarian sector in the GDP in 1977 was 1 percent while employment was 61 percent, and for the industrial sector, 76 and 14-15 percent, respectively.[11]

In all the groups of the developing countries, without exception, a larger portion of their gainfully employed population is engaged in the service sphere than in industry and construction. Its share has increased in all the groups. Here in the groups holding higher positions in terms of the overall development level, the share of the service sphere in employment, as a rule, has been higher and has grown more rapidly. The corresponding indicators for the nations of I (where this is determined by the overall development level and by the social influence of external factors) and III (where this is related chiefly to specialization in the international division of labor) groups have come up to and in individual instances have even surpassed the share of employment occurring in the service sphere in the developed capitalist countries. The countries in the oil exporting group stand out in this regard; here employment in the service sphere has broadened particularly rapidly: in 1950-1970, the share of this sphere in employment almost doubled. To a certain degree this compensates for the extremely low involvement of the active population in the industrial sphere. In the countries of groups IV-VII, the amount of the gap between the shares of the service sphere in product and employment is relatively larger.

From Tables 2 and 3 it follows that the labor-absorbing capacity of the service sphere is higher (and is increasing more rapidly) than in the industrial sector. But it can scarcely be felt that the accelerated expansion of the service sphere can become a radical means--in any event over the next decade--for solving the problem of employment where this problem is most acute: in a majority of the Afro-Asian countries.

The slow shift of the gainfully employed population in the developing countries into the industrial sector and the existing gaps in the proportions of the GDP and employment have already been pointed out in the literature.[12] The data of Tables 1-3 make it possible to trace the asynchronous development in the production and employment structures over an extended historical period and on various levels of the developing world. The changes in these two structures here, and particularly in those groups of countries where a predominant portion of the Asian and African population is concentrated, not only do not coincide but also have differed sharply from what happened in the past in the presently developed capitalist states. The structural shifts in the economy of the developing countries have not merely been later in comparison with the previous historical models. In remaining for different times and on different scales in the various economic sectors and in the different country groups, they have produced variations of economic growth which differ substantially from the past of the capitalist countries. The postwar development compressed into a short

time interval has exacerbated the sharp imbalance in the basic socioeconomic proportions. The arising economic disproportions are fraught with serious reproduction disruptions and create a field of enormous social tension.

Modern and Traditional Economic Sectors: Changing Relationships

The unprecedented gap between the production and employment structure in the developing countries is the result primarily of the extremely uneven and essentially focal economic growth. The initial development level of the productive forces was very low and industrialization for a majority of the Afro-Asian countries started only in the postwar decades. For this reason the comparatively rapid rise in the capital-to-labor ratio and labor productivity (although the latter rose relatively more slowly) has involved only individual, as a rule, very limited spheres of the local economy, chiefly the production of industrial articles and partially services (primarily transportation and communications).

The development of modern equipment, while increasing productivity, also reduces the demand for manpower. The demand for manpower from the young industry of the developing countries has been growing particularly slowly; the modern enterprises developed here are in principle equipped with more productive equipment and employ more efficient production processes than those which were typical for the corresponding stages in the economic history of the presently developed states. The developing countries, in endeavoring to accelerate industrialization, often introduce more capital-intensive production methods than is required by the ratio existing here between labor and capital.

For this reason and also due to the rapid demographic growth, a significant contingent of the labor force settles in the traditional and other little-productive economic spheres the development of which is based chiefly or exclusively on manual labor: primarily in agriculture and certain other sectors (particularly in the service sphere).

The economy of the developing countries generally and industry in particular are marked by an extremely broad and diverse range of employed implements of labor. Here side by side with machine technology there exist, on the one hand, the embryos of more technologically complex types of production reflecting the arrival of the age of the scientific and technical revolution and, on the other, the most primitive equipment and manual labor are employed on an enormous scale. Due to this, the forms of the social organization of production and the motivating reasons and possibilities for the growth of its various sectors are also characterized by a broad range and a significant diversity. The heterogeneity of the local socioeconomic structures substantially complicates their integration within unified national economic complexes.

The eroding of the boundaries between the different types and forms of production as well as the lack of the necessary statistics do not make it possible with complete reliability to determine their economic and social role. This cannot be done also because among specialists there is no unanimous opinion on the economic structures existing here.

Changes in the sectorial production structure in one way or another are connected to a reorganization in the forms and methods of the organizing of social labor, the professional-skill and socioclass composition of the labor force and hence to the way of life and the nature of consumption. In a general form these shifts are fixed in the changing relationship of the two basic sectors in economic activity: the traditional and the modern. However, the very dividing along the given lines does not coincide with the sectorial, while technical and socioeconomic progress are far from always matched in time. In general the real scale and particularly the depth of modernizing the socioeconomic structures is significantly harder to detect (in any event, in an aggregate form) than is the change in the proportions of production and employment. For this reason we were forced to employ the method of reconstructing the whole from the parts and "sketching in" the general picture from the existing individual data in the country and regional breakdown. The estimates which are offered below for this reason are of an approximate nature.

With all the conditionality of dividing the economy of the developing nations into the traditional and modern sectors (in the employed terminology), this is very useful. In broadening the framework of the previous analysis, this sheds additional light on the still insufficiently studied socioeconomic breakdown of their structural development and thereby provides a clearer notion both of the scale (partially also of the social forms) in the incipient reorganization of the archaic economic structures as well as of the unevenness in the very development process.

In our analysis, the traditional sector includes the precapitalist production forms and typical for which are a predominance of manual labor, stagnation of the technical level forms of social organization which have come from the past and a sporadic, frequently compulsory tie with the market. As for the modern sector, it, on the contrary, includes the relatively developed types of production in organizational and technical terms and these are organically linked to the market and are based, as a rule, on the use of hired labor. This is formed on the basis of large-scale and medium private capitalist entrepreneurship, mixed state-capitalist forms of management and the state sector per se. In the socioeconomic structures of the developing countries, in addition, an intermediate sector is frequently established and this incoporates all the transitional (from the organizational, technical and social viewpoint) forms of production, that is, small-scale capitalist and a portion of small-scale commodity production. The so-called unorganized or, as it is often termed in foreign literature, the informal sector is sometimes also viewed as a separate economic subdivision; in our view, this sector is an unique part of the intermediate sector, its inferior level, although in terms of its technical level and the specific purpose of the product (an orientation to the consumption of the poor strata of the population), the informal sector differs little from the traditional.

According to the existing estimates, at the beginning of the 1960's, the modern sector in the economy of the most developed, Latin American region produced an average of around 50 percent of the GDP while the traditional produced 7 percent; the remainder was due to the intermediate sector.[13] In South and Southeast Asia, as well as in Africa, the share of the modern and intermediate sectors was incomparably less. Thus, if we take the volume of noncommodity [nonmarket]

production and the so-called sales out of need caused by the necessity of paying debts, taxes and so forth for the product of the traditional sector in agriculture in India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, then the share of this sector would be at least four-fifths of the entire agricultural product of the region. (The noncommodity [nonmarket] agricultural product during this period has been estimated at around two-thirds of the gross product while approximately one-half of the total commodity stocks went for the share of peasant sales out of need.) Since the share of agriculture in the GDP of these countries was then around 50 percent, the proportional amount of the traditional sector in all their gross product reached 40 percent. Since at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's these four countries produced around two-thirds of the aggregate GDP of all the states of South and Southeast Asia, we can assume that the indicators for the designated region as a whole were approximately the same. In the developing countries of Africa, with an approximately equal share of noncommodity [nonmarket] product and sales out of need, the traditional agriculture sector at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's also provided around four-fifths of all agricultural production. However, the share of this sector in the GDP was approximately 40 percent there and respectively the proportional amount of the traditional sector in the GDP equaled 33 percent.[14]

Since in actuality the traditional sector also includes a portion of construction, the service sphere and small-scale industry which deliver their product to agriculture on the basis of a direct exchange of product, its share in the GDP of the last two regions should be somewhat higher than the calculated.[15] Thus, the indicators adopted by us intentionally do not understate the share of traditional production.

Over the two decades which have passed from the time to which these estimates relate, the role of commodity-monetary and capitalist relations and at the same time the intermediate and modern sectors in the economy of the developing countries has undoubtedly grown. Certainly, this growth has varied in the different countries. But since the growth dynamics of production in the traditional sector can be hypothetically considered equal to the increase rate of the population, having estimated the initial share of this sector in gross production and in knowing the growth rate of the GDP as a whole, it is possible to approximately determine the change of its share in the economy. Thus, with an increase in production in this sector equal to the growth of the population, in 1960-1980, in the developing countries of Africa its product would have risen by 58 percent, in South and Southeast Asia by 61 percent and in Latin America by 77 percent.[16] In comparing these data with the production dynamics of the GDP as a whole over this same period, we see that the product of the intermediate and modern sectors which have provided virtually the entire increase in per capita income in these three regions increased by 160, 175 and 215 percent, respectively.[17] With such a ratio in the rates, the share of the traditional sector in the economy of the nations of Africa and South and Southeast Asia by the start of the 1980's would have declined to 25-27 percent and in Latin America to 4-5 percent.

Progress, as we can see, has not been so slight, although it must not be forgotten that the initial data for the traditional sector, particularly for the first two regions, were somewhat understated. But even this is not the main

thing, but rather it is in the significantly more important role which is played by the traditional sector in the employment structure and, consequently, in providing the population with the means for existence. In Latin America, by the start of the 1960's, this sector employed around two-fifths of the gainfully employed population while the modern one employed around one-eighth.[18] Hence, in terms of labor productivity the modern sector here has passed the traditional one by almost 23-fold: even the transitional forms of production, if one proceeds from these data, would be an average of more than 4-fold more effective than the traditional ones.

In line with the lower development level (and, respectively, the smaller adaptability of the local economy to assimilating modern production forms and methods) in the developing Asian and African countries, the gap between the modern and traditional sectors, in all probability, as an average is not as great as in Latin America. But here, in comparison with the Latin American countries, the modern sector of the economy provides means for existence for a smaller portion of the population while the traditional one, conversely, does this for a much greater portion. Supporting this conclusion, on the one hand, is the more significant role of the agrarian sector generally and the consumer semi-barter economy, in particular, in the economy of the Asian and African countries and, on the other, the smaller development of the institution of hired labor.

An approximate notion of the share of the gainfully employed population engaged in the traditional sector can be obtained from the ILO data on the scale of poverty and incomplete employment in the developing countries (see Table 4).

Table 4

Population of Developing Countries Suffering from "Profound Poverty"* and Incomplete Unemployment in the First Half of the 1970's

	Population in "Deep Poverty" (% of total population)	Not Fully Employed (% of gainfully employed population)
Developing world as a whole	67	38
Including:		
Asia	71	36
Africa	69	38
Latin America	43	29

Source: ILO. "Employment, Growth and Basic Needs. A One-World Problem," Geneva, 1976, pp 18, 22.

* "Profound Poverty" is a category employed by international organizations for describing population groups with the lowest income level in the developing countries.

Obviously, poverty, including "profound," is also widespread outside the traditional sector in the developing world. The extremely low standard of living which scarcely rises above the poverty line is undoubtedly characteristic for a significant portion of the unemployed as well as those employed in the informal sector (which is part of the intermediate one). At the same time, the existing statistical data on poverty apply not to the economically active but rather to the entire population. If it is assumed that the numbers of poor and more or less prosperous families are approximately the same, these data can be used as a guide for assessing employment in the traditional sector or, more accurately, its possible limit. The lower limit of employment in this sector is determined by the total number of not fully employed (in line with seasonal fluctuations in the production cycle and in the prevailing portion of the traditional forms of labor activity). This category, according to the ILO definition, also includes those whose employment is ineffective, that is, those who due to the extremely low (even due to local conditions) labor productivity possess also a low income. Thus, the real scales of employment, the traditional sector, are located somewhere in the range between that share of the population which is cut off by the "profound poverty" boundary and that portion which suffers from incomplete and ineffective employment. A numerical expression of the employment, judging from everything, is closer to the first indicator. An indirect confirmation of this is the above-given estimate of the Economic Commission for Latin America for employment in the traditional sector of the Latin American countries at the beginning of the 1960's.

Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to assess the employment dynamics in the traditional sector and the degree of its lag behind the modern one in terms of labor productivity. But, taking into account the relatively low labor-absorbing capacity of the nontraditional economic forms and primarily the modern ones (this moreover has shown a tendency to decline), it can be assumed that shifts in the employment structure in favor of the modern sector have been much less than in the production sphere. Consequently, the lag of the traditional sector behind the modern one in terms of labor productivity has increased substantially. In any event, the gaps between production and employment in the modern and traditional sectors are probably not less but rather more than those sectorial gaps which were described above.

However, from this it does not follow that the traditional structures themselves have not undergone any changes. A portion of them (as a rule, a rather limited one), being involved in the channel of general development, has been transformed into semimodern or modern structures; the other had continued to be in a state of stagnation and decay. The commencing intensification of agricultural production has encouraged a broadening of economic ties between the agrarian sector and the industrial one. Very indicative in this regard is India where the share of industry in the current reproduction expenditures of agriculture since the end of the 1940's up to the mid-1970's has risen from 2.6 to 14 percent, or more than 5-fold.[19]

At the same time, the strengthening of economic ties between the two basic sectors of material production in one area has been accompanied by their relative weakening in another. With diversification and the greater complexity of the local industrial structures, their dependence upon the agricultural raw materials has declined. In the same India, the proportional amount of

agriculture in the current reproduction expenditures of industry over the designated 25 years has declined from 40 to 24 percent.[20] The rapid growth of commodity exchange relations with industry in the countries developing along a capitalist path has been characteristic only for a very small, comparatively developed part of the agrarian economy, for the better off peasant and capitalizing landowner farms. The ties of the basic mass of peasantry with urban civilization in the production sphere have maintained predominantly a one-sided nature. Need, the illiteracy of the peasantry and the extremely limited access to organized credit impede the use of agrotechnical innovations on their farms.

Thus, the integration of industry and agriculture in essence has not touched the vast traditional periphery of the local economy. A certain broadening of the semimodern and modern sectors in the course of intensifying farming has usually been accompanied by a relative and often an absolute deterioration of the situation in the traditional sector. The problem of employment in the countryside has been exacerbated as a result, on the one hand, of the growing purchasing of land from the poor peasants or their violent driving off from the occupied land and, on the other, the accelerated mechanization of agricultural work occurring in the capitalizing farms. The partial, focal nature of intersectorial integration not only has not offset the overall disintegration in the socioeconomic structure of the developing countries but in certain terms has even intensified it.

As a whole, the difficult and extended nature of transforming the archaic forms of production and the lag in agricultural development (along with the predominant use of comparatively capital intensive production methods in industry, the chronic underloading of production capacity and the low national economic efficiency of this sector), in exacerbating the employment problem, have contributed to the growth of poverty and to a deepening of socioeconomic inequality. The socioeconomic dualism is not being eradicated but rather preserved: the integration of diverse economic and social elements into homogeneous structures based on similar values and stereotypes of conduct is encountering serious impediments.

At the beginning of the article, we pointed out that the postwar period has involved a significant acceleration in the economic growth of the developing countries. From 1-2 percent increase in the GDP in the postwar decades, average annual indicators for the developing world as a whole has risen up to 5.3 percent in 1950-1980. In the UN strategy for the 1980's, the task has been set of bringing the growth rate up to 7 percent per year. Even if such a rate were feasible (and the indicators achieved at the start of the decade show that this is more than dubious), a sharp inequality in development has been and remains one of its main distinguishing features on the periphery of the nonsocialist world.

An average annual growth rate for the GDP exceeding the average indicator for the 1950-1980 period has been reached by countries the population of which does not amount to one-third of the developing world (and a rate of over 8 percent has been achieved by only 1 percent of the population), while the share of countries the growth rate of which was below (or equal) to 3.5 percent (that is, at best scarcely keeping up with the growth of the population) is responsible for over 45 percent of the population in the entire developing world and around

73 percent of the population in the countries with a low per capita income level (groups VI and VII according to the classification which we have used), almost exclusively Afro-Asian.[21] The social "return" from economic growth, consequently, has not been felt (or is virtually not felt) by an enormous part of the population in the developing countries. This is valid in terms of significant masses of people even in such relatively developed countries as Brazil and Mexico which are undergoing accelerated capitalist modernization. This is all the more valid for the enormous, often predominant portion of the population in a majority of the Asian and African countries. A range of ensuing economic and social problems, thus, although with a varying degree of acuteness, is present in all developing countries.

Our analysis has made it possible to outline the situation primarily for the population groups employed in agriculture and concentrated in the traditional or related subdivisions of the intermediate sector. We have shown that while the share of these sectors in terms of product is declining rather rapidly, in the composition of the population it is declining very slowly. In absolute terms, the number of persons whose physical existence, labor, way of life and so forth are determined by traditional and semitraditional forms of social production in the developing world as a whole and in a majority of the nations included in it is growing. These spheres of production provide the means for life for scores and hundreds of millions of people. Over an extended period of time this cannot be replaced by anything. For this reason a realistic strategy should proceed from the fact that the traditional sector performs important functions in economic and social life. The forms of its transformation, of course, will be diverse. On the economic level, the central task involves the connecting of this sector to the process of expanded reproduction (in which the leading role, of course, will be kept by the modern sector) while on the social level this will be to seek out the methods for synthesizing the traditional and modern elements which open up (and not seal off) a way for progressive social development.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Computed from: "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," 1969, Vol II, New York, p 160; 1980, Vol II, p 252; UNCTAD, "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics," New York, 1981, p 354.

[2] See: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 12, 1981, pp 62-64, Table 4 (p 72); all subsequent historical comparisons in the given article are based on the indicators of this table.

[3] At the end of the 1920's, the share of agriculture in the gross product of Germany was 16 percent, 36 percent for Italy, around 20 percent for Japan, 9.5 percent for the United States. See: B. R. Mitchell, "European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970," New York, 1975, pp 799-816; "Historical Statistics of the United States," Washington, 1957, p 140; S. Tsuru, K. Ohkawa, "Long-Term Changes of the National Product of Japan Since 1878," "Income and Wealth," Series III, Cambridge, 1953, p 24.

[4] Let us stipulate, however, that such an equalness occurred only on a level of the industrial sector taken as a whole, chiefly due to the extracting industry. The share of the manufacturing industry in the GDP of the developed capitalist countries in 1979 was 29 percent, and in the developing countries 18 percent. (Calculated from the sources indicated in Table 1.)

[5] See the sources in Table 4: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 12, 1981, p 72 as well as: "The Economics of Underdevelopment," London, 1960, pp 142-143; S. Tsuru, K. Ohkawa, op. cit., p 10.

[6] The significant lag in agriculture in terms of labor productivity in a majority of the developed capitalist states either did not occur at all or is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In the initial stages of the Industrial Revolution, labor productivity in agriculture in relation to the corresponding general economic indicator was 0.4 just in the United States; in Japan it was 0.8, in England 0.9 and in France 1.0 (see: S. Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Nations," Cambridge [Mass], 1971, p117).

[7] Misclassification has been proposed by one of the authors of the given article (see: AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 1 and 2 of 1980) and has been used in the works of a number of researchers. Groups I and III include only a few, exceptionally small-sized Afro-Asian countries; group II includes the "rich oil exporters" of the Near East and Africa (as well as Brunei); groups IV and V (intermediate in terms of the accepted classification criteria) are predominantly Afro-Asian while groups VI and VII are exclusively so (group IV is comprised of the three large Asian states of India, Pakistan and Indonesia; group VII basically coincides with the UN list of the least developed countries).

[8] The GDP--in fixed 1970 prices. Calculated from the data of the sources given in Tables 1-3.

[9] It is important to point out two major differences which make Table 1 (as well as Table 4 mentioned in footnote 2) and 2-3 not completely comparable. In the first place, the indicators for the country groups in Tables 2 and 3 are average unweighted (they provide a more adequate notion of the spread of the determined proportions over the countries of the developing world regardless of the differences in the sizes of these countries), while all the indicators of Table 1 (and in Table 4, footnote 2) are average weighted ones. The discrepancies with the average weighted indicators which to a greater degree reflect the situation in the large countries are greater the more small countries are present in the unweighted final indicators. In order to assess the magnitude of the discrepancies, the lines of Tables 2 and 3 which summarize the data for all the developing countries for each year are shown in both variations. Secondly, the employment statistics which we possessed include transportation and communications in the service sphere. This required a regrouping of the data in Tables 2 and 3 in comparison with Table 1. Correspondingly all the indicators of the industrial sectors are lower than in Table 1 by the amount of the share in transportation and communications and in the service sectors they are higher.

[10] The average weighted shares of employment in agriculture for the group of nations with medium-developed capitalism were 9-10 points higher chiefly due to Brazil and Mexico. However, at the end of the 1970's agriculture in these large countries employed 38-40 percent of the active population and this coincides approximately with the average weighted indicator for the developed capitalist countries at the beginning of the 1920's.

[11] See: UN MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, No 2, 1981, p 211; ILO, "Labor Force Estimates and Projections. 1950-2000," Vol 1, p 60; UNCTAD, "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics," 1980, p 402.

[12] See: AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 11, 1979, p 30; S. Kuznets, "Modern Economic Growth," London, 1967, pp 87-158.

[13] UN ECLA, "Income Distribution in Latin America," New York, 1971, pp 27, 37, 136.

[14] Calculated from: V. G. Rastyannikov, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: prodovol'stviye i politika" [The Developing Countries: Food and Policy], Moscow, 1968, pp 23-25, 34-35, 44; A. Ya. El'yanov, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta i rynok" [The Developing Countries: Problems of Economic Growth and the Market], Moscow, 1976, pp 61-64, 177, 179; see also UN ECA, "Economic Bulletin for Africa," Addis Ababa, [S.A.], Vol IV, No 1, Part B, p 12.

[15] This share is understated because the official statistics on which the calculation of the GDP for the developing countries is based has a tendency to underestimate the amount of the product created in the traditional barter and semibarter sectors of the economy (and, consequently, its share in the GDP): in the first place, due to the difficulties of measuring this and, secondly, as a consequence of the lower level of the actual prices for the product as well as the prices taken as the basis in determining the volume of nonmarket production. This trend is particularly apparent in converting the value amount of the GDP from the national currencies into American dollars at the official exchange rate and this is ordinarily done in international comparisons. For this see: "Tipologiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran (Opyt mnogomernogo statisticheskogo analiza narodnykh khozyaystv)" [Typology of Nonsocialist Nations (An Attempt at a Multidimensional Statistical Analysis of National Economies)], Moscow, 1976, pp 38-39.

[16] Calculated from: UN MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, No 1, 1967; No 1, 1977; No 1, 1982. Since this does not take into account the loss of the gainfully employed population from the traditional into the intermediate and modern sectors, it is not to be excluded that the growth rates for traditional production are somewhat inflated. But, in equating the growth rates of the population and production in the traditional sector we, in the first place, consider the probability of certain technical progress in this sector and, secondly, we are not risking the understating of its role at the present stage.

[17] Calculated from: UN TAD, "Trade and Development Report," Geneva, 1981, pp 26, 72; "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," 1976, 1980.

[18] UN ECLA, "Income Distribution in Latin America," pp 27, 37, 136.

[19] "Tovarno-denezhnyye otnosheniya v ekonomike Indii" [Commodity Monetary Relations in the Indian Economy], Moscow, 1976, p 62; "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya" [The Developing Countries: Problems of Economic Development], Moscow, 1978, p 147.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Calculated from: "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics"; "UN Demographic Yearbook"; UN MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS for appropriate years. Data have also been employed from the national statistics from a number of countries.

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ON THE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL POTENTIAL OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 27-36

[Article by S. L. Stoklitskiy]

[Text] In 1973, in Oman which had scarcely roused itself from medieval slumber, the authorities decided to begin creating a satellite communications system with the outside world. At the same time, the nation then did not have a single specialist capable of operating modern telemetric equipment and there were neither VUZes or universities which could train personnel for handling the modern equipment.[1] This possibly extreme but far from the sole example starkly contrasts the real contradictions in the development of the young independent states during the age of the scientific and technical revolution. On the one hand, scientific and technical progress which has become a global factor in the development of the productive forces and, on the other, the socioeconomic backwardness of the liberated states for many of which the age of the Industrial Revolution long passed by capitalism serves as a still far-off goal.

Since in the system of the world capitalist economy the West maintains a monopoly on science and technology, it is understandable that the use of the recent achievements of scientific thought by the liberated states involves their growing dependence upon "technological neocolonialism." But it is not merely a question of the possibilities of the new scientific and technical discoveries and developments (here the advantage of the world capitalist centers is obvious) but also in the capacity to employ their results. Hence, the complex and ever-more urgent problem of creating conditions in the developing countries whereby it would be possible to more productively employ the factor of scientific and technical progress in the interests of the national economy. In the initial phase of scientific and technical development which the countries of the region are now going through, it is becoming particularly important to search for ways for creating and strengthening the national scientific and technical potential (STP)[2] and for carrying out the corresponding scientific and technical policy.

The problem of the gap between the required and existing levels and scales for the financing of the STP in the Arab world, undoubtedly, is among the most acute. The scientific and technical infrastructure begins to produce a real return only under the condition of sufficiently large expenditures on its creation. According to the "World Plan of Actions" aimed at the development of science and technology in the young states and proposed by UN experts, by the end of the 1970's it was recommended that the liberated countries allocate

at least 1 percent of their GNP for this purpose. In the 1980's, in the opinion of experts from the Arab world, at least 2-3 percent of the GNP had to be spent annually for an initial rapid rise in science and technology.[3]

At the same time, none of the countries in the region has succeeded in achieving the designated goals. According to the data at our disposal (Table 1),[4] the share of expenditures on research and development (R&D) in the GNP has at best reached 0.7 percent in Egypt and Lebanon. As for a majority of the remaining states, this indicator is even lower.

The enormous gap between the desired and actual efforts of the young states is determined by the action of a number of factors. Primarily it is the high specific capital intensiveness of modern science. If one does not consider the extreme positions held in Table 1 by Egypt and Libya, on the one hand, and Bahrain and Oman on the other, the cost of one research job in the Arab countries in the second half of the 1970's was from 15,000 to 36,000 dollars and varied around the indicators characteristic of Israel and Portugal (around 24,000 dollars) where the productive forces are in a higher level of development.

Table 1

R&D Expenditures in Arab Countries, United States, Israel and Portugal

Countries	Years	Total, million dollars*	Calculated per specialist with higher education employed in R&D, dollars*	Per capita, dollars*	Share of R&D expenditures in GNP, %
Egypt	1976	85.5	7,235	2.3	0.7
Libya	1976	48.3	--	19.8	0.5
Iraq	1974	25.0	16,853	2.3	0.2
Kuwait	1977	21.0	36,296	19.5	0.1
Tunisia	1977	19.9	--	3.5	0.5
Lebanon	1973	17.5	22,400	2.0	0.7
Sudan	1978	13.8	4,239	0.8	0.3
Syria	1976	6.9	--	0.9	0.1
Jordan	1976	6.2	25,000	2.2	0.5
North Yemen	1974	2.2	36,153	1.3	0.2
Morocco	1976	1.4	--	0.08	0.01
Bahrain	1976	1.3	15,330	4.7	0.2
Oman	1976	1.2	--	1.6	0.07
United States	1976	40,113	74,133	186.5	2.7
Israel	1978	354	23,886	95.5	4.2
Portugal	1976	42.3	24,209	4.5	0.3

* Recalculated in dollars at official exchange rate on corresponding date.

Calculated from: UNESCO, "Statistical Yearbook," Paris, 1980, pp 872, 874, 876, 877; 1981, p V-50, 51; "National Science...," p 116; "An Introduction to Policy...," pp 83-84.

The significant capital intensiveness of a scientific job, in turn, is largely explained by the high specific capital expenditures on experimental research. In Algeria in 1974-1977, the proportional amount of the planned expenditures on equipping a researcher with the necessary equipment and facilities was estimated at up to 52 percent of all the R&D expenditures (not counting investments into the construction of laboratory buildings and so forth).[5] A large portion of the funds allocated for these purposes is spent in foreign currency. For example, in Egypt, in 1977, the proportional amount of the currency expenditures on financing research projects reach, according to our estimates, 32 percent and in technically more complex R&D, for example the nuclear power research program, it is around 70 percent.[6]

The possibilities of the Arab countries to form the STP are determined not only by the specific indicators of the financial expenditures. Ultimately of crucial significance is the absolute amount of the expended material and financial resources. For each type of research there is a "critical minimum" of absolute expenditures which is set for a given moment. Differing for the types of research, this minimum generally grows in keeping with the development of scientific and technical progress. At the same time, the absolute R&D expenditures in the region have remained insignificant. According to our estimates, in the second half of the 1970's, they were 270-300 million dollars. In the estimate of a prominent specialist in the area of science and scientific policy in the Arab world, A. B. Zahlan, in 1976, these expenditures were around 335 million dollars in comparison with 80 million dollars in 1965. However, considering inflation, R&D expenditures in 1976, in 1965 prices, much less, some 128 million dollars.[7]

One is struck by the extreme unevenness in the distribution of financial expenditures within the region (Table 1). Undoubtedly Egypt was ahead of the other countries in the given area. A sharp jump in R&D expenditures occurred in the oil exporting countries of Libya, Iraq, Kuwait and Tunisia and in each of these even in the mid-1960's the R&D expenditures were 0.3-0.7 million dollars. Judging from a number of indirect data, R&D expenditures are growing rapidly in Algeria and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, in certain countries of the region the currency and financial possibilities for forming the STP are limited. In some due to the absence of "petro dollars" and in others as a consequence of the small absolute amounts of the GNP, and in still others for both these reasons. Lebanon, Syria, North Yemen and others are among the countries with limited possibilities. Often these countries have been forced to resort to outside financing sources. For North Yemen the share of these sources in the total volume of financing was (in 1974) 74 percent.[8]

Thus, the interaction of the two processes of a continuous rise in the material requirements on forming the STP, on the one hand, and the growing unevenness in the distribution of economic potential in the region and, as a consequence of this, the sharp differentiation in the possibilities of financing the STP, on the other, has led to a limiting of the number of countries which possess the real material and financial capabilities for creating their own full-scale STP which meets modern requirements.

A process which is similar in nature but somewhat different in results is also occurring in the area of the training and improving of scientific and technical

personnel. There is a very tangible gap between the "critical minimum" of specialists and scientists needed for R&D and their present contingent in the Arab world. It is considered that for more or less successful development of even one, not even broad area with the current development level of science and technology, at least 100 researchers with a higher education are needed. At the same time, up to the second half of the 1970's, in all the Arab countries, according to our estimate, there were only 12,000 specialists with a higher education employed in R&D. Calculated per 100,000 inhabitants, this is several-fold less than in the developed capitalist states. Around 8,000 or two-thirds of all the scientific workers in the Arab world are concentrated in Egypt (Table 2), while in such countries as Oman, Bahrain and Somali, their numbers are literally in the tens. While in Egypt the scientific contingent is mainly comprised of national personnel, for example, in Kuwait, Libya and Sudan predominantly foreigners are engaged in scientific and technical research. Their share in the contingent of specialists employed in R&D was, respectively, 91, 80 and 69 percent, there.[9] But times are changing and, judging from individual indirect data, by the beginning of the 1980's scientific personnel and primarily national was appearing in those countries where it had not been previously (Bahrain, United Arab Emirates). There has also been a process of replacing foreigners. However, in a majority of instances, as yet one can only speak about a trend toward a substantial change in the existing order of things.

Table 2

Contingent of Specialists Engaged in R&D in a Number of Arab Countries, the United States, Israel and Portugal

Countries	Years	Specialists with Higher Education				Technicians engaged in R&D, persons
		Total, persons	Employed in R&D*			
			Persons	% of total number	Per 100,000 inhabitants	
Egypt	1973	593,300	6,900	1.16	24	--
Sudan	1978	--	3,300	--	18.8	3,300
Iraq	1973	50,000	200	0.4	14	400
Jordan	1977	11,600	500	4.31	15.6	--
Kuwait	1977	27,200**	600	2.2	53.7	200
Lebanon	1973	36,000	300	0.63	23.2	200
North Yemen	1974	1,400	60	4.28	1.2	50
Libya	1973	8,300	50	0.6	2	100
United States	1978	2,508,000	586,000	23.3	269	66,600
Israel	1978	--	14,700	3.43	399.1	--
Portugal	1978	--	2,100	--	--	2,700

* Recalculated for persons employed full-time in R&D.

** 1975

Calculated from: UNESCO, "Statistical Yearbook 1980," Paris, 1981, pp 755-757, 762-764; "National Science...," pp 113, 202; "An Introduction to Policy...," pp 70-75.

Table 3

Number of Arab Scientists Publishing Their Own Works in Scientific Publications

Country	1967	1970	1973	1976
Egypt	293	443	443	731
Lebanon	58	89	106	100
Iraq	32	44	60	94
Sudan	30	70	59	93
Algeria	22	46	62	63
Saudi Arabia	8	14	17	57
Kuwait	2	2	39	56
Tunisia	3	17	20	39
Morocco	11	12	19	31
Libya	3	5	16	31
Jordan	1	7	7	15
Syria	2	1	9	10
Other countries	0	0	0	3
Total	465	750	847	1,323

Source: A. B. Zahlan, op. cit., p 30. (Compiled on the basis: "Who Is Publishing in Science," Philadelphia, for appropriate years.)

Selective research on the number of Arab scientists publishing scientific works (Table 3) also shows the intraregional differentiation. From the given data it can be seen that in the second half of the 1970's, a number of countries which were not the leading oil exporters held virtually a monopoly position in the given area. In some instances, a definite role was played by the higher overall development level of the "human factor" (the sociocultural level of the population, the degree of its literacy, informed awareness, the spread of mass information media and so forth). This is seen most clearly from the example of Lebanon (7.5 percent of all the published scientific works in 1976). In other instances (Sudan, with respectively 7 percent) the absolute size of the population was important. The beneficial effect of these two factors has made it possible for Egypt over the designated decade to maintain the role of the obvious leader with over 63 percent of the total number of persons publishing scientific works in 1967 and over 55 percent in 1976. One is struck by the impressive progress in the given area by a number of the leading oil exporters. Over the designated decade the number of scientists from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya publishing works rose by several-fold. As a result, the proportional amount of the designated group of countries in this regard increased from 9.7 to 18 percent. At the same time the productiveness of the Arab scientists is still low. In 1976, 1,323 persons published scientific works, that is, only 11 percent of the entire contingent of specialists with a higher education employed in R&D.[10]

There are numerous reasons for the designated lag. In the opinion of experts, among these one must mention the low status of the profession of a scientist in Arab society, the insufficiently high wage level in comparison with entrepreneurial activities, the absence of a truly scientific atmosphere in the research collectives, the scattering of personnel and weaknesses in the organization of R&D.[11] It is also essential to point to the very small number of auxiliary middle-level technical personnel (see Table 2). Of all the graduated specialists from this category in the second half of the 1970's, science employed only 1.6 percent (in the United States, 23.3 percent). In the Arab East, a majority of the VUZ and university graduates considers it more attractive to work in industrial business, trade, banks and the state apparatus. Moreover, highly skilled personnel is basically employed in teaching and devotes only a portion of its time to science. According to an expert estimate, around 50 percent of all the research work in the Arab world is done by university instructors during their free time.[12]

The "brain drain" has become a true scourge for Arab science. According to a number of estimates, of all the scientists of the Arab world possessing degrees equivalent to the level of candidates and doctors of sciences, a minimum of 50 percent is presently employed abroad.[13] According to calculations by American specialists, at least 10,000-20,000 Arab students who have obtained a higher natural-science or technical education in the developed capitalist countries remain there.[14] This certainly weakens the national STP of the Arab world and contributes to an increase in the technological gap between them and the centers of world capitalism.

Finally, there is the influence of the still persisting shortcomings in the system of training specialists with a higher specialized and secondary education. Seemingly there have been significant successes in the sphere of higher education. In the 1970's, the number of universities in the Arab countries more than doubled. They were established in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, North Yemen and South Yemen.[15] As follows from Table 4, in 1965, the contingent of Arab students in VUZes as a whole for the region numbered 295,000 persons; in 1970, the figure was 442,000, in 1975, 806,000 and by the start of the 1980's surpassed 1 million persons. Such development rates for VUZ education are higher than in a number of the developed capitalist states, although in terms of the share of young people 20-24 years of age studying in institutions of higher learning, a majority of the Arab countries is behind the industrially developed countries of the capitalist world. A better situation in the Arab world is held by the countries where there is a higher development level of the "human factor" but some of these are not among the leading oil exporters; these are primarily Egypt as well as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. There is a rather large contingent of students also in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. There is a rapidly growing number of persons receiving a higher education (at home or abroad) in those countries where just 15 years ago a VUZ student was a rarity: in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and so forth. Noticeable progress in this area has also been achieved in South Yemen, regardless of the limited material and financial opportunities and the shortage of teacher personnel. However, the level and quality of education from the viewpoint of the requirements of modern STP in a majority of instances leave much to be desired. As before, the humanities prevail; in the estimate of experts, only 36 percent of the students were majoring in the natural sciences and technical disciplines in the second half of the 1970's.[16]

Table 4

Contingent of Students in Arab Nations,
United States, Israel and Portugal*

Countries		1965	1970	1975	1976-1979 (for one of these years)
1		2	3	4	5
Egypt	A	175,000	233,000	455,000	493,000
	B	6.8	8.0	13.7	14.5
Syria	A	33,000	43,000	74,000	112,000
	B	7.6	8.9	13.6	17.8
Iraq	A	28,000	42,000	86,000	96,000
	B	4.0	5.2	9.0	9.1
Lebanon	A	20,000	42,000	--	79,000
	B	9.7	24	--	28
Morocco	A	9,000	16,000	45,000	67,000
	B	0.8	1.5	3.2	4.2
Algeria	A	8,000	20,000	42,000	57,000
	B	0.8	2.0	3.0	3.7
Saudi Arabia	A	3,300	8,500	26,000	47,000
	B	0.6	1.6	4.3	7.1
Tunisia	A	6,000	10,000	21,000	30,000
	B	1.8	2.9	4.2	5.1
Sudan	A	8,000	14,000	21,000	26,000
	B	6.8	1.2	1.5	1.7
Jordan	A	3,200	4,500	12,000	20,000
	B	1.8	2.2	5.3	7.3
Libya	A	1,900	5,200	13,400	14,400
	B	1.4	3.0	6.3	6.1
Kuwait	A	--	2,700	8,100	11,600
	B	--	6.7	9.0	11.7
North Yemen	A	--	60	2,400	4,100
	B	--	0.02	0.7	1.1
South Yemen	A	--	90	--	2,500
	B	--	0.07	--	2.0
Bahrain	A	--	300	700	1,200
UAE	A	--	--	--	1,000
United States	A**	5,500	8,500	10,200	11,300
	B	40.4	49.4	54.6	56.0
Israel	A	36,000	56,000	75,000	87,000
	B	20.0	20.0	23.2	25.6
Portugal	A	35,000	50,000	80,000	85,400
	B	5.0	8.0	10.5	10.7

* A--Number of students (persons).
B--Share of young people 20-24 years of age receiving higher education (%).

** Million persons.

Sources: UNESCO, "Statistical Yearbook," 1972, pp 325-330, 332-336; 1980, pp 432-444, 448, 458-466; 1981, pp 28, 36, 41, 43, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68.

In truth, these data should be adjusted. The Arab states are training abroad very many specialists in the natural science and technical areas, regardless of the threat of the "brain drain." According to a survey, of the 2,500 Arab students studying in the leading American universities and colleges in 1976-1977, only 7.1 percent had majored in the pedagogical sciences and 8.2 percent were in the humanities, while 23.4 percent were studying computers, engineering, and physics majors, 36 percent were taking aviation specialties and 6.2 percent were taking a course in production management.[17] Characteristically of the students covered by the survey, almost 80 percent came from the major oil exporting states: 27 percent from Saudi Arabia, 24 from Kuwait and 16 percent from Iraq.

In training students in the national institutions of higher learning, as specialists have pointed out, in the course of the academic process little attention is given to the development of creative thinking needed for work in the R&D sphere. Frequently blind copying of Western standards leads to the ignoring of local conditions for scientific and technical development. Little time is given to laboratory work, field exercises and so forth.[18] The insufficient attention to the training of technicians and lab workers is also a consequence of the underestimating of scientific and technical knowledge.

A number of complex problems in the scientific and technical policy of the Arab states is involved in the transfer of foreign technology. The problem is that in the region it has become a widespread practice for the Western firms to build large economic projects, where all the production and engineering decisions both in the area of capital construction and in the production sphere are completely imported while the client state receives a finished project. In 1959-1976, this was the case in 95 percent of the 584 plans for petrochemical enterprises in the Arab countries.[19] Foreigners (individuals, consulting firms and so forth) are responsible for the basic share of patents issued in the region for inventions or innovations. According to some estimates, this share in Lebanon, for example, was 85 percent in the mid-1970's.[20]

In favoring such a form of acquiring foreign technology, the authorities with reason assume that this policy makes it possible to more rapidly increase the nation's production potential. However, there is a reverse side to this policy. In contrast to the partners of the Arab states from the socialist countries, the Western entrepreneurs are not concerned for training national skilled personnel on the spot. Moreover, there have been frequent instances, particularly in the conservative Arabian monarchies, where local specialists of sufficiently high skill have been simply eliminated by the Western firms from the taking of scientific and technical decisions. This complicates the problem of replacing the foreign personnel. National organizations and entrepreneurs become the "captives" of the Western firms, consulting engineers and so forth. It is no accident that those countries which are carrying out radical socioeconomic changes and are fighting decisively to establish true and not formal economic sovereignty endeavor to be very careful and limited in their use of such "services" of the West.

It must be said that the importing of Western technology costs a great deal. Embodied in machines, machine tools and equipment, the new technology is inseparable from them and for this reason it is hard to determine its cost. At

the same time it is perfectly obvious that technical progress, along with improving the equipment, simultaneously increases its price. The following example is indicative: the construction of petrochemical enterprises under the conditions of the Arab countries has been 50-100 percent more in comparison with the building of analogous projects in the industrially developed capitalist countries. Overpayments by Arab countries for importing technology in 1975-1980 have been estimated at 25 billion dollars, or around 35 percent of the planned capital investments. This is scores of times more than what was spent on the development of Arab scientific and technical research starting from 1900 up to the present.[21]

In analyzing the question of the results of importing foreign technology, one must take into account the cost of the necessary research to adapt the imported equipment to the local natural and climatic conditions.[22] It is also important to consider the availability and training level of skilled manpower in each specific instance. Thus, in the zone of the Arabian Peninsula, where there has been an acute shortage of local skilled specialists, an emphasis on introducing labor-saving technology is not excluded. In other countries of the region, for example in Egypt, where the unemployment problem is acute, there may be an increase in the proportional amount of labor-intensive operations, a lower level of mechanizing and automating a number of jobs than is envisaged by modern standards, the more active use of manual conveyor assembly and so forth. But, in either way, obviously the questions related to the use of foreign technology cannot be settled productively and in national interests without considering the national scientific-technical personnel and institutions.

The problems of scientific and technical development in all the countries of the region have been elevated to the rank of state policy. Precisely the state in a predominant majority of instances is endeavoring to assume the organization of scientific and technical research on all levels. Scientific and technical departments under local private firms are an extremely rare phenomenon in the Arab world. The foreign affiliates of the overseas companies, as has already been pointed out, use ready-made technology developed at the home enterprises.

State bodies entrusted with the coordinating and management of scientific research have been set up far from everywhere. Probably the most extensive institutional structure of the corresponding bodies exists in Egypt, where there is a ministry responsible for carrying out scientific research as well as special committees supervising the course of scientific research in the sectorial ministries (industry, agriculture and so forth). The Academy for Scientific Research and Technology established in Egypt in 1971 is in charge of broad coordination work and scientific research directly. In many countries of the region the functions of a head scientific body have been assumed by major scientific research institutions. In Jordan this role is played by the Royal Scientific Society, in Kuwait by the Scientific Research Institute, in Saudi Arabia by the National Committee for Science and Technology, in the Sudan by the National Council on Scientific Research and so forth.[23]

A characteristic trait of national scientific and technical policy in the Arab countries is a tendency toward a closer tie of it with the social and economic development plans. For example, in Syria the scientific research program has

become an integral part of such plans even in the first half of the 1970's, while analogous phenomena can be observed in the scientific life of Algeria and a number of other countries. But even when the institutional structure of the scientific-technical bodies and organizations has been more or less formed, one of the most difficult questions remains the choice of the priority R&D areas in the given nation. The humbler the scientific and technical potential of a nation the more acute this problem is, for it does not have sufficient forces for broadly developing research.

Among the problems of an applied nature, the basic efforts of the scientific institutions in the Arab countries, as a rule, are concentrated on adapting the achievements of foreign technology to local conditions. Thus, the co-workers of the Kuwait Scientific Research Institute have worked out methods for testing and adjusting the quality of imported structural elements and mechanisms. The Royal Scientific Society in Jordan has worked out methods for employing imported methods to produce equipment for land reclamation.[24]

Depending greatly in their development upon natural resources,[25] the Arab countries have been interested in broadening the research in the area of geological prospecting and improving its methods. This area has become one of the key ones in Egypt. Geophysical research at the local Academy of Sciences is aimed at discovering new mineral deposits as well as locating underground water sources in the arid regions of the country. One of the priority places is held by geological prospecting and work in the area of cartography in Syria, in the nations of the Arabian Peninsula and so forth.

In the region ubiquitous interest is shown in developing and improving methods for using nontraditional energy sources. Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Kuwait have established experimental stations and laboratories for employing solar and wind energy. Egypt, Iraq and Libya are developing ever-wider research on nuclear power. As can be seen, much attention is being given to a search for a solution to the energy problem not only in countries without their own major reserves of liquid fuel but also by the oil exporters. The latter are interested in promptly preparing a dependable energy base for future generations in employing their "petrodollars."

In the area of agriculture, the research projects involve primarily the problems of combating soil erosion, improving the seed stock, protecting livestock against infectious diseases and so forth. Similar research is being conducted both by nations which have large areas of land (for example, Sudan, Iraq and Morocco) as well as by those which, in experiencing acute land hunger, are betting on intensive methods for developing agricultural production (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula). Many researchers are also resorting to an analysis of past experience. For example, Egypt is studying the traditional irrigation methods.

Since the scientific and technical potential of the individual countries is slight, more and more frequently in the Arab world appeals are being made to pool the forces on a regional basis and intensify scientific and technical ties. At a conference held in 1976 in Morocco for the ministers of the Arab countries responsible for scientific and technical policy, a number of specific projects were proposed aimed at carrying out this task. In particular, it was proposed

that the efforts of the scientific institutions be focused on working out five priority problems: studying the water resources of the region; combating drought and soil erosion; geological and geophysical prospecting; developing the coastal sea zones; research in the area of nontraditional energy sources.[26] It was also proposed that the various countries establish regional centers for the training of scientific and technical personnel. They have not yet begun to actively carry out these and similar projects as differences in the levels of socioeconomic and sociopolitical development and so forth impede the pooling of scientific potentials.

The processes and tasks of forming the STP in the region's countries have common traits. These are determined by their significant lag behind the industrially developed countries in the scientific and technical sphere.

The forming of the STP of the Arab countries requires not only a solution to technical problems. This is primarily a socioeconomic problem, a problem of a general rise in the cultural and social level of society. This means that the path to the successful formation of the STP lies through progressive changes in the social and economic structures. This in essence denies the model of dependent capitalist development as not meeting those requirements which the scientific and technical revolution places on the young independent states.

At the same time it must be pointed out that there has been a noticeable modifying in the approaches to forming the STP under the conditions of the resource-economic, sociopolitical and economic differentiation of the region and the serious differences in the availability of the STP components. For Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia and a number of other countries with a more developed "human factor," the formation of the STP is being impeded primarily by the insignificant material and financial possibilities. Conversely, a majority of the major oil exporters, primarily the Arab monarchies as well as Libya, are limited in forming the STP by a relative and in a number of instances also absolute shortage of personnel. Such countries as South Yemen, Oman and Somali are experiencing difficulties of both sorts. These differences also determine the contradictions in forming the STP which differ in nature and degree of acuteness and also the largely different nature of the decisions taken. In following a feedback system, this gives rise also to new prerequisites for intensifying the uneven development in the various areas of scientific and technical progress.

In the development of the STP of the Arab countries, the external factor plays an enormous role. However, the scientific and technical superiority of the developed capitalist states and the accompanying concentration of technological power in their hands at present do not fatally determine the destiny of the scientific and technical development in the young independent states. The constant growth and strengthening of the influence of the socialist commonwealth, including in the area of scientific and technical progress, have not only undermined the monopoly of the West on modern technical achievements, but have also confronted the region's states with a real alternative for escaping from the fetters of "technological neocolonialism" by developing and strengthening mutually advantageous scientific and technical ties with the socialist world.

FOOTNOTES

[1] UNESCO, "Science Policy Studies and Documents," No 38, "National Science and Technology Policies in the Arab States" (below, "National Science..."), Paris, 1976, pp 29-30.

[2] By STP one understands the aggregate of material, financial and human resources, scientific-technical knowledge, the means and forms of managing scientific and technical progress as well as discoveries, inventions and developments closely tied to the use of science and technology. See: "National Science...," p 33.

[3] UNESCO, "Science Policy Studies and Documents," No 46, "An Introduction to Policy Analysis in Science and Technology" (below "An Introduction to Policy...,"), Paris, 1979, p 41; "ECWA Regional Report for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development," E/ECWA/N.R. Conf. 2/11/Rev. 1., 7 November 1978, p 36.

[4] The author would like to thank L. P. Zudina for aid in compiling the statistical materials.

[5] Calculated from: "National Science...," p 53.

[6] Calculated from: A. B. Zahlan, "Science and Science Policy in the Arab World," London, 1980, p 84.

[7] Ibid., p 80.

[8] See the sources in Table 1.

[9] "National Science...," p 34.

[10] See: A. B. Zahlan, op. cit., p 31.

[11] See: "ECWA Regional Report...," pp 8-14.

[12] A. B. Zahlan, op. cit., p 14.

[13] Ibid., p 75.

[14] "Men and Arms in the Middle East: The Human Factor in Military Modernization," R-2460 NA, U.S., Santa Monica, June 1979, p 28.

[15] "ECWA Regional Report...," p 14.

[16] UNESCO. "Etudes et documents de politique scientifique," No 41, "La science et la technologie dans le développment des Etats Arabes," (below "La science et la technologie...,"), Paris, 1977, p 73.

[17] "Men and Arms...," p 26.

[18] See: "La science et la technologie...," p 183.

[19] "Technology Transfer and Change in the Arab World," London, 1978, pp 15, 19.

[20] Ibid., p 55.

[21] Ibid., p 15.

[22] For more detail on this see: R. M. Avakov, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya i problema zavisimosti" [The Developing Nations: The Scientific and Technical Revolution and the Problem of Dependence], Moscow, 1976, p 142.

[23] For more detail on the bodies concerned with scientific and technical policy in the individual Arab countries, see: "National Science..."

[24] A. B. Zahlan, op. cit., p 57; "Technology Transfer...," p 54.

[25] See our article in the journal NORODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 1, 1982, pp 79-90.

[26] See: "La science et la technologie...," pp 37-54.

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AFRICAN STATES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 95-101

[Article by I. V. Cherkasova]

[Text] Being surrounded by independent states, South Africa in its struggle against the national liberation movement of peoples employs not only naked force; it also has wagered on its economic might. In terms of the economic development level, the production volume in industry and agriculture and the scale of the infrastructure and foreign trade, South Africa substantially surpasses a predominant majority of the continent's countries, including its southern part. In 1980, this country was responsible for 25 percent of the African GNP, 40 percent of the product from the manufacturing industry and 45 percent of the extracting industry, 64 percent of the electric power production, 46 percent of the motor vehicles and 66 percent of steel consumption. South Africa produced 30 percent of the beef, 41 percent of the corn, 19 percent of the potatoes and wheat. Some 29 percent of the continent's railroads is concentrated on its territory.[1]

An important trait in South African imperialism is the foreign economic expansion based on this advantage. Inseparable from the aggressive actions against a number of the neighboring states, it has become a constant factor having a destabilizing effect on their economic and political situation. The rapid accumulation of South African capital has been the basis for this expansion. In 1971-1981, the assets of the 33 largest state and private corporations in South African industry, transportation, communications, trade and finance increased by 5.4-fold.[2] In the 1970's, the exporting of capital from South Africa broadened significantly. The overseas assets in 1970-1980 (not counting gold reserves and SDR) increased from 1,896,000,000 rands to 8,458,000,000 rands, or by 4.5-fold, basically due to private capital; the share of state investments in 1970 was 31.6 percent and in 1980, 25.7 percent of all the South African foreign investments. A large portion of the South African capital has gone into the developed capitalist countries (in 1980, 65 percent of all the overseas South African investments went to Western Europe, the countries of the American continent and Oceania), but investments in Africa were also very significant, where, in 1980, 21.2 percent (1.8 billion rands) of all the overseas South African capital investments was concentrated. Africa is very important for South Africa as a sphere for investing private capital and it was responsible for 22.5 percent (1.4 billion rands) of the overseas private capital investments.[3] According to data in the South African press, in 1980, South African

exports to Africa were 1.1 billion rands, or 11.4 percent of the value of all the exported goods (minus gold); due to the boycot announced by the OAU in 1963, this share has markedly declined (it was 17.7 percent in 1965).[4]

An important instrument in South African economic expansion has been the regional organizations established by the racist regime, including the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) concluded with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) and the South African Rand Currency Zone (SARZ). The BLS is a sort of periphery of South African imperialism as around 86 percent of the imports of Botswana and 90 percent of the imports of Lesotho and Swaziland are received from South Africa or are transported across its territory.[5]

The agreement to set up the SACU signed in September 1965 (it replaced a customs union which had existed since 1910) envisaged the complete unification of trade and currency operations for the member states, and the use of the provisions of South African customs legislation by all of them; a common customs tarriff was set and customs-free mutual exchange in the products of the manufacturing industry was permitted; in accord with the quotas, the receipts from the customs taxation of commodities entering from other countries was distributed between the participants. The agreement permitted South Africa not only to use the markets of the SACU member states but also to dominate them, seeking protection from the competition of the other imperialist states behind a uniform high customs tarriff. Although in 1970, upon the insistance of the BLS the agreement was partially revised, their share in the receipts from the customs assessments was somewhat increased and they were formally permitted to create "industrial sectors which are of important national significance" (it was a question of only the primary processing of raw materials) and carry out a local coordinated customs policy, the South African regime, however, has continued to control and restrain the economic development of the BLS.

With the approach of independent Africa to the frontiers of South Africa, the apartheid regime has had to carry out evermore complex tasks. South Africa continues to remain an imperialist center of strength but its situation has undergone substantial changes. With the victory of the patriotic forces in Zimbabwe, it has been deprived of its only ally in the region. Even more important is the fact that at present the apartheid regime is opposed not by isolated countries but rather by a solid grouping of independent states.

In endeavoring to adapt to the altered situation in the region, the South African government proclaimed a so-called total strategy aimed, as highly placed figures in South Africa states, "saving the country from revolution." An important component in this strategy was the creation of a "constellation" of Southern African countries which, in the ideas of the ruling South African circles, should become a form of a common market for the Southern African countries. The idea of creating a "constellation" was voiced by the Premier P. Botha on 19 April 1979. In speaking in the South African Parliament, he announced that there would be a lessening of tension in relations with the moderate African leaders and the signing of a nonaggression pact between the Southern African states. In advertising the "constellation," the racist propaganda has endeavored to depict it as some sort of confederation of the region's country which would be based upon the principles of equality, cooperation and good neighbors. In addition to solving economic problems, the rapprochement between

the members of the "constellation" should help to combat "communism," that is, to neutralize the national liberation movement on the continent. Among the potential members of this confederation, the South African government intended to include the pseudoindependent "bantustans," hoping that this would help them in gaining international recognition. Along with them as well as Namibia, the "constellation" should include certain independent states, namely Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and even Angola and Mozambique. Subsequently the number of "stars" was to increase.

The aim of the "constellation" plan was to achieve economic and then political and particularly military integration among the Southern African states under the aegis of South Africa. This prepared the grounds for forming new forms of dependence of the African countries upon South Africa with their supposed "economic equality." This plan was to give an active nature to the defensive which South Africa was forced to adopt and preserve initiative in the region in its hands. However, this plan was not to be fully carried out. The sharply negative position of the African states forced the South African government in July 1980 to resort to creating a truncated "constellation" initially consisting of South Africa and the three "independent" bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Venda and Transkei) and later Siskei. It must be said that the administrations of the bantustans have endeavored to conceal the puppet nature of their "independence" (they are impelled to do this by the hope of being recognized by the independent African states). But, while voicing their "political differences" with South Africa, the authorities of the bantustans have willing agreed to broaden economic "collaboration" with it. For this, special organizations have been set up including a joint Council of Ministers for Development, an Economic and Financial Committee and a Provisional Leadership Committee. Certain aspects of "collaboration" have been agreed upon in the area of forestry, trade and tourism, and accord has been reached on the creation of a Southern African Development Bank with a capital of 2 billion dollars. However, further coordination of the questions has foundered on South Africa's lack of interest in the true economic development of the bantustans. As a result, for example, the manufacturing industry has been dropped out of the cooperation projects.

Having correctly assessed the essence of the "constellation" plan, the independent Southern African nations have not only rejected the very idea of participating in it but seized the initiative from South African hands. In July 1979, the representatives of the "frontline states" (Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania), assembling at the conference in Arusha (Tanzania), proclaimed the basic principles in a joint strategy of economic liberation. Its goals were the following: the overcoming of external dependence, chiefly upon South Africa; ensuring effective economic collaboration based upon the equality of partners; mobilizing of the inner resources needed for maintaining development on the national, interstate and subregional levels, the winning of international recognition and the attracting of outside aid.[6] For carrying out these goals, the designated states set up a regional organization, the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The leaders of the "frontline" states resolved to hold conferences annually on the level of the heads of states and governments as a "mechanism for disclosing the achieved results, for assessing the fulfillment of the approved plans, determining the strong and weak aspects of their activities and coordinating plans for the future."[7]

The first such conference was held in April 1980 in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. In addition to the "frontline states," Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe which had just won independence became members. A SWAPO delegation attended as an observer (representatives from this organization as well as from the African National Congress of South Africa participated in all subsequent conferences).[8]

SADCC became a permanent international forum of the listed countries, the territory of which is 4.9 million km² and the population in 1981 was 59 million persons.[9] The aggregate GNP of the SADCC members does not exceed one-third of South Africa's GNP. Calculated per capita, in 1980 this averaged 562 dollars while in South Africa it was 2,771 dollars.[10] These countries individually possess neither resources nor a market sufficient for the development of the basic industrial sectors, for increasing agriculture and reconstructing the individual economic sectors. The incipient coordination of actions and a noted tendency toward integration open up favorable opportunities for pooling the individual resources and markets in the interests of solving acute socioeconomic problems and overcoming the backwardness.

Over the short period of its existence, SADCC has achieved certain specific results. An institutionalized structure has been created for the organization and a number of important joint documents have been approved, formulating a strategy for the struggle to overcome economic dependence. These documents include: "A Program of Action for Regional Collaboration," "Memorandum for Mutual Understanding" and others; sectorial divisions of the "Program of Actions" have been worked out and are being implemented. SADCC has not set up supranational bodies and has virtually no property; the projects which SADCC is mobilizing financial assets to build will become the property of the country where these projects are located. Coordinating the activities to carry out the individual divisions of its program has been entrusted to those countries where the corresponding economic sector has achieved the greatest development.

Primary attention in the SADCC action program has been given to the problems of developing transportation and communications (the coordinator is Mozambique). This is understandable as the economy of the liberated Southern African states is most strongly dependent upon the South African transport system as six countries of the subregion (Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland) do not have direct access to the sea. At the same time, there area railroad lines which connect the countries located inside the continent with the port cities of Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. Mozambique holds the key position in this regard as the commodities imported and exported by Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Swaziland transit across its territory. After the winning of independence, Zimbabwe began to intensely use the Mozambique ports of Maputu and Beira. The SADCC members are planning by 1990 to completely halt transit shipments across South Africa for Zambia and Zimbabwe and to reduce these significantly for Botswana. Basic attention has been concentrated on the rebuilding and reconstruction of the existing transport system. The total value of the planned projects will be 1.9 billion dollars, of which around 400 million dollars will be spent on the construction of new projects. The approved programs include 99 projects; there are plans to expand the capacity of the ports of Beira, Dar-es-Salam, Lobito, Maputu and Nakala and the railroads leading to

them. A portion of the projects concerns the development of civil aviation, communications, motor vehicle and internal water shipments. There are plans to allocate 600 million dollars for the reconstruction and development of rail transport; another 370 million dollars is to be allocated for doubling the capacity of the ports of Beira, Maputu and Nakala.[11]

A regional transport commission (SATCC) has been created with its own secretariat and technical personnel. Some 22 transport development projects were provided with financial resources at the end of 1980 and had begun to be carried out.

The fulfillment of the designated projects has encountered great difficulties with South Africa consciously creating these. The South African authorities have organized, in particular, sabotage on the Mozambique transport arteries. Bands of separatists supported by Pretoria have attacked the railroads and highways and blown up bridges. These attacks thus do damage to the economy of the neighboring states. For example, due to the sabotage carried out in 1982 on the rail line running from the port of Beira, there were repeated interruptions in the supply of imported liquid fuel and mineral fertilizers for Malawi and shipments of vitally important freight for Zimbabwe and Zambia.

A special program is devoted to agricultural development. Several nations are concerned with coordinating it. Zimbabwe is working out measures to increase food production and together with Lesotho to maintain soil fertility. The organizing of research and the combating of livestock illnesses has been entrusted to Botswana and the development of fishing, the conservation and use of wild animals to Malawi.

The carrying out of this program, particularly its food part, will have exceptionally great importance for the SADCC members. In the subregion only 5 percent of the agriculturally suitable land is tilled. Under colonialism, the development of food production was impeded and the production of export crops such as tobacco, tea, coffee, citrus, sugar cane, cashew nuts and cotton was pushed. Rice, wheat and corn were largely imported. Only Zimbabwe was an exception which was capable of producing corn not only for domestic consumption but also for export (the white farmers grew the basic amount). A specially created administrative body under the Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture is concerned with the carrying out of the food production program. The program includes nine projects for creating a meteorological warning system, for the building of warehouses and storage capacity, for the processing of food, combating the tse-tse fly and hoof-and-mouth disease and so forth.

Power is among the priority areas in coordinated development. Such countries as Lesotho and Swaziland are 90 percent dependent upon South African power supply. The Pretoria government is seeking to create a unified Southern African power grid under its control in order to place its neighbors under even greater dependence. For example, serious difficulties are being experienced by Mozambique where there is one of the largest hydropower plants in Africa, Cabora-Bassa. All the power produced at it is initially transmitted to South Africa from where it is returned to the industrial and port centers of Mozambique. In the region there is a number of other large hydropower plants such as Kariba, Kafue and Kunene. These produce electric power in a quantity

sufficient to ensure the initial stage of industrialization and for agricultural development in all nine countries. However, the lack of a regional power system separate from South Africa impedes the use of this.

The SADCC members are rich in oil. It is produced in large amounts in Angola but virtually all goes for export. The nation has just one small oil refinery the capacity of which scarcely satisfies internal needs. Signs of oil have been discovered in Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique. The nations of the South have 80 percent of the large coal reserves of the continent. Coal is mined in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland for local use. Thus, there are real opportunities to significantly increase the output and use of energy sources in working on a regional basis. SADCC has already taken a number of important steps to carry out a unified energy policy. A report has been prepared for the UN Conference on New and Replenishable Energy Sources. A program document "on a coordinated energy policy for the nations of Southern Africa" has been adopted. This outlines a strategy for overcoming the dependence on imported oil and for mobilizing significant energy resources to satisfy their own needs.

At present, medium- and long-term programs for cooperation in other national economic areas are being worked out. The development program for the manufacturing industry and trade (Tanzania is the coordinator) envisages the broadening of production for electrical engineering equipment, agricultural machinery and implements, mineral fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides and other chemicals, cement, textiles, paper, salt and the organizing of trade for these goods between the Southern African states. A detailed program has been adopted for training labor resources (Swaziland is the coordinator); preparatory work is underway aimed at creating a southern African development fund (Zambia is the coordinator).

SADCC-II was held in November 1980 in Maputu, the capital of Mozambique. The importance of this conference can be seen from the fact that in addition to the SADCC members, participating in it were the representatives of 29 nations of the world and 18 international organizations. As a result of this it has even been called in the press an "international donors conference." The conference examined 97 development projects for transportation and communications. For financing them, the foreign conference participants agreed to provide SADCC 650 million dollars in the form of loans up to 1985. The largest obligations were assumed by the African Development Bank (ADB) with 380 million dollars, the EEC with 100 million and Italy with 50 million dollars. The remaining 120 million dollars were received in small amounts from the United Nations, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the FRG, Sweden and the United States.[12]

In July 1981, SADCC-III was held in Salisbury (now Harari), the capital of Zambia. This meeting approved the institutional set-up of the organization. Its main bodies are: the conference of heads of state and government; the SADCC council of ministers which supervises the fulfillment of the adopted programs; the permanent committee of experts; the sectorial commissions; the secretariat (established in July 1982 with headquarters in Gaborone); there are also working sectorial subcommittees on the questions of veterinary science, manpower, the coordinating of industrial development and so forth.

Blantyre, the capital of Malawi, became the site of SADCC-IV (November 1981) with the representatives of 20 foreign states and 12 international organizations participating. The major result of this meeting was the strengthening of the tendency to view economic problems in close relationship to the political situation in the south of the continent. This was clearly apparent in the final statement of the conference which expressed concern over the South African actions which disrupted stability in the region and the hope of granting independence to Namibia in the near future with Namibia becoming, thus, the 10th SADCC member. Such a position of the independent African states in the South evoked a stormy reaction not only from the South African government but also from official Washington. The head of the American delegation at the conference F. Ruddy demanded that SADCC not become involved in political questions and threatened financial sanctions. However, the American representative was not even supported by the U.S. Western European allies. The head of the EEC delegation spoke out against the destabilizing actions of South Africa, including against its invasion of Angola.

SADCC-V which met in July 1982 in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, was able to note successes in carrying out the development programs: the number of approved projects had increased up to 106 and totaled 2.6 billion dollars. Some 870 million dollars had been provided, that is, significantly more than the foreign donors had promised to grant at SADCC-II.[13] The concluding conference communique again pointed to the danger of South Africa's subversive actions in the region and in its statements sharply condemned Pretoria's position on the Namibian question.[14]

SADCC-VI held in January 1983 in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, with representatives from 29 countries and a number of international organizations, reflected the growing international recognition which the regional organization of independent Southern African states had achieved. It was able to secure significant financial resources. The total obligations of foreign donors approached 1.6 billion dollars (SADCC plans on receiving at least 3.5 billion dollars). Along with the development of transportation and communications, the organization had also begun to carry out agricultural and industrial projects. It had been able to obtain around 200 million dollars for these purposes.

The founding of SADCC did not mean a desire of the Southern African states to achieve autarky or to form a closed group of countries. On the contrary, the document adopted by SADCC-IV entitled "Coordinating Southern African Development: From Dependence and Poverty to Economic Liberation" emphasizes that the members of this organization fully share the Lagos Action Plan approved at the Second Extraordinary Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU and registered with the United Nations as a component part of the International Development Strategy for the 1980's. The same document states that SADCC would collaborate with the remaining African states as well as with all developing countries. A number of SADCC members participate in other African organizations, for example, in the Organization for the Development of the Kagera River Basin. A majority of these are among the 16 states of Eastern and Southern Africa which in Lusaka in March 1982 adopted a 4-year program for collaboration in the area of agriculture, industry, trade, and the use of labor and natural resources.

The activities of SADCC have a clearly expressed anti-imperialist nature and the brunt of them is aimed against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The formation of the new economic organization shows the changing balance of forces in Southern Africa. The economic and political unification of the independent countries in this portion of the continent has become an important factor determining the situation in the region and checking the economic expansion of South Africa and the neocolonial exploitation of its natural and labor resources. The carrying out of the programs adopted by the SADCC will help to overcome the backwardness inherited by the African states from colonialism, it will contribute to their economic development and at the same time to the successful struggle for the complete political liberation of the entire South.

FOOTNOTES

[1] THE SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST, Pretoria, 9 January 1981, pp 77-80.

[2] WEEKLY NEWS BRIEFINGS, London, Vol 5, No 17, 1981, p 18.

[3] Calculated from QUARTERLY BULLETIN. SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK, Pretoria, No 102, 1971, pp S-64, S-65; No 146, 1982, Supplement, pp A-4, A-5.

[4] Calculated from: THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 January 1981; SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST, 9 May 1981, p 80.

[5] OPTIMA, Johannesburg, No 2, 1981; R. Green, "South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions on Southern African Economies," Geneva, 1980, p 9.

[6] "Southern Africa. Toward Economic Liberation," London, 1981, p 3.

[7] "Declaration by the Frontline States Made at Arusha," "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation," Arusha, 1979.

[8] In the foreign literature it is usually the case to view the Arusha and Lusaka meetings as one, constituent conference but which is extended in time and called SADCC-I.

[9] MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, New York, No 7, 1982, pp 1-4.

[10] Calculated from: "Survery of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa 1980-1981," Tripoli, 1982, ECA N E/ECA/CM, 8/17, p 211.

[11] A. Tostensen, "Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa," Uppsala, 1982, p 132; "Zimbabwe Towards a New Order: An Economic and Agricultural Review," New York, 1980, pp 139-140.

[12] SADEX, Washington, Nos 3, 5, 1981.

[13] FINANCIAL TIMES, 23 June 1982.

[14] PRAVDA, 29 July 1982.

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ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION: POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ACTIVITIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 101-108

[Article by L. B. Borisov]

[Text] In recent years, in a number of countries where Islam is the religion of a predominant majority of the population, one can observe increased social activity among the masses acting under Islamic slogans. Various Muslim organizations have become widely active on the international scene and the process of the politization of Islam has been growing stronger. At the same time, the modern Muslim movements have pursued different, often contradictory goals, acting in some instances from anti-imperialist positions, and in others, in collaborating with imperialism and neocolonialism.

Such contradictoriness in the sociopolitical role of both the Islamic and other religious currents reflects a real contradiction between the social content of the revolutionary-liberation movements and the religious form in which this content is expressed in a number of instances. The social protest of the broad strata of society in history has been repeatedly clothed in a religious guise and, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "the struggle of democracy and the proletariat has occurred in the form of the struggle of one religious idea against another."[1]

The contradictoriness and variety in the present-day political, ideological and social situation in the Islamic world has left its impression also on the activities of the international Muslim organizations. At present, the most influential of them is the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and this brings together virtually all the states in which a majority of the population professes Islam.

"Islamic unity" has a history. Even at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries, the theological notions of a "single Islamic nation" began to be used in the East for establishing the ideas of a political unification of the Muslims and the creation of a single Islamic state under the leadership of the caliph.[2] Such Pan-Islamic concepts were described by V. I. Lenin as a current which endeavored "to unite the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with a strengthening of the positions of the khans, landowners, mullahs and so forth."[3] However, the attempts to carry out the caliphatistic ideas undertaken after World War II, in particular by King Hijaz Husein and King Fuad I of Egypt, ended without success.

The ideas of Muslim unification gained further development after World War II, during the period of the new rise in the national liberation movement. Pan-Islamic aspirations initially began to grow into a movement for uniting the Islamic nations on an international basis. However, the attempts undertaken in this area in the aim of uniting the Muslim states on the basis of anticommunism and under the aegis of the United States and England either did not gain any serious support (the Baghdad Pact) or ended without any results (the draft plan to create the "Islamic Pact").

The idea of setting up a governmental Muslim organization turned out to be more viable. The impetus to the realization of this idea was the defeat of the Arab countries in the 1967 "Six-Day War" which led to the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and a portion of the territory of a number of the states adjacent to Israel.

The ICO was founded in May 1971 in accord with the decisions of the conference of the heads of state and government of the Muslim nations (Rabat, September 1969) and the conferences of the foreign ministers of the Islamic states (Jidda, March 1970; Karachi, December 1970).[4] At present, it includes 41 states,[5] as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization. With observer status at the ICO are Nigeria, Benin, the Muslim community of Cyprus and the Moro Liberation Front (MLF) in the Philippines. The highest body of the Islamic Conference is the "summit" meetings and the executive body is the foreign ministers conferences. The ICO has a permanent Secretariat headed by a general secretary (this position is presently held by Habib Shatti) with a temporary (as the ICO has proclaimed "until the liberation of Jerusalem") headquarters in Jidda.

The official aims of the ICO are stated to be: the coordinating of efforts to defend the "holy places," the support for the struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their rights and the "liberation of their land"; the strengthening of Islamic solidarity; support for the struggle of the Muslims "in defense of their honor, independence and national rights"; activities to eliminate racial discrimination and colonialism; the adopting of measures to maintain international peace and security; the holding of consultations between the ICO members which participate in international organizations; the development of economic, social, cultural and scientific collaboration between the ICO member states and third states.[6]

The ICO members are countries with varying socioeconomic and foreign policy orientations. Saudi Arabia, other conservative Arab states and the African Muslim states which are financially and economically dependent on them possess significant influence in the Organization. At the same time, the ICO membership includes a number of progressive developing states the core of which is made up of the Arab countries which are members of the National Front of Strength and Counteraction. Iran has taken an active part in the ICO functions and has endeavored to play an independent role. In practice, in discussing certain questions Iran has supported the progressive states and in examining others, has sided with the conservative countries.

From the moment of the founding of the ICO up to the present, the Near Eastern problem has been at the center of its attention. The "Palestinian cause," as is emphasized in the resolutions of the Third Islamic Summit Conference

(Mecca-Taif, 25-28 January 1981), is the "main task of the Islamic 'ummah'."[7] The ICO position on the Near East is based on the principle of establishing a just peace in this region founded on the complete and unconditional departure of Israel from all the occupied "Palestinian and Arab territories" and the restoration of the "permanent rights of the Palestinian people" including their right to self-determination and the creation of an independent state in Palestine under the leadership of the PLO.[8] At the same time, the ICO has rejected the Security Council Resolution No 242 of 22 November 1967 as "incompatible with Palestinian and Arab rights and not representing a suitable basis for settling the crisis in the Near East and resolving the Palestinian problem."[9] The ICO decisions on the Near East are interpreted differently by its members. Some countries, in acting from extremist positions, view the designated decisions as calling for the creation of a Palestinian Arab state on all Palestinian territory, in essence, for eliminating the state of Israel and in principle reject Resolution No 242. Other Muslim states interpret these as a demand to liberate the Israeli-occupied territories on the course of subsequent Arab-Israeli wars and to create a Palestinian state on the West Bank of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip, while Resolution No 242 is considered not acceptable basically but rather because it does not mention the rights of the Palestinian people but merely speaks about a just settlement for the refugee problem.[10]

As methods for achieving the set goals, the ICO has proposed a jihad for the sake of "saving Al-Quds, support for the Palestinian people and the cause of liberating the occupied territories,"[11] as well as the use of the political, financial, oil and military potential by the Muslim countries for combating Israeli aggression.[12] The ICO has repeatedly adopted resolutions on providing material and moral support for the Palestinian people and on the necessity of "achieving changes in the international political positions" vis-a-vis the PLO.[13] Regardless of the fact that the designated decisions have too general a nature and some of them (for example, the jihad resolution) are additionally of a declarative sort, their adoption demonstrates the support from the Muslim countries for the Arab struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression. These resolutions, stated the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee in an interview given to a France Presse correspondent on 28 January 1981, "strengthen the determination of the Palestinian people to conduct a struggle by all means for creating an independent state."

The organization, in addition, has repeatedly adopted decisions concerning individual aspects of the Near Eastern problem. Thus, the summit conference in Mecca-Taif adopted a special resolution on Jerusalem which emphasized the necessity of achieving its liberation "so that it can become the capital of the Palestinian state";[14] in September 1980, in line with the decision of the Israeli authorities to declare Jerusalem as the "eternal and indivisible" capital of Israel, an extraordinary special foreign ministers conference was convened and this urged the ICO members to fight against the annexation of this city. A session of the Islamic Conference Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Questions held in Tripoli on 16-19 January 1982 in a special resolution condemned Israel's decision to annex the Golan Heights as a criminal action contradictory to international law. The 13th ICO Foreign Ministers Conference (Niamey, 22-26 August 1982) condemned the Israeli destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981.

At the Niamey conference, special attention was given to the situation in Lebanon. The ICO affirmed its support for Lebanese independence, the integrity of its territory and people and its sovereignty over the entire nation's territory within the internationally recognized limits. The session sent out telegrams of greeting to the leadership of the PLO and Syria, expressing full support of the ICO for the struggle of the PLO and Syria against Israeli aggression in Lebanon. At the same time, due to the absence of unity between the representatives of the Arab countries, the conference members were unable to agree on the adopting of specific measures in support of the PLO, limiting themselves to the demand to carry out previous ICO decisions on the Near East and Jerusalem. If the Arab and Muslim states, stressed the ICO General Secretary Habib Shatti in his speech at Niamey "would be able to close ranks, to act in unity, direct their forces against the Israeli expansionists and assume a firm position toward the powers providing military and political aid to Tel Aviv, then such brazen Israeli conduct in Lebanon would simply have been impossible."[15]

The ICO as a whole has come out decisively against the Camp David Accord. The Muslim state's foreign ministers conference in Fez (May 1979) condemned the policy of surrender of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and adopted a resolution on the "freezing" of Egypt's membership in the ICO. These decisions were confirmed by the foreign ministers at the following meetings in Islamabad and Amman at the beginning and middle of 1980, while an extraordinary special minister conference convened in September 1980 announced the intention of the Islamic states to continue the struggle to undermine the Camp David Agreements, using all available means for this. The Third Islamic Summit Conference confirmed "its unaltered hostility for the Camp David Agreements" and emphasized that the ICO "rejects any initiative undertaken separately by any Arab or Muslim country in the aim of settling the Palestinian problem and the problem of the occupied territories."[16]

At the same time, the ICO position on the Near East problem is not completely consistent. This can be explained by the strong influence had on its activities by the region's conservative states which are tied to the West. American imperialism, the Libyan newspaper AL-JAMAHIRIA emphasized in this context, "is endeavoring to distract the Arab and Islamic peoples from their main task, the struggle against the domination of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, for national liberty and independence, for the liberation of the occupied Arab lands and a just solution to the Palestinian problem."[17] Thus, the convening of the foreign ministers conference in Islamabad for examining the so-called "Afghan question" was initially set for 26 January 1980, that is, the day when ambassadors were exchanged between Egypt and Israel. Only under the pressure of the progressive Arab countries which announced that "the convening of the conference on 26 January...pursues the goal of diverting the attention of the Arab, Muslim and world public opinion from this infamous act of surrender by Sadat," was it moved to 27 January. The very fact of convening the conference for discussing questions related to the situation in Afghanistan showed the desire of the reactionary forces active in a number of the Arab and Muslim countries and being under U.S. pressure to divert the ICO from the Near East conflict, from the question of the destiny of occupied Jerusalem and eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression and the Camp David betrayal which is fraught with the splitting of the Arab countries.

Similar attempts were made also at the Third Summit Meeting. "Certain Arab leaders," stressed the leader of the Lebanese Movement of Independent Nasserites "Murabitun" I. Koleylat in a statement made by him in Beirut on 29 January 1981, "endeavored to distract the attention of the members of the meetings for the heads of states and governments of the Muslim countries in Taif by discussing secondary questions and this conforms to the interests of Israel and its allies." Saudi Arabia, commented AL-JAMAHIRIA, at this meeting endeavored to "play the role of a legislator...in order through its influence to strengthen the positions of the United States and the other Western states in the Near East region and among the Islamic states."[18]

However, the general rise in the anti-American mood (related to the growing open support by the United States for Israel's aggressive policy as well as the events in Iran) not only in the Arab but also in the Muslim world as a whole had a definite impact on ICO activities. The foreign ministers meetings repeatedly (particularly after the Camp David conspiracy) adopted resolutions calling for a struggle against the influence of the imperialist powers, primarily the United States, in the region. The conference at Mecca-Taif adopted a decision on a military, political and economic boycott of the countries collaborating with Israel so that they would impel it to liberate the occupied territories.

The anti-American mood of a majority of the ICO members also influenced the position of Saudi Arabia which could not help but side (at least in words) with a condemnation of Washington's pro-Israeli policy. In his speech at Taif on 26 January 1981, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia accused the United States of "perpetuating Israeli presence as a foreign body in the Arab structure." Even such a statesman known for his pro-American attitudes as the Pakistani President M. Zia-ul-Haq was forced, in speaking at Taif on 26 January 1981, to urge the U.S. President R. Reagan to carry out a new policy vis-a-vis the Near East "in accord with the verdict of the international community" and "apply the necessary pressure on Israel in order to force it to halt its aggression."

Washington's support for Tel Aviv was sharply criticized at the Eighth Foreign Ministers Conference. In the speech of H. Shatti, the American position on Israeli aggression in Lebanon was described at "scandalous."[19] In Niamey resolutions were adopted condemning the inimical attitude of the United States toward the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and U.S. military, political and economic aid to Israel and urging the ICO members "to revise their attitude on diplomatic relations with the United States."

At the same time, the ICO conservative wing has endeavored to emasculate the anti-American essence of the adopted decisions and deprive them of practical significance. Thus, having criticized the pro-Israeli U.S. policy in comments at a press conference during the Third Summit Conference, the Saudi Arabian minister of foreign affairs Sa'ud al-Faysal immediately after this stated that his government considered it inacceptable to use the "oil weapon" against the supporters of Israel. In the course of the conference in Niamey, Shatti, in describing the ICO position on the United States at a press conference on 23 August 1982, pointed out that the participants of the meeting would not undertake sanctions against Washington as they intended to "rectify" and not "punish" and that they "did not intend to go to war against the United States."

As a whole, regardless of a certain inconsistency in its position, the ICO has carried out a policy of focusing the efforts of the Muslim states in support of the struggle against Israeli aggression and in support of the Arab people of Palestine. At the same time, the chief shortcoming in its activities is the fact that the resolutions adopted by it are not carried out or are carried out incompletely. The ICO member nations, H. Shatti emphasized in this context in Niamey, when confronted with such problems as the exacerbation of the situation in the Near East and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, must "unite and say less and do more."[20]

The ICO has also given significant attention to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. The ICO has repeatedly expressed serious concern over a "war in the Gulf" and has urged Iraq and Iran to cease fire and reach a political settlement to the crisis. Urgings to cease the "fratricidal" war between these countries were also heard at the last Eighth Foreign Ministers Conference in August 1982.

The ICO has undertaken specific attempts to achieve a peaceful settlement. In accord with a decision adopted by the extraordinary foreign ministers conference on 26 April 1980 in New York, a "good will mission" was established to mediate between Iraq and Iran.[21] In addition, the Third Summit Conference in Mecca-Taif reached an agreement on the establishing of Islamic armed forces, "if this was necessary," in order to achieve a cease fire.[22] In 1981-1982, the "good will mission" several times attempted to play the role of a mediator but without results. Nevertheless, the Niamey conference resolved to continue the mission's activities. In speaking at a press conference on 23 August 1982, H. Shatti particularly emphasized that the meeting being held would not make any specific actions to settle the Iranian-Iraqi conflict outside the framework of this mission. On the eve and in the course of the conference, H. Shatti had separate meetings with the Iraqi and Iranian delegations, working for their agreement to resume the activities of the "good will mission." Obviously, such an agreement was obtained since at the end of October 1982, a delegation from the mission flew to Baghdad where talks were held with the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of Iraq I. Ibrahim. The Iraqi side had high praise for the mission's activities and announced agreement with its proposals. However, the success of this attempt at mediation will obviously depend upon the position of Tehran which, as is known, has made a number of rigid preliminary demands, including those of a political nature.

In 1976-1978, the ICO, in addition, endeavored to mediate between the Philippine government and the Moro Liberation Front (MLF) which was fighting for the autonomy of the 13 Southern Philippine provinces with a predominantly Muslim population. The efforts made, with Libya playing an active role, made it possible to work out principles for a political settlement of the crisis and these were set down in an agreement between representatives of the Philippine government and the MLF and signed in Tripoli. Regardless of the fact that the Tripoli Agreement has not been carried out, the ICO has not resumed mediation attempts, restricting itself to appeals to the opposing sides to settle the problem of the Muslim minority in the Philippines in accord with the agreement reached in Tripoli.

The ICO has repeatedly stated its support for the demand of the Comoro Islands for the return of Mayotte Island and has urged France to "find a just resolution"

for this problem.[23] However, the ICO has not undertaken any specific political moves in this area.

It must be pointed out that the ICO has not limited its activities to reviewing the problems of the Islamic world. The foreign ministers conferences have repeatedly adopted resolutions which oblige the ICO member nations to provide aid to the African liberation movement and which condemn apartheid and racism. In particular, the 13th Foreign Ministers Conference confirmed the support of the ICO for the armed struggle of SWAPO for the independence of Namibia and for the liberation struggle of the people of South Africa. The ICO has supported proposals for creating nuclear-free zones in the Near East, Africa and South Asia and has urged the member nations to aid in adopting measures for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The Third Summit Conference appealed to the ICO member states not to join military alliances and not to provide their territory for foreign military bases.

However, the ICO far from always proceeds from anti-imperialist positions. Thus, its conferences have discussed the "status of Muslims in the USSR" and this represents interference into the internal affairs of the Soviet Union which, as is known, is not a member of the ICO. The ICO has also attempted, not without outside encouragement, to adopt decisions condemning the policy of the revolutionary-democratic authorities in South Yemen.

The negative features in ICO activities are particularly apparent in the position adopted by it over the so-called "Afghan question." The anti-Soviet, imperialist circles with the aid of the local reaction have succeeded in misleading certain leaders of the Muslim countries and imposing a discussion of the so-called "Afghan question" at the extraordinary foreign ministers conference called at the end of January 1980 in Islamabad. The conference adopted a decision to "freeze" Afghan membership in the ICO and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan, without simultaneously condemning the aggression against the Afghan resolution carried out from Pakistani territory by hirelings of imperialism and the Muslim reaction. The Libyan newspaper ZAHF AL-AHDAR, in assessing the work of the Islamabad conference, cautioned the Muslims against "becoming a victim of the noise artificially stirred up by imperialism over events in Afghanistan," and urged them "to be armed with awareness and vigilance so that America did not use them for achieving its own goals aimed against the Muslims."[24]

The "question of Afghanistan" was also examined at the meeting in Mecca-Taif and this "expressed profound concern over the Soviet military interference" into Afghanistan and again called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country.[25] The ICO position on this problem was confirmed also by the Niamey conference which called for the "immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan." At the same time, one cannot help but note that in his speech at the opening of this conference, H. Shatti, having pointed out that the "Afghan problem" is the only difference existing between the Soviet Union and the ICO, at the same time emphasized that the Muslim countries view the USSR as "a state friendly to their community, considering the support provided by the Soviet Union to the ICO member nations on international questions as well as the relationships of friendship and cooperation maintained by the USSR with a majority of the community's member states."[26]

As a whole, on the question of the situation around Afghanistan, the ICO has continued to hold a position of interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan and this is incompatible with the sovereignty of this country. Such an ICO line objectively conforms to the desire of the imperialists to use the Islamic movement and its reactionary elements for fighting against the people's liberation revolutions.

The desire of the Muslim conservative, proimperialist regimes to orient the ICO at struggling against the progressive movements has left its imprint also on the approach to the problems of the Horn of Africa. The resolution adopted on this question by the Third Summit Meeting expressed "complete support for the suppressed Muslims in this region" and contained a demand for the "complete and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Horn of Africa."[27] Although the meeting also called "for the parties participating in the conflict to undertake joint efforts to reach a just settlement of this conflict," in essence, its position had an anti-Ethiopian and a pro-Somali character. The question of the situation in this region was also examined at the 13th Foreign Ministers Conference which, according to a statement by the Nigerian newspaper EL SAHEL, adopted a resolution in support of Somali, but this was not included in the Final Declaration of the conference.

The activities of the ICO on the international scene thus have a dual nature. On the one hand, anti-imperialist traits are inherent to it. This is explained by the influence of the progressive Afro-Asian countries which are members of it as well as by the fact that imperialist policy creates a threat even for states with conservative regimes. On the other hand, the imperialist powers are endeavoring (and in a number of instances not without success) to use the "moderate" Muslim countries which prevail in the ICO to turn it into a political organization acting against the USSR and the progressive movements in the Islamic world.

"We, the communists," emphasized the 26th CPSU Congress, "respect the religious convictions of people who profess Islam, like other religions. The main thing is what goals are pursued by the forces which proclaim various slogans."[28] The documents and practical actions of the various religious-political organizations of the modern world, including those such as the ICO, are assessed by Soviet researchers in light of this.

FOOTNOTES

1 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 48, p 232.

2 N. Ashirov, "Islam i natsii" [Islam and Nations], Moscow, 1975, p 11.

3 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 166.

4 "The Middle East and North Africa. 1977-1978," London, 1978, p 159.

5 Including Egypt and Afghanistan, the membership of which in the ICO was "frozen" by decisions of the foreign ministers conferences, respectively, in May 1979 and January 1980.

[6] "The Middle East and North Africa, 1978-1979," p 159.

[7] "Ummah"--the Muslim community.

[8] The Resolution "The Palestinian Cause and the Near East" of the Third Islamic Summit Conference.

[9] Ibid.

[10] See: "The Middle East and North Africa, 1978-1979," p 64.

[11] "Jihad" or holy war; "Al-Quds"--the Arab name for Jerusalem.

[12] The Resolution "Holy War of Jihad" of the Third Summit Conference; the Final Resolution of the Extraordinary Special Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic States (Fez, September 1980); the Resolution "The Palestinian Cause and the Near East" of the Third Summit Conference.

[13] The Resolution "The Palestinian Cause and the Near East" of the Third Summit Conference.

[14] The Resolution "The Holy City of Al-Quds" of the Third Summit Conference.

[15] EL SAHEL, 23 August 1982.

[16] The Resolution "The Palestinian Cause and the Near East" of the Third Summit Conference.

[17] AL-JAMAHIRIA, 27 January 1981.

[18] Ibid.

[19] EL SAHEL, 23 August 1982.

[20] Ibid.

[21] The Resolution "Conflict Between Iraq and Iran" of the Third Summit Conference.

[22] Ibid.

[23] The Resolution "Mayotte Island (Comoro Islands)" of the Third Summit Conference.

[24] AZ-ZAHF AL-AHDAR, 25 January 1980.

[25] The Resolution "The Situation in Afghanistan" of the Third Summit Conference.

[26] EL SAHEL, 23 August 1982.

[27] The Resolution "The Suppressed People of the Horn of Africa" of the Third Summit Conference.

[28] "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 13.

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COOPERATION OF MONGOLIAN AND SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 138-140

[Article by Sh. Natsagdorzh]

[Text] The active cooperation between Mongolian and Soviet scientists represents one of the important elements in the integration processes presently developing in all spheres of social life in the socialist commonwealth countries. It is being carried out in accord with the principles and organizational forms envisaged by the "General Conditions for Carrying Out Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between the USSR and Mongolia."

The History Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences has been developing bilateral cooperation with the institutes of history, archeology, oriental studies and ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In recent years the scientists of both countries have been carrying out extensive joint work on studying Mongolian history. Archeological and ethnographic work is being done in the aim of thoroughly investigating Mongolian history before the introduction of writing. Here great importance is being given not only to the subject but also to the chronological and territorial system. A study has been made of the monuments from various historical ages including the settlements and burials of the Stone, Bronze and Early Iron Ages and the ancient states on Mongolian territory.

As a result of the research carried out by the Soviet-Mongolian Cultural History Expedition, the continuous development of society on Mongolian territory has been established from the most ancient period of history, from the Paleolithic Age; the succession and cultural uniqueness of the tribes and nationalities which lived in different chronological periods of history have been disclosed. At the same time, it has been shown that regardless of specific traits, in socioeconomic terms there were common development patterns in the society of the ancient peoples of Mongolia.

Mongolian historians along with their Soviet colleagues have completed the work of revising and supplementing the second edition of the single-volume "Istoriya MNR" [History of Mongolia] in Mongolian and Russian. The new edition reflects the basic research results of scientists from both countries and the accomplishments of the Mongolian people over recent years in all areas of socialist construction have been generalized. A two-volume collection of documents and

materials from Mongolian-Soviet relations has been published and this was prepared by the Institute for Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the History Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences and the Mongolian State Historical Archives. This work encompasses the political, economic and cultural relationships of Mongolia and the USSR from 1921 through 1974. An important achievement was the publishing of the collective monograph "Istoriya mongolo-sovetskikh otnosheniy" [The History of Mongolian-Soviet Relations], 1981). This analyzes the history of the fraternal friendship of the Mongolian and Soviet peoples, representing a model of a new type of socialist international relations and embodying the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism.

Research in the philosophy and sociology areas is being carried out by scientists from the Institute for Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences together with colleagues from the Philosophy Institute and the Institute for Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The result of this work will be the collective volume "Teoreticheskiye i prakticheskiye voprosy sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni" [Theoretical and Practical Questions of the Socialist Way of Life]. At the same time, joint research is being conducted on the questions of Buddhist philosophy. In 1984 there are plans to hold "Roundtable Talks" between Soviet and Mongolian Buddhist scholars in Ulan-Ude. These will be devoted to the methodological questions of studying Buddhism in Mongolia. The "Antologiya mongol'skoy filosofii" [Anthology of Mongolian Philosophy] is being prepared for publication and this will be part of the series "The Philosophical Heritage." In 1983, joint sociological research has been started on the questions of developing the social structure in the Mongolian rural population and the time budget of workers and white collar personnel in Ulan-Bator.

The Economics Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences (in 1982, this became the Economics Institute of the Mongolian Gosplan and Academy of Sciences) is collaborating with similar institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences on theoretical and methodological questions of socialist construction in Mongolia and, in particular, the creation of the material and technical base of socialism. Joint work is also being done on the questions of Mongolia's participation in socialist economic integration and studying the history of the nation's socialist economy. As a result of the joint research, a corresponding section has been worked out in the General Scheme for the Development of Mongolian Productive Forces Up to the Year 2000. Work is being completed on the collective monograph "Istoriya sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki MNR" [The Socialist Economy of Mongolia].

Joint research by Mongolian and Soviet scientists has been successfully developed in the area of Mongolian linguistics and literature. The collective work "Literaturnyye svyazi Mongolii" [Literary Ties of Mongolia] has been published and this examines the ties of Mongolian literature with the literature of Mongolia's neighboring countries and encompassing the entire development period of literature from folklore to modern socialist realism literature. A draft plan has been worked out for the first volume of "Istoriya mongol'skoy literatury" [History of Mongolian Literature] in Russian. The Institute for Language and Literature of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences and the Institute for World Literature imeni A. M. Gorky of the USSR Academy of Sciences are

planning in 1984 to begin research on the following subjects: "The Epic and Epic Narrative of the Peoples of Central and East Asia" and "The Revolution and Development Patterns of New Literature in Mongolia and the Other Socialist Asian Countries." Joint research is being completed on creating the "Atlas of Phonemes of Modern Mongolian Language." Of particular significance is the joint work by Mongolian and Soviet philologists from the Institute for Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Language and Literature of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences in the area of compiling the "Bol'shoy mongol'skorusskiy slovar'" [Large Mongolian-Russian Dictionary] (at present, scholars have already begun work on the second volume). Being prepared for press is the "Mongol'skiy lingvisticheskiy sbornik" [Mongolian Linguistic Collection] devoted to the development of Mongolian linguistics over the 60 years.

Soviet science has had a beneficial impact on the development of social sciences in Mongolia and world Mongolian studies. Soviet scientists have made a major contribution to Mongolian studies by their work "Obshchestvennyye nauki v MNR" [Social Sciences in Mongolia]. This generalizes the achievements of Mongolian researchers in the area of social sciences and due to this the research of Mongolian scholars has become available to foreign Mongolian scholars.

A broad system of Marxist-Leninist social sciences has been formed and is successfully developing in Mongolia. New sciences have appeared for Mongolia such as archeology, ethnography, sociology and others. Skilled specialists have been trained in the area of the humanities. The theoretical and methodological level of the scientific research has been constantly rising. Certain areas of social science have already emerged on the international scene.

The increased tasks of socialist construction in Mongolia, scientific-technical progress and the ideological struggle of the two world systems have urgently required a profound analysis of the patterns in the present development stage of society and its prospects; there must be the elaboration of the problems of socialist construction and the further development of theoretical thought and the development of Marxist-Leninist social sciences. The 18th MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Congress, in noting the growing role of social sciences in the nation's socialist construction, proposed important tasks for solving the problems of socialist construction and for increasing the theoretical and practical value of the research in the area of social sciences. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress are of great theoretical and methodological significance for the research.

Awaiting thorough elaboration and analysis are such questions as the experience of the noncapitalist path of Mongolia, the development dialectics of real socialism in Mongolia, the problems of strengthening the material and technical base of socialism, improving the effectiveness of social production and bettering socialist social relationships, the process of the formation and development of the socialist way of life, the ideological-political, economic, social and cultural integration of Mongolia with the socialist commonwealth countries and primarily the Soviet Union, and the questions of the indoctrination of the new man. Of great scientific-technical, ideological-political and practical significance is also a study of the history, language and culture of the Mongolian people and their cultural ties with the Central Asian peoples. Important

tasks for the social scientists are the criticism and unmasking of various concepts and views held by reactionary bourgeois scholars who endeavor to misinterpret the historical development path of Mongolia.

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MONGOLIAN-SOVIET ACADEMY CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCES HELD

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 149-150

[Unattributed conference report]

[Text] On 15-18 February 1983, the first session was held of the Commission for Collaboration Between the USSR and Mongolian Academies of Sciences in the Area of Social Sciences, with Mongolian scholars present headed by the Vice President of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, the Chairman of the Mongolian Part of the Commission, Academician Sh. Natsagdorzh. The delegation's membership included the Director of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences A. Luvsandendev, Corresponding Member of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences N. Ishzhamts, the Sector Head of the History Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences N. Serodzhav, the Sector Head of the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences and the scientific secretary of the Mongolian part of the commission G. Luvsantseren. Along with the members of the Soviet part of the commission headed by the Director of the Institute of History, Philology and Philosphy of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. P. Derevyanko, participating on the Soviet side in the session were scholars from Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk and Ulan-Ude.

The session was opened by the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Ye. M. Primakov. Having assessed the fruitful activities of the commission, he pointed out its important significance for world science. Giving a word of greeting to those present were A. P. Derevyanko and Sh. Natsagdorzh who emphasized the importance of the commission's activities for the further development of Soviet-Mongolian scientific ties.

The scientific cooperation of the USSR and Mongolian Academies of Sciences has been developing in several areas: the training of scientific personnel, field work in the area of studying the ancient history of Mongolia and archeology and the creation of joint general works. Academician A. P. Okladnikov was the first chairman of the Soviet part of the commission. Heading the joint Soviet-Mongolian Interdisciplinary Expedition, he contributed to the enriching of historical science by discoveries in studying the ancient ages in mankind's development.

Sh. Natsagdorzh gave the report "Basic Results in the Joint Research Conducted by the Institutes of the Mongolian and USSR Academies of Sciences in the Area of Social Sciences."[1]

The report by the deputy chairman of the Soviet part of the commission V. M. Solntsev was devoted to the results of the Fourth International Congress of Mongolian Scholars and to the tasks of further collaboration between the Soviet and Mongolian Academies of Sciences in developing Mongolian studies. He, in particular, drew basic attention to further improving the forms of cooperation and to the questions of coordinating the research by Soviet and Mongolian scholars on a basis of an interdisciplinary long-range cooperation plan.

One of the forms for such collaboration is joint expeditions. The positive results from the Soviet-Mongolian Cultural History Expedition are generally known. However, in the aim of improving its activities, it is advisable to strengthen the economic and financial base, to broaden its functions and in addition to archeological research include in its tasks field work on the problems of modern history, economics, language and literature. There is also the question of organizing an independent ethnographic expedition of the USSR and Mongolian Academies of Sciences and cooperation in the area of ethnographic museum studies, the exchange of ethnographic collections and so forth would be beneficial to both sides.

V. V. Volkov (Archeology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences), R. S. Vasil'yevskiy (Institute for History, Philology and Philosophy of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences) and N. Serodzhav (History Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences) spoke on the question of the work results of the joint Soviet-Mongolian Cultural History Expedition. Research on the key problems of ancient and medieval Mongolian history was the task of the Cultural History Expedition established in 1969 with an interdisciplinary nature. The expedition conducted 14 field seasons. A significant portion of the materials collected by it was put into scholarly circulation and this was reflected in 14 monograph studies and more than 200 articles and comments. In the last decade, due to the work of the expedition on Mongolian territory, hundreds of different monuments dating to the Paleolithic, Epipaleolithic and Neolithic Ages have been uncovered. The obtained materials have substantially altered the fundamental ideas about the evolution and nature of the most ancient Mongolian cultures. The Mongolian Stone Age cultures played an important role in the formation and development of the cultures in adjacent territories. The influence of these cultures is felt both in East and North Asia. An examination of the problem of the initial settlement of the American continent by man at present is also impossible without Mongolian materials. Of undoubted scientific interest is, for example, the research in the area of Tamtsak-bulak of a Neolithic settlement with the remains of a settled agricultural culture and this forces one to revise the former ideas of Mongolia as a nation of unchallenged domination by nomadic livestock raising.

The expedition's activities were highly praised at the plenary sessions of the Fourth International Congress of Mongolian Scholars in 1982. Soviet and

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[1] See the article by Sh. Natsagdorzh in this issue of the journal.

Mongolian archeologists proposed a number of specific measures which will contribute to the more fruitful activities of the expedition. The participants of the commission's session approved the work of the expedition and recognized the conducting of joint field research as one of the effective forms of collaboration by Soviet and Mongolian scholars in studying the archeology, ethnography and ethnographics of Mongolia.

There was a discussion of the reports heard at the session. The speakers made proposals on broadening the framework of collaboration among the Soviet and Mongolian scholars, to create a publishing facility to publish the valuable materials which the scholarly repositories of the USSR and Mongolia possess and for establishing a periodical on Mongolian studies. The session approved the Regulation Governing the Commission on Collaboration of the USSR and Mongolian Academies of Sciences in the Area of Social Sciences and amendments and supplements in the subject plan for the scientific collaboration of both academies for 1981-1985 were ratified.

The Mongolian scholars visited the scientific institutions of Moscow, including the Institute for the Far East, the Institute of World Liberature imeni A. M. Gorky and the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The library of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences timed a major exhibit of literature about Mongolia for the session.

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INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON THIRD-WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY HELD

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 150-151

[Unattributed conference report]

[Text] In December 1982, a scientific conference was held on the "Strategy for Socioeconomic Development of the Liberated Countries in the 1980's." This was organized by the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences jointly with the Scientific Council Under the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences on the Interdisciplinary Problem "Modern Problems of the Developing Countries." Participating in the work of the conference were representatives from the scientific and practical organizations of Moscow and Leningrad.

The conference examined a range of questions involved with the elaboration of plans, stages, ways and methods for implementing the strategy of socioeconomic development on international, regional and subregional levels as well as in terms of individual countries. A number of speeches was devoted to an analysis of the theories, doctrines and concepts underlying the various strategies. In speaking about economic development practices, the conference participants pointed to the presence of a gap between the officially proclaimed development goals and the changes in the national economic mechanism. Here the conference raised anew a broad spectrum of questions related to the objective development patterns and to the conditions and factors determining the formation and course of implementing the strategy for the 1980's.

G. K. Shirokov pointed out that in a number of the developing countries there has been a transition from market growth strategies based upon an import or export orientation within the world capitalist economy to the elaboration of a resource strategy. In his opinion, such phenomena as the extended impact of economic crises in the West and the change in the world market structure which does not permit excessive competition on the colonial periphery have led to a growing differentiation and competition both between the developing countries and between the developing and developed capitalist countries. Under these conditions the West has less interest in the developing countries as a sphere for investing capital and as sources of raw materials and this makes the possibility of establishing a NMEP [new international economic order] become very problematical. S. A. Bylinyak, in agreeing with the view of the reduced role of the developing countries as markets, feels that as a whole the crises of the 1970's accelerated the process of drawing the developing countries into the world capitalist economy. In the opinion of A. I. Dinkevich, the industrial

revolution on the periphery of the world capitalist economy is a new type of revolution which was not known by the countries of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. Its specific feature is a disrupting in the sequence of technological development and the combining of the various phases of industrial growth. This particular feature has determined the divergent nature of the very industrial revolution and forms the underlying inner basis for the different directions of the strategy. V. G. Rasyannikov and A. I. Dinkevich emphasized that the lack of coordination in the social and economic development dynamics shows the insolubility of the fundamental problems of the liberated countries on the path of capitalist development. The social form of development more and more is becoming the main limiter of economic growth.

The speeches of the conference participants pointed out that the attempts to mitigate the social tension by redistribution lead to an inevitable reproduction of this tension in the later development stages. For this reason the main task for an effective development strategy is to combine economic growth with social progress. Here, in the opinion of V. M. Menchinov, the appearance of new production technology requires a corresponding change in the organizational structure. This should ensure the carrying out of the development strategy and make more dynamic the process of taking those national economic decisions which would conform to the more complex internal and international economic relationships.

V. L. Sheynis pointed out that the uneven development of economic relations in the liberated countries has appeared on several levels: the duality of the economic structures within the national economies; the differentiation between different country groups; the growing gap between the center and periphery within the world capitalist economy. N. Z. Volchek feels that on the level of regional strategy proposed by the ESCATO experts, a reliance on "collective self-sufficiency" is still far from realization both due to political factors and as a consequence of the particular features of the reproduction structure in many countries of the region. V. M. Kollontay pointed out that the reorientation of the industrially developed countries to low economic growth rates will be accompanied by a shifting of the contradictions accumulated in the decades of development to the developing countries. A new situation is developing whereby the trends of the world reproduction process will become increasingly out of pace with the national economic interests of the developing countries. Under these conditions the internationalization of economic life and its opposite tendency toward a strengthening of state and economic nationalism must be reassessed. In the opinion of A. V. Aleshina, the struggle for qualitative changes in the development strategy and practices have led to a growing differentiation and further regrouping among the developing countries. This can be seen, in particular, from the shifting of attention from the problems of external factors to the problem of internal development conditions.

The conference participants, in taking up the energy factor, pointed out that the moving away from an energy-intensive type of industrial production has caused irreversible structural changes in the industrialization strategy. In the opinion of N. P. Shmelev, these have been accompanied by a new price situation and by the formation of so-called "political" rent for the energy raw material resources. The dynamics of oil prices on the world market influences the value proportions of reproduction in the strategies of the oil importing

countries. This exacerbates foreign exchange and inflationary problems. The attempts to resolve these by reorganizing the mechanism of the capital market in favor of the developing countries has not been crowned with success. Yu. M. Osipov pointed out that the United States by exporting inflation has manipulated the international balance of payments, shifting the burden of increasing disproportion to the developing countries. In the opinion of L. Z. Zevin, the reduced influx of external resources for development needs and the deteriorating conditions for providing these have caused a reorientation of the strategy to internal development factors. Here the employment problem is most acute and this was viewed by some members of the conference in the context of the demographic situation. The "demographic press" in a majority of the developing countries, in the opinion of A. P. Kolontayev, has put pressure on the economy and has permitted the development of both precapitalist forms of production as well as a modern sector in industry and agriculture.

The search is continuing for new concepts, channels and institutional forms for redistributing a portion of national product to mitigate the social tension related to the employment problem. In the opinion of O. V. Malyarov, the organizing of the rural and urban poor can become an essential condition for carrying out this course. Although the possibilities for economically effective farming to the successes of farming techniques, have been substantially extended, their realization is impossible without a corresponding redistribution of the ruling classes to carrying out a policy aimed at mitigating social inequality requires consideration of the subjective factor in analyzing the strategies. V. V. Krylov pointed out that this makes it possible to determine to what degree the class interests of the ruling strata in the developing countries correspond to the objective development trends. Ye. V. Kotov took up the theoretical aspects of forming a development strategy, as determined by the nature of evolution in non-Marxist economic science.

Using the example of countries with different types of development, the conference participants examined a number of essential development problems for the liberated countries. The solution to these problems--and this was the general opinion of the scientists--is possible only by carrying out profound socio-economic changes and by democratizing the social life of the developing nations.

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AFRICA INSTITUTE VIEWS SOCIAL STRUCTURES, WORKING CLASS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 151-152

[Unattributed conference report]

[Text] In December 1982, a scientific meeting was held on the methodological problems involved in studying the socioclass structure of African society. Giving a report was M. I. Braginskiy who pointed out that in an analysis of the socioclass structure of African society, it is essential to consider both the general demographic changes as well as the position of the individual classes and social strata. After the winning of independence, the process of class stratification accelerated both in the countryside and in the city. This can be traced with particular clarity in the countries which have set out on the path of capitalist development. In the socialist-oriented countries, this spontaneous process has been checked by a policy of forming cooperatives of the small farms and creating state farms. Of very important significance is the place and role of the working class in the structure of African society.[1]

In studying the process of the formation of the national bourgeoisie, a number of questions arise related to defining the very concept of the "national bourgeoisie," and to ascertaining to what degree it expresses true national interests of the African states and whether it is capable of actually becoming a progressive force in solving the socioeconomic problems of the countries which have escaped from colonial suppression. The speaker felt that under present-day conditions, the formation of the national bourgeoisie cannot occur along the classic path followed by the Western European bourgeoisie and that the African bourgeoisie is presently incapable of performing a progressive role in the development of society. The mixed economy in the African countries has led to the formation of various social strata including semi-proletarian (lying between the peasantry and the working class) and middle strata (between the working class and the forming bourgeoisie). The higher administrative personnel forms an influential group. An analysis of the socioclass structure in African society makes it possible to conclude that in Africa favorable conditions are developing for forming a broad coalition of working classes in the

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[1] See M. I. Braginskiy, "New Phenomena in the Formation of the African Proletariat," NARODI AZII I AFRIKI, No 3, 1982, pp 61-69.

struggle for progressive socioeconomic development of the liberated countries along the socialist-oriented path.

V. M. Kirko pointed out that the social structure must obviously be viewed in close relationship to the social processes which are in constant movement. N. G. Khorbenko provided information on the work methods of a group of scholars from the Africa Institute concerned with the problem of studying the social structure of African society. Since the existing statistics did not give data on the class composition of society, the researchers had to use indirect indicators characterizing the activities of various groups of the economically active population. Yu. G. Sumbatyan (MGU [Moscow State University]) emphasized that in studying social structure it is essential to bear in mind the low level of the productive forces inherent to the continent's countries and the corresponding nature of production relationships as well as the political instability. There must be concrete analysis of the position of the various strata of the intelligentsia, in particular, the military intelligentsia, which has come to political power in virtually all the states, as well as the progressive, patriotic intelligentsia which has played an important role in the fact that many states have not only gained political independence but have also set out on a socialist-oriented path.

Jody Silete-Adogli (graduate student from the Republic of Togo at the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences) described the changes which are occurring in the social structure of Togo. For determining the class affiliation of people, in his opinion, it is possible to use data on wages, although this is not the sole source of income for hired persons, in addition to data on trade unions. In the process of the social research, it is also essential to consider the presence of unemployed. Unemployment in Togo is related to a number of factors and primarily to urbanization.

A. S. Madatov (MGU) and O. Z. Mushtuk in their speeches touched on methodological problems involved in studying the African working class. A. S. Madatov did not agree with a categorical assertion that there was lacking an integrated system for studying the social structure of society in the developing countries, including on the African Continent. He also pointed out that Soviet scientific literature has worked out various methodological approaches to studying the problem, in particular, for studying the social structure of the developing countries from the viewpoint of the diversity of their societies, their socioeconomic development and so forth. The process of social differentiation have occurred differently in the various countries and has its particular features in the socialist-oriented countries. A. S. Madatov pointed to the dubiousness of putting office workers in the worker category. In the opinion of O. Z. Mushtuk, office workers are a special stratum of society which does not fit in the known criteria for determining the category of the working class. One has scarcely to establish numerical criteria in determining the presence of the working class in one or another country of the continent.

E. V. Pavlutskaya has assumed that changes in the social structure manifest themselves differently in the socialist- and capitalist-oriented countries. In the process of studying the problem, it is essential to investigate not only the horizontal but also the vertical structures of society and pay more attention to the problems of employment, migration, stratification among the

intelligentsia as well as to defining the concept of the "cadre [true] proletariat." There must be study on the questions of the formation of the stratum of skilled workers and defining the concept of the "agricultural proletariat," since in many developing countries workers from the food industry, woodworking and so forth are classified by official statistics as agricultural workers.

I. T. Katagoshchina feels that in analyzing the social structure of African society, it is essential to bear in mind the short period which has lapsed since the time Africa set out on the path of class stratification. This has caused certain specific problems, in particular, the uncertainty in defining the concept of the "African intelligentsia." I. T. Katagoshchina has proposed her own definition of this concept. Along with highly educated specialists, she also puts in the category of the intelligentsia those specialists of the middle and inferior level. For determining the structure of the intelligentsia, in her opinion, it is essential to take into account not only the income level but also the nature of their social psychology, ideology and sociopolitical role in society. In analyzing class processes it is obviously essential to study not the static position of society but rather the dominant trends in its development. V. L. Chertkov spoke about the importance of studying the intelligentsia and the socioprofessional groups such as the army and the professional political leaders. Ye. V. Morozenskaya drew attention to the substantial importance of the income indicator for determining the social groups. The peasants, craftsmen and small producers are put in the category of independent farmers and owners. Precisely these groups of small commodity producers are the social base for many classes, groups and social strata.

L. K. Tumanova pointed to the necessity of precisely determining the concept of "social stratum" and the concept of the small and middle bourgeoisie considering the specific features of Africa. For studying the social structure of a society, field research conducted in Africa by Soviet scientists can be of essential significance. E. A. Shauro voiced the opinion that the field research helps disclose and analyze, using concrete empirical material, the basic stages in the process of forming class awareness on the various levels and in various spheres (family, every-day, social, political and ideological). An analysis of the sociopsychological indicators, in the opinion of E. A. Shauro is of great importance in studying the problems of the formation of social groups and classes in modern African society.

N. D. Kosukhin summed up the meeting's results.

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FIFTH SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF MODERN ASIA

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 p 155

[Unattributed conference report]

[Text] The conference was held from 22 through 25 January 1983 in La Jolla, California, in the United States. The delegation of Soviet scientists who are specialists on international relations and internal political processes in Asia included: the Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Ye. M. Primakov (delegation leader), the Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. F. Kim (Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences), A. G. Arbatov (IMEMO [Institute for World Economics and International Relations] of the USSR Academy of Sciences), A. A. Kokoshin (U.S. and Canada Institute), V. I. Ivanov, G. F. Kunadze, V. M. Menchinov, G. D. Sukharchuk, A. I. Chicherov and G. I. Chufrin (all from the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences).

On the American side participating in the work of the conference were leading co-workers from the East Asian Research Institute of the University of California (Berkeley): Prof R. Scalapino (delegation leader), L. Rouse, L. Dittmar, C. Jackson, M. Weiner (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), R. Clough (previously with the State Department), A. Whiting (University of Chicago), G. Riggine (Columbia University), Chong-sik Li (University of Pennsylvania), G. Pauker (Rand Corporation), as well as employees from the State Department, research organizations and scientific centers in the states of California, Washington and Hawaii.

The sessions discussed the problems of international relations in Asia and the Pacific region, the state and prospects for the development of the international situation in East, Southeast, South and Southwest Asia, the problems of Soviet-American relations and the foreign policy of Japan, China, the ASEAN nations and India.

The members of the Soviet delegation visited a number of scientific centers, universities, private and public organizations concerned with the problems of studying international relations as well as major industrial and financial corporations.

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FROM NATIONAL TO SOCIAL LIBERATION

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 175-179

[Review by N. D. Kosukhin and Yu. G. Smertin of the book "Ot natsional'nogo osvobozhdeniya k sotsial'nomu. Sotsial'no-politicheskiye aspekty sovremennykh natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revolyutsiy" (From National Liberation to Social. Sociopolitical Aspects of Present-Day National Liberation Revolutions) by G. F. Kim, Moscow, Glav.red. vost. lit-ry izd-va Nauka, 1982, 296 pages]

[Text] The reviewed monograph continues research by Soviet orientalists and African scholars on the fundamental questions of the present-day national liberation movement. At the center of the author's attention is the problem of the growth of the national liberation revolutions into social-liberation ones. This process which is reflected in exacerbated social conflicts, the demarcation of opposing classes and social groups, in the intensifying confrontation of the liberated countries with imperialism and neocolonialism and, finally, in strengthening the course toward a socialist orientation, is becoming a pattern of social development in the Afro-Asian world.

The author has set a difficult task for himself, namely to examine this range of problems within a single monographic work. Let us say first of all that this attempt seems generally successful to us. G. F. Kim has succeeded in avoiding a gap between the general theoretical constructs and concrete research inherent, unfortunately, to certain works on the problem of the national liberation movement. The author examines the general traits of the revolutionary changes in the zone of the national liberation movement in their dialectical relationship to the specific socioeconomic conditions, to the political and ideological structures and the specific features of the individual regions.

The analysis of the process of the growth of the present-day national liberation revolutions into social ones in the monograph is carried out in three areas: the evolution of the socioclass structure and the exacerbation of social contradictions after the achieving of political independence; the relationship of the general national and social factors in the national liberation revolutions; social progress and the ideological struggle.

The research of G. F. Kim is based on a sound foundation of sources and the author presents various viewpoints on the studied problems, he takes issue in a number of instances with those who have proposed these and develops his own ideas.

As the events of the 1970's have shown, in the center of gravity in the national liberation revolutions shifted to the social plane and the internal socioeconomic conditions became more acute, the common traits of the national democratic revolutions became apparent in a far-from-uniform manner under the specific national conditions of the Afro-Asian countries. In this sense the viewpoint of the author of the reviewed monograph is interesting and very fruitful.

G. F. Kim gives particular attention to an analysis of Lenin's ideas and theses concerning the problems of the strategy and tactics of the national liberation revolutions in the age of imperialism and in their aggregate these ideas comprise an integrated teaching on the ways and methods for the national and social emancipation of the suppressed peoples. The author points out the influence of this on the entire course of world history.

In the reviewed monograph the problems of the deepening of the social content in the present-day national liberation revolutions is naturally examined in a unity with the problems of noncapitalist development. Many pages of the book are devoted both to the theoretical aspects of the socialist orientation as well as to the practical policies of the Afro-Asian countries following this path of development. We would note the author's conclusion that an essential feature in the development of the socialist-oriented countries at the present stage is their further rapprochement with real socialism in the sphere of economic and political relations, cultural and scientific ties and in the area of foreign policy activities. Also developing is the relatively new and important trend toward the appearance and strengthening in the foreign policy of all states of the principle of proletarian internationalism expressed, in particular, in the coordinated stance with the socialist commonwealth nations in the UN, its bodies and so forth.

Of undoubted interest is G. F. Kim's definition of the criteria for the socialist orientation. The scholar has focused his attention on those aspects which distinguish the countries of noncapitalist development from the other states which are carrying out radical socioeconomic measures. Among such criteria he mentions the conscious, theoretically based rejection of capitalism as a social system and the proclaiming of socialism as the aim of national development; the nature of the authority which is held by the coalition of the socioclass and political forces basically representing the interests of the working strata of the population; the nature and scope of socioeconomic changes carried out in the country and the conforming of the declared principles to their actual embodiment in practice (in the author's opinion, the main, objective criterion of a socialist orientation); the attitude of these countries to the socialist commonwealth and the international communist movement as a whole (pp 154-157).

These criteria are applied to a majority of the socialist-oriented countries, however their specific embodiment in the policy of these states occurs under far-from-uniform conditions and depends upon many objective and subjective factors. For this reason G. F. Kim provides his own typology for the revolutionary-democratic currents. He distinguishes between the currents oriented at a petty-bourgeois socioclass base (among these, in particular, are the ideological concepts of the Syrian Baathists), the revolutionary democratic currents of the populist type (Algeria, Tanzania, Madagascar, Burma and others)

and movements represented by vanguard parties which have proclaimed Marxism-Leninism as their ideological and theoretical basis (South Yemen, Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, the Congo and others).

A scientifically based typology for the ideological currents of modern revolutionary democracy is of great importance for analyzing the general patterns and specific features of the political processes in the socialist-oriented countries and on this level the overall concept of G. F. Kim makes a definite contribution to its elaboration. At the same time, we feel that the auther's identification of national and revolutionary democracy and the synonymization of these terms are scarcely justified. The term "national democracy" is broader than the term "revolutionary democracy" and designates a broad spectrum of political and class forces in the Afro-Asian countries, from the portion of the national bourgeoisie interested in the democratizing of social relations by the paths of capitalist development to the proletariat which alone is capable of "ultimately bringing about the democratization of the political and social system."[1] In our opinion, revolutionary democracy must be viewed as a special sort of a political coalition which includes the progressive social forces endeavoring to achieve social progress, in bypassing or interrupting the capitalist stage of development.

We would like to make another comment of a methodological sort on the question of the content of the people's democratic revolution in the Asian and African countries and on the paths of transition to socialism for these countries.

G. F. Kim rightly, in our view, defines the people's democratic revolutions as anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolutions carried out by a coalition of worker strata headed by an organization of Marxist-Leninists and in the course of which democratic changes are carried out which prepare for a purposeful transition to socialism (p 146). Along with this type of revolution, the author also points to another path of social liberation for the workers, that is, the national democratic revolution by which he understands an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution carried out "by a coalition of national democratic forces under the leadership of an organization of revolutionary democrats. In the course of this revolution's development it is possible to have the planned realization of democratic changes in all spheres of social life and the creating of conditions for a gradual transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism or interrupting its development" (p 147).

Also uncontested is the notion of the book's author that the establishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the countries developing on a national democratic basis occurs only after the growth of the national democratic revolution into a people's democratic one. G. F. Kim puts Vietnam and Laos among the countries where the revolutionary process assumed a people's democratic nature even during the period of the struggle for independence. In other countries this occurred after the winning of national independence (North Korea and Cuba). At the same time, there is a group of states (South Yemen, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, Benin and Ethiopia) "which have started

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[1] V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 2, p 455.

off on the people's democratic path of development as a result of the growth of the national democratic revolution into a people's democratic one" (p 146).

The author's position is that such revolutions can occur only in the modern age, the age of mankind's transition to socialism. But this possibility is realized only in those countries where the appropriate objective and subjective factors have formed and where the organizations of Marxist-Leninists have matured for providing effective leadership over the struggle of the broad masses of people against the imperialists, feudal lords, reactionary circles of the local bourgeoisie and tribal aristocracy and for achieving and strengthening national independence, for social liberation and progress along the paths of socialism. Precisely effective leadership over the process by the organization of Marxist-Leninists, the higher form of which is a communist party, ensures its stability, consistency and results.

However, it is recognized that a socialist revolution or--in other terms--a social revolution of the proletariat, is a most profound change and a fundamental qualitative transformation. The transition to the socialist stage depends not only (and not so much) upon the choice of a scientific ideology but rather on the political maturity of the progressive classes and to what degree they are aware of their class interests. The author calls the degree of maturity of the basic driving forces of the revolution as one of the distinguishing features of the national democratic revolution from the people's democratic one (p 148). But scarcely anyone would dispute the quite obvious fact that the basic revolutionary classes--the working class, the semi-proletarian strata and the peasantry--in Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, Benin and other countries have still not reached that level of political development which would allow one to conclude their conscious and purposeful involvement in socialist construction.

As historical experience shows, the choice of socialism as a development goal and scientific socialism as a development ideology still does not mean a socialist revolution and is not even a guarantee for eliminating the political and economic influence of the conservative and exploiting classes. K. Marx pointed out that "society, even if it has fallen on the track of the natural law of its development...is unable either to skip over the natural phases of development or replace the latter with decrees. But it can shorten and mitigate the birth pangs."[2] In our opinion, the people's democratic revolution is such a "natural phase" which precedes the socialist stage in the liberated countries. In the course of this revolution, under the leadership of the party holding Marxist-Leninist positions, radical political, socioeconomic and ideological changes of a general democratic sort are carried out and these should provide the best conditions for the subsequent transition to socialism. Obviously this very important theoretical and methodological question requires further elaboration.

In noting the definite accomplishments of the socialist orientation in Africa and Asia, G. F. Kim describes the development difficulties and contradictions of the progressive countries related primarily to their incorporation in the world

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2 K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 23, p 10.

capitalist market, to the low development level of the productive forces, the underdevelopment of the socioclass structure, the low level of mass awareness and sometimes to the insufficient consistency of the anticapitalist changes. For this reason, of primary importance for these countries is the elaboration of a scientifically sound development strategy, the choice of optimum forms and methods for carrying out the changes, the seeking out of the necessary resources, ensuring the support for the revolutionary democratic measures by the masses of people and drawing closer to all the progressive forces of our world (pp 166, 177). The absence of such a strategy combined with other unfavorable external and internal factors has led, as is known, in a number of states to a departure from a course of progressive changes. The author has analyzed certain aspects of this problem and in particular the reasons for the departure from the course of a socialist orientation.

Of interest is the positing by G. F. Kim of the problem of the interaction of the leadership and the masses and the combining of the revolution and democracy in the socialist-oriented states. The mistakes and oversights of a subjective sort have already been extensively dealt with both in Soviet literature and by the revolutionary democrats themselves. G. F. Kim has also brought out objective reasons for the "gap" between the revolutionary-democratic authorities and the broad masses. This is explained by the presence of an external imperialist threat which impels the revolutionary democrats to have a strong centralization of power, by the underdevelopment of the political awareness of the masses themselves, by their lack of the necessary democratic skills and by the shortage of skilled, ideologically committed administrative personnel. The main role in resolving these contradictions should be played by the vanguard worker parties which must become an effective instrument for organizing the masses (p 172). One form for such an organization is the national-patriotic front which has been established in certain countries and includes representatives of all the anti-imperialist, patriotic forces (p 175).

A special section of the reviewed monograph is devoted to the present-day trends of the ideological struggle in the liberated countries. In analyzing the role of traditions in the development of the Afro-Asian countries and the acute struggle which is being waged in the zone of the national liberation movement on the question of how the cultural heritage of these countries should be used, G. F. Kim criticizes the bourgeois and national concepts of the hypertrophied cultural uniqueness of Africa and Asia. Socialist ideology in no way negates the enormous role of the traditional cultural heritage but for it, as the author rightly points out, the assessment of traditions depends upon to what degree they contribute to the activating of society's progressive forces in the process of its revolutionary transformation.

Of significant interest is the picture provided by the author of the evolution of the basic ideological currents and doctrines--from the revolutionary-democratic to the bourgeois-nationalistic--in the 1970's. G. F. Kim gives particular attention to the revolutionary democratic teachings. In noting the growing influence of Marxism-Leninism on them, he rightly points out that many revolutionary democrats still have a good distance to go from assimilating individual slogans and principles from the ideology of scientific socialim to a perception of all aspects of these teachings including philosophy, political economy and scientific communism (p 202). Let us add that in this instance they cease being revolutionary democrats and become Marxist-Leninists.

Important is the author's conclusion that under the growing influence of world socialism and the world revolutionary process as a whole, the social aspects are becoming predominant *in all* (emphasis ours.--N. K., Yu. G.) ideological areas of the developing countries (p 212).

We would particularly like to mention the attempt made by G. F. Kim to trace the prospects in the struggle of the developing countries for social progress in the 1980's. Unfortunately, in the monographic research on the problems of the developing countries there have still been few attempts to theoretically model the future internal and external political processes although the scientific and practical need for such forecasts is obvious. The prospects forecast by G. F. Kim for the struggle to carry out the social goals of the national liberation movement and the ideological-political struggle in the 1980's are in no way simple suppositions but rather conclusions drawn on the basis of the achievements of Soviet oriental studies in the area of investigating the problems of the national liberation movement and the author's analysis of the processes in the Afro-Asian countries. In the opinion of G. F. Kim, the 1980's will be marked by a further advance against the positions of the imperialist monopolies in the Asian and African countries, by the carrying out of significant democratic changes, by the increased differentiation of the liberated countries from the standpoint of the growth rates and development level of the economy, by intensified social polarization, by a further increased role of the state in socioeconomic development and so forth (pp 271-273).

Of fundamental importance is the author's conclusion that on the basis of the most profound antagonistic social conflict between the national democratic forces and imperialism, the social base and the framework of the mass anti-imperialist movements will be deepened and broadened and this will contribute to an even closer combination of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, anti-capitalist, democratic--and in the longer run--also the socialist trends in the social revolutions in the Afro-Asian countries (p 276).

We have taken up only certain problems raised in the reviewed monograph. As a whole it must be pointed out that the new book by G. F. Kim not only generalizes the author's previous research but also sets out guidelines for further studying the development problems of the liberated Asian and African countries. By doing so the author makes a significant contribution to the further elaboration of the Marxist-Leninist concept of national liberation revolutions.

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FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AFRICAN NATIONS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 179-183

[Review by G. A. Nersesov (posthumous) of the book "Vneshnyaya politika stran Afriki" (Foreign Policy of the African Countries), edited by An. A. Gromyko, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1981, 333 pages]

[Text] A group of scientific institutes from the socialist commonwealth countries has initiated the joint publishing of a series of studies on the "Foreign Policy of the Developing Countries." This series includes, in particular, the reviewed book the writing of which involved scientific co-workers from the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Polish Institute of International Questions, the East German Institute of International Relations and the Czechoslovak Institute for Oriental Studies.

The developing countries, including the African nations, have become a major international force and their role is constantly growing in world policy. Primarily this determines the importance of research on the foreign policy principles and activities of the African states. Such research assumes particular importance in the event that attention in it is focused on the theoretical aspects of the problem. The creators of the collective monograph have set such a task for themselves. The Introduction states that the author collective has endeavored to review the basic trends, objective patterns and particular features in the development of international relations among the nations of the African Continent.

In analyzing the various spheres of foreign policy activities by the African states, the authors have isolated a number of main areas: inter-African relations (on the continental-wide, regional and bilateral levels); relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, with the United States, the former metropolitan countries and the remaining nations of the West and with the developing Asian and Latin American countries; finally the positions of the African countries vis-a-vis the major international problems of the modern world.

The book commences with an analysis of the general aspects of the studied question. These are the basic principles and factors in the foreign policy of the independent African countries (Chapter 1); the role of diplomacy as a most important means in the foreign policy of the African states (Chapter 2).

On the methodological level, the authors have been guided by the Marxist-Leninist concept of the social causality of foreign policy and in their analysis have clearly distinguished two groups of African states. In the first they have put those countries which have tended to draw closer to the former metropolitan areas and with other developed capitalist states. The second group is made up of the socialist-oriented countries where power has passed to the working classes and social strata. As a result, the book points out, "the capitalist powers have lost the opportunity of controlling the development of domestic and foreign policy of these countries" (p 24). Characteristic of the socialist-oriented countries is a course of ever-broader development of ties and collaboration with the socialist commonwealth.

However, regardless of differences in the social nature of foreign policy among the various African states, inherent to their international activities is a number of common traits which are of a fundamental nature. This is due to the circumstance that the African countries gained independence as a result of the national liberation revolution which developed in a situation of conflict between the two opposing systems on the world scene. The authors have isolated three general main principles in the foreign policy of the African states and these they have termed "the general achieving of the African liberation revolutions" (p 27), that is, anticolonialism, African unity and non-alignment.

Closely tied to the question of the foreign policy principles of the African countries is the problem of nationalism with its role in the formation of the foreign policies of the individual countries and their groups. The authors have approached the study of this problem dialectically, in tracing the interrelated dynamics of nationalism and foreign policy. Generally speaking it is a question of the opposition of Pan-African and local nationalism. The former, being oriented at a strengthening of political liberation, has aided, as the monograph points out, in uniting the young states on the basis of the principles of anticolonialism, unity and non-alignment. The ideological and political arguments of Pan-African nationalism lay at the basis of the OAU Charter and played an important role in the forming of such progressive foreign policy concepts as the abandoning of territorial claims against neighbors, a policy of a peaceful settlement of inter-African conflicts and the providing of aid to the fighters for national liberation in the countries continuing under colonial and racist suppression.

A different assessment is given to local nationalism which opposes the continental-wide goals, isolates the African countries and thereby weakens their positions in the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. The book emphasizes that although in a number of instances aspects of an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, anti-racist, that is, general democratic, program are present in local nationalism, its negative aspects are still prevailing.

Of interest are the views of the authors on the diplomacy of the African states. The very use of the term "African diplomacy" is based, and completely rightly in our view, on the fact that this concept expresses a new quality of diplomatic activities, the collective actions of the OAU countries for carrying out a number of general foreign policy tasks. Certainly this does not mean, the book states, that some "diplomatic monolith" has been formed in Africa. An analysis of the positions taken by the continent's countries on specific international questions shows that often serious differences have arisen between

them, leading to a dividing into groupings, each of which carries out its own diplomatic line.

In line with the problem of the collective nature of African diplomacy, the book examines the role of the OAU in international relations and the stances of the African countries in the UN. Particular attention has been given to the questions of African unity. It is emphasized that with all the difficulties which confront this movement, it is a historically determined process, it is an expression of objective necessity and for this reason has a future. At the same time the caution made by the authors on the danger of the opposing of Africa's interests to the interests of the other anti-imperialist forces, in particular the socialist countries, is completely valid. The governments of many African countries, the book states, "are aware of this and are struggling to further strengthen anti-imperialist soldarity of African diplomacy with the diplomacy of the socialist countries" (p 59).

Relations between the African states and the socialist commonwealth countries are the subject of research in the third chapter. Of fundamentally important significance in analyzing this problem is a consideration of the historical fact that the socialist countries maintain in our world a new type of international relations and consistent internationalism is inherent to their foreign policy course. This internationalism inseparably combines the principles of defending international peace and providing international support for the peoples struggling against imperialism. This creates a basis for collaboration of the African states with the USSR and the other socialist commonwealth countries which are, in the expression of the ZambianPresident K. Kaunda quoted in the book, "the traditional allies of the fighters for freedom" (p 74).

The profoundly progressive nature of the political, economic and cultural ties of the African countries with the socialist nations is shown by the authors in analyzing such an important question as support by the socialist commonwealth for Africa's struggle to overcome the backwardness inherited from the colonial past. Proper attention has been given to the collaboration of both groups of states in the UN and other international organizations. A separate section is devoted to the political relations of the socialist-oriented African countries with the socialist nations. It is rightly emphasized that one of the main particular features in the relations between them is in the common interests in the struggle for social progress.

Along with this the book points out that the relations between the African and socialist countries have not always developed without interference and complications, since reactionary social circles play a significant role in the social life of a number of African states. But as a whole this cooperation "has developed along an ascending line" (p 78).

The fourth chapter takes up inter-African relations and in the development of these one can trace two opposing processes: the process of consolidation, a movement toward unity on a continental-wide scale as embodied in the OAU, and the process of the socioeconomic polarization of the African states expressed, in particular, in the creation of various groupings and alliances. The consolidation process is particularly tangible in the joint struggle of the African states to eliminate the colonial-racist regimes on the continent, for equal

rights on the world scene and against imperialist aggressive policy. At the same time, there is a tendency which has grown stronger as a result of the intervention of the imperialists in African affairs toward imposing bilateral military treaties on the continent's countries and for forming military-political groupings which are under the influence of the imperialist powers. The book points out that the progressive African forces are working actively against this tendency, seeking to strengthen African unity on an anti-imperialist basis.

In the monograph a significant place has been given over to examining the economic aspects of inter-African relations, that is, to the problem of economic integration among the African countries within the limits of the individual subregions and the entire continent. An undoubtedly pertinent question has been put in a separate section, that is, the relations of the states of Tropical Africa with the Arab states. The authors point out that as the conflict in the Near East has developed, an ever-larger number of African countries and the OAU as a whole have begun to come to the defense of the legitimate demands of the Arab countries, against Israeli aggression and the Camp David conspiracy under U.S. auspices. There is also a tendency for the development of economic and technical Afro-Arab cooperation. However, there is the rather acute question raised by the African states of oil deliveries to them by the OPEC countries under preferential conditions and of gratis compensation for the losses from oil overpayments by the African countries. In this regard, the book points out that the Arab nations prefer to carry out a compensation policy by granting credits and loans, aid in the financing of development projects and so forth. As a whole, the rapprochement between the Tropical African countries and the Arab states has been described as a process having an objectively anti-imperialist nature.

A special chapter in the book is devoted to the struggle of the independent African nations for the liberation of the South of the continent from colonial and racist suppression. There is a thorough examination of the role of the OAU in this struggle and the importance of the diplomatic, moral-political and material support which the sovereign African states provide for the struggling peoples of South Africa. The questions of the elimination of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa, the winning of independence by the Zimbabwe people and the struggle for freedom in South Africa and Namibia have been examined from this viewpoint. It is also pointed out that success in this struggle has been helped by the all-round support which the USSR and the other socialist countries have provided to struggling Africa.

The relations of the African states with the developed capitalist nations are the subject of research in the sixth chapter. "In this area," it is stated here, "the main task in the foreign policy activities of the independent nations is the struggle for equality and against neocolonialism in all its forms and manifestations" (p 156). This problem is examined by a concrete analysis of the relations of the African states with the leading imperialist powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Japan as well as with the small Western European nations and the EEC. The factual material given in the chapter shows that, regardless of the growing neocolonial expansion of the imperialist powers, primarily the United States, the progressive African forces are fully determined to achieve the final liberation of their

countries from all forms of foreign dependence and exploitation by monopolistic capital.

In Chapter 8 "Relations of the Independent African Countries with the Developing Asian and Latin American States" takes up the problems of economic collaboration among the countries of the three regions and the involvement of Africa in their common struggle for economic independence. One of the central questions in this chapter is that of the role of the African states in the non-alignment movement in which they are not only the most numerous but also a very organized and dynamic grouping. The book analyzes the factors due to which Africa, in the author's definition, "has become a powerful catalyst in strengthening the authority of the non-alignment movement and its anti-imperialist content" (p 242). Among these factors are the existence and activities of the OAU, the scope of the national liberation revolution on the continent with the rapid pace of its decolonialization in the 1960's and 1970's, and the broad spread here of socialist ideas manifested, in particular, in the creation of a large group of socialist-oriented states.

Another chapter in the book describes the positions of the African states on basic international problems such as the process of a lessening of international tension, the problem of international security, the struggle for disarmament and so forth. The approach of the African states to these problems is inseparably linked, as is rightly pointed out in the book, with the historical task confronting them of surmounting their backwardness and the need to carry this out has caused a vital demand to support universal peace. There is no doubt that the struggle for peace and international security helps to strengthen the political independence of the African countries, it limits the opportunities of the domestic reaction which has wagered on the military support of imperialism and makes it possible for the young states to more successfully oppose the imperialist plans to turn Africa into a military-strategic staging area. One of the main areas of strengthening peace is the struggle for disarmament. This is closely tied to the problem of strengthening the development rate of the liberated nations. The abandoning of the arms race would make it possible for the African countries to curtail military expenditures which are becoming evermore burdensome for them and at the same time would create new opportunities to provide economic aid to Africa.

The book also sets out one other very important aspect for Africa in the struggle for peace, namely, that under the conditions of the detente process it is becoming harder for imperialism to support the national-racist regime in South Africa the existence of which serves as a constant source of international tension. In this context it is pointed out that the struggle against colonialism and apartheid is the contribution of the African states to the cause of strengthening peace throughout the world. The pages of the book take up the struggle of the peace-loving forces in Africa to eliminate foreign military bases on the continent, to remove the centers of military conflicts on African land, to create a nuclear-free zone in Africa, to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and to create a zone of peace in the Mediterranean.

The Conclusion sums up the research and draws the conclusion that, regardless of the opposition from imperialism and the forces of internal reaction, the

anti-imperialist trend in the foreign policy of the African states will generally grow stronger. The authors base their forecast on the fact that "the struggle for national liberation on the continent inevitably is growing into a struggle against exploiting relations and for social liberation" (pp 314-315).

We feel that the reviewed book marks a step ahead in working out the questions of international relations among the African nations. The book excels in a profound penetration into the problems and difficulties confronting the African nations in carrying out their most important foreign policy tasks. One other noteworthy feature of the research conducted by the scholars from the socialist nations is the desire permeating the entire book to help in strengthening mutual understanding between the African peoples and the socialist commonwealth states.

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PAKISTAN: STATE FINANCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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[Review by A. Ye. Granovskiy of the book "Pakistan: gosudarstvennyye finansy i ekonomicheskoye razvitiye" (Pakistan: State Finances and Economic Development) by S. N. Kamanev, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va Nauka, 1982, 223 pages.]

[Text] In recent years the Soviet Union has published a series of studies devoted to the state finances of the individual developing Asian nations.[1] Among these publications also stands the reviewed monograph which, in our view, evidences a new stage in the study of financial problems and of their organic linking to the general reproduction problems. Both the indisputed merits of the monograph as well as its shortcomings lead to an answer to the question of the degree of priority in studying state finances of the developing countries. This question has recently become a subject of debate at the Institute for Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Among the merits of the work by S. N. Kamanev are primarily the systematic approach to an analysis of state income and expenditures and a detailed investigation of the intercausality of the various budgetary items and the relationship of each of these items to the movement of real social product. The employment of a standardized system of budgetary accounts the dynamics of which is examined over three decades makes it possible to gain an integrated notion of the development of the entire state finances mechanism. Such an approach, on the one hand, provides, in a majority of instances, the high reliability of the conclusions, providing the reader with an opportunity to recheck them, and on the other, opens up broad possibilities for international comparisons. We are convinced that the author has handled the difficulties of comparing the

[1] See: U. Z. Sharipov, "Byudzhet i byudzhetnaya sistema Irana" [The Budget and Budgetary System of Iran], Moscow, 1976; V. A. Grantskiy, "Filippiny: gosudarstvennyye finansy i ekonomicheskoye razvitiye" [The Philippines: State Finances and Economic Development], Moscow, 1979; Ye. I. Urazova, "Nalogi i ekonomicheskiy rost razvivayushchikhsya stran (na primere stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka)" [Taxes and Economic Growth of Developing Nations (From the Example of Near and Middle Eastern Countries)], Moscow, 1981.

federal finances of Pakistan before and after 1971. Also very successful is the method employed in the monograph of comparing the most important structural parameters of the financial system in Pakistan and in the other developing Asian countries.

The intelligibility and the clarity of the monograph's basic conclusions which have been well systematized in the conclusion to it free the reviewer from any need to retell and interpret them and make it possible to concentrate on the questions the posing and solving of which in the monograph merit, in our view, the reader's particular attention. This applies primarily to Chapter I "The Financial Base" which goes far beyond the ordinary introductory comments on the financial base prescribed for any research on state finances and containing a very interesting analysis of shifts in the sectorial structure of social product and in the distribution of end personal income. This analysis greatly develops the ideas put forward in the author's previous monograph.[2] One must particularly note the critical examination of data on the concentration of personal income (pp 28-49). The sole comment on this chapter comes down to the fact that the author somewhat primitively has accepted the well known thesis on the determining of the distribution structure of social product by the structure of its production (p 28). A consideration of the dialectical relationship between these two phases of reproduction, in particular, the influence of the composition of aggregate demand on the sectorial production structure, would make it possible to more convincingly explain the shifts in this structure, particularly in the 1970's.

In Chapter II "Organized State Income," of greatest interest is the analysis of the following problems: the dynamics of export and import customs receipts related to shifts in the foreign exchange and financial situation of Pakistan, the rise and fall of internal intersectorial disproportions and changes in the industrialization strategy (pp 61-68); the ratio of customs duties and internal excise taxes (pp 65, 76-77); the role of excise taxation as an instrument for settling competition between large- and small-scale production (pp 71-72); the relationship between customs and excise taxation, on the one hand, and the so-called sales tax, on the other (pp 79-82). These questions have been studied from the standpoint of the acute contradictions between the state's fiscal interests and its tasks of stimulating economic growth. Very indicative is the fundamental discrepancy disclosed by the author between the change in the rates of the various indirect taxes and the dynamics of receipts from these taxes. In the sections devoted to direct taxation, special attention should be given to the review of the mechanism of investment and other benefits for personal and corporate income taxes (pp 86-93), the struggle between the rural upper clique of landowners and rich peasants and the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie over the question of the taxing of agricultural income (pp 96-100) and the problem of the so-called Islamic taxes of the zakiat and ushr (pp 100-104).

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[2] S. N. Kamenev, "Ekonomicheskiy rost Pakistana. Analiz obshchestvennogo produkta" [Economic Growth of Pakistan. An Analysis of Social Product], Moscow, 1977.

In Chapter III "Extraordinary State Income," the author, in our view, has succeeded fully in analyzing the ratio of external and internal sources of borrowed money (pp 117-122), the shifts in the structure of the internal sources, in particular, the replacing of the long-term bonds by small savings and reserve funds (pp 123-125), changes in the relationship of deficit financing and inflation as well as the role of compensatory factors in this relationship (pp 127-130). At the same time, the rather detailed description of foreign aid (pp 131-144), while very interesting by itself, somewhat disrupts the overall plan of research. While the dynamics of the other types of budget income is viewed in relation to the reproduction process, in examining foreign aid the author departs from this principle and restricts himself to describing the particular features of foreign credits and subsidies as an element of foreign economic ties, without considering their impact on the nation's economy.

In Chapter IV "State Expenditures," one must point to the section devoted to expenditures on economic development (pp 150-178) and this is probably the best in the book. Here the author goes beyond the narrow confines of analyzing the budget accounts and provides an informative essay on the development of the sectorial development strategy of Pakistan over the years of independence, pointing out how various shifts in the strategy have influenced the structure of state allocatations for the economy. An indisputable accomplishment of this essay is the fact that S. N. Kamenev has not limited himself to analyzing the aggregated sectorial groupings usually given in the budget, but has been able to show how the use of funds within each sector has changed and what technical, economic and socioeconomic shifts within the sectors have been encouraged by state capital investments. An achievement of the author has also been the study of the relationships between shifts in the structure of state allocations and in the investment structure of the state sector, the organizational forms of its activities and an analysis of the relationship between budgetary and nonbudgetary methods of financing the state sector. We would merely like to point to one important circumstance which, unfortunately, has not been commented on by the author. The maximum growth rates of agriculture in Pakistan were reached in the second half of the 1960's, when the proportional amount of this sector in state allocations had declined significantly (from 17 to 11 percent) and in addition the absolute amounts of the allocations had been reduced (p 155).

The analysis undertaken in the monograph of the structure and dynamics of state finances provides, in our view, solid grounds for the following thesis proposed by the author: "The contradiction between the income structure which is a consequence of the socioeconomic backwardness of the nation and the comparatively modern nature of the budget's expenditure portion is a reflection in the sphere of state finances of the transitional nature of the country's socioeconomic structure" (p 4).

As was already pointed out, the monograph by S. N. Kamenev has been written on the borderline of financial science and the theory of social reproduction. This circumstance, in helping to increase the informativeness of the research, at the same time has created additional difficulties on the author's path. The system of categories in the science dealing with finances developed at a time when the tasks of this science differed qualitatively from its present-day tasks and came down to best meeting the interests of the state treasury. For this reason the undifferentiated application of this system of categories to

present-day conditions in the developing countries at times sooner obscures rather than clarifies the real situation. For example, let us take the concept of extraordinary income adopted in Soviet economic literature and employed by S. N. Kamenev. During the period of the birth of capitalist relations, internal and external loans actually had an extraordinary nature, however in modern Pakistan they are completely normal and often the chief means for mobilizing internal and external accumulation for the needs of economic development. Obviously the author himself understands the imperfectness of the terminology employed by him in this instance, when he describes loans as "additional sources of income which in financial literature have come to be called extraordinary" (p 115).

The following of an imperfect system of financial categories forces the author to define the budget deficit as "the difference between the total amount of state expenditures (including expenditures under the current budget and the capital investment budget.--A. G.) and ordinary income" (p 115). Thus, all the state's efforts to mobilize borrowed internal and external resources are viewed by N. S. Kamenev as forms of budget deficit financing (pp 115-145), while this very deficit comprises from 30 to 50 percent of the total state expenditures (p 116). We feel that such a posing of the question is not completely correct. As was already pointed out, the state's credit mobilizing of individual savings and external financial resources is the most important task of state finances. In the system of categories employed in the monograph, the increase in the budget deficit turns out to be one of the state's main tasks and this makes the very concept of a deficit devoid of sense. In the generally accepted understanding "budget deficit financing" and "deficit financing" are synonyms, however the author puts these concepts into opposition. At the same time that he, as has already been pointed out, understands the entire total of borrowed or "extraordinary resources" as "budget deficit financing" (pp 117-122), "deficit financing" encompasses only an insignificant share of these resources, namely the "loans of the bank of emission granted against treasury notes from surplus paper money emission" (p 126). The last definition basically conforms to that understanding of the budget deficit which has developed in modern economic literature.

In examining the particular features of deficit financing in Pakistan per se (pp 126-130), the influence of traditional, namely monetarist, notions is felt in two regards. On the one hand, the emission of paper money is viewed as an exogenous cause of inflation, although on p 130 the author stipulates that "of course, one must not see the cause of increased prices exclusively in the surplus emission of money." The modern theory of inflation, deficit financing and the emission of paper money can serve both as the cause and as the effect of increased prices. However, this latter, structuralist aspect of inflation (in contrast to its monetarist aspect) is not examined in the work. On the other hand, the author limits himself to a narrow, monetarist definition of deficit financing, excluding from it the pure credit from commercial banks to the state. In order to justify such an approach, it is essential to show that the investments by commercial banks into state securities do not lead to a deterioration of bank liquidity, that is, that there is merely a redistribution of credit from private lenders to the state and not an increase in the total amount of bank credit. In the opinion of Yu. M. Osipov who has made a detailed investigation of this question, "the classifying of the credits provided by

commercial banks to the state in the category of deficit financing does not cause any dispute."[3]

The author points out that indirect taxes "cover chiefly consumer goods and hence these taxes are basically taxes on the poor" (p 60). Unfortunately, this important thesis is proven only by references to the situation in prerevolutionary Russia and not by an investigation of the question of who actually pays indirect taxes in Pakistan. Our calculations for neighboring India show that the poorest half of the population pays one-quarter of the excise taxes and this is clearly insufficient for asserting that these taxes are basically taxes on the poor. It would be more correct to say that indirect taxes are less progressive than direct ones (at least without considering the shifting of the tax burden).

Finally, one other comment concerning the interpretation of the relationship of taxes and inflation with the size of the market. "Inflation, with increased taxes being a cause of this," writes S. N. Kamenev, "told negatively on the solvent demand of the population, exacerbating the narrowness of the nation's domestic market" (pp 73-74). The reason for this erroneous, in our view, conclusion is, on the one hand, the confusing of the consumer demand of broad strata of the population and aggregate demand, and on the other, the aggregate demand and demand for an individual good. Both inflation and increased taxes reduce the purchasing power of the mass of the population, but this is achieved not by reducing the total volume of the market but rather by redistributing purchasing power in favor of the entrepreneurs and the state which employs tax receipts and deficit financing for increasing state expenditures. For an individual capitalist, an increase in the excise taxes for his products means increased demand for them, but for the entire class of capitalists there is merely a redistribution of the market's commodity structure (if only the state does not put the money collected in the form of taxes "in the stocking"). The influence of inflation and indirect taxes on the overall size of the market, in the first place, by the change in the net cash remains among the population as a result of the increased prices and, secondly, by the ratio of intensity of ties between the sectors satisfying the consumer demand of the poor masses and the consumer demand of the well-off strata and the state. If the former aspect is little felt in the developing countries (since a significant share of the hoarding of money occurs in the precapitalist groups), the second aspect encourages, as a rule, a growth of the market, since the intersectorial multiplier of elite and state consumption is usually higher than the consumption multiplier of the poorest strata.

As a whole, the monograph of N. S. Kamenev is a very valuable study the importance of which goes far beyond the limits of studying the economy of just Pakistan. We feel that the author's approach to the designated question is the most promising area of research on the state finances of the developing countries, namely an analysis of the reproduction functions of these finances.

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[3] Yu. M. Osipov, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: finansirovaniye ekonomiki i inflyatsiya" [The Developing Nations: Economic Financing and Inflation], Moscow, 1978, p 21.

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